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CHARACTERISTICS 



THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON 



LONDON : 

Printed b}' G. Barclay, Castle St. Leicester Sq. 



CHARACTERISTICS 

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OF 



THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON 



APART FROM 



HIS MILITARY TALENTS. 



BY 



THE EARL DE GREY, KG. 

4 



SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED. 



LONDON: 
THOMAS BOS WORTH, 215 REGENT STREET. 

MDCCCLUJ. 



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INTRODUCTION. 



It may be thought, and not unreasonably, that another 
work relating to the illustrious Duke of Wellington is 
unnecessary ; more especially from one who had no pro- 
fessional or private connexion with him ; because all the 
events of his public career, and, indeed, most things 
connected with his private life, have been already col- 
lected and laid before the world. 

The press has teemed with his Memoirs in every 
guise and in every form, and they have been published 
at a cost calculated to bring them within the reach of 
almost the poorest reader ; and if the following sheets 
professed to be merely a general memoir of his military 
and political life, or a series of anecdotes, however inte- 
resting and well-authenticated, they would, indeed, be 
superfluous. 

His voluminous Dispatches embrace so wide a field, 
and extend over so many years, recording events or 
opinions in chronological order as they arose, upon such 
a diversity of subjects, that it is difficult to fix the atten- 
tion upon every one. 

A general impression of the talent and assiduity 
possessed by him who wrote them, must strike the most 
casual observer: but it requires time and observation, 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

which may not always be at command, to separate the 
objects, and to understand clearly the fall extent of each. 

It has appeared to the writer, therefore, that it would 
be an act of justice to the memory of that great man, and 
might be of service to his surviving fellow-countrymen, 
to put together in a more condensed form some obser- 
vations upon his private feelings and principles, as forming 
a beautiful and touching part of his character, apart from 
his public and professional position, which is already 
before the world. 

The Duke was a soldier, and every act of the greater 
part of his life, and every letter in the Dispatches, were 
in reference to his profession. But this is not a military 
work. We do not profess to give a memoir of his cam- 
paigns, nor do we presume even to detail any of his 
military measures, or to comment upon any of his pro- 
fessional proceedings. 

His " Military Talents" we believe, would not have 
shone with so much lustre, if they had not been accom- 
panied by some of the " Characteristics " which it is our 
object to illustrate. Many of them are intimately con- 
nected with his profession, and all were conducive to his 
military renown ; but they are essentially separate, and 
no doubt a man might be a great soldier without being 
so eminently gifted with them. Believing, however, that 
we observe them very strongly marked in him, our object 
is to point them out " apart from Ms military talents" 

They are qualities of mind which would have done 
equal credit to his head or to his heart, if he had been 
subjected to the same contingencies in any other branch 
of the service of his country. 

It may be fairly said, that no man's character was 
ever subjected to so severe an ordeal during his life as 
the Duke of Wellington's. 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

The actions of many former great men have been 
published during their lives ; but it has been left to after 
ages and subsequent elucidations to explain the motives 
which led to them. Many a hero has received the 
plaudits of his contemporaries, whose glory was perhaps 
accidental, or whose success arose from unforeseen and 
fortuitous circumstances, which were untold at the time, 
and the concealment of which might have been dictated 
by sound and honest policy. 

But here every deed, and the ground upon which it 
was founded, are shown at the same time. 

Nothing but the most entire confidence in the honesty 
and integrity of every public act of his life, could ever have 
made a man consent to the exposition and publication of 
all his motives, feelings, views, and wishes, which are 
laid open in the wonderful collection of these Dispatches. 
He had that confidence. He knew that not one word 
would be found in them of which he need to feel ashamed ; 
and from them alone, sanctioned as they have been by 
his own supervision, every argument and every deduc- 
tion in the following pages will be drawn. 

Where, indeed, could more unquestionable documents 
be adduced, upon which a subsequent judgment of the 
human mind could be formed? Written without pre- 
paration, under circumstances frequently of the most 
trying nature, upon every diversity of subject, and to 
every variety of correspondents, without, at the time, the 
most remote probability that any but the avowed " Official 
Dispatches" would meet the public eye, — if ever there 
were undeniable proofs of the real mind of the writer, 
here they are ! 

We lay claim to no attempt at novelty. Every 
sentence which is quoted has been before the public, and 
well known for years : many of them have been printed 



INTRODUCTION. 



and reprinted, till the world knows them by heart : but 
our object has merely been to collate them, so as to afford 
the reader a more defined view of the point to which they 
have reference. 



Brought forward in early life into a position of emi- 
nence, and invested with an extent of authority during 
all his Indian campaigns which would have been apt to 
turn the head of most men, he seems, as we find by all 
his correspondence of that period, to have shown the 
same equanimity, the same patience under disappoint- 
ment, and the same forbearance towards those whose 
faults or failings had a tendency to thwart his own more 
enlarged and energetic views, which we find him to 
preserve to the end of his glorious career. 

It was, in fact, a remarkable feature in his remarkable 
life. Gifted by nature, as he seems to have been, beyond 
the ordinary run of mankind, with forethought, and a 
power of looking, not merely at the events passing under 
his eyes at the moment, but at almost every possible 
contingency which might befall him, he never seems 
to testify impatience at finding that others were not 
equally apt and ready ; or, at least, he never suffered 
his consciousness of it to affect his conduct towards 
them. 

Another striking feature was his remarkable placa- 
bility. Those who saw him only at a distance, deemed 
him cold and austere. He has been called the " Iron 
Duke," whom nothing could move ; and it was said that, 
though he acquired the esteem and respect of all, he gained 
the affection of few. To a certain extent, as regards the 
world at large, this might be true. He was, no doubt, 
too cautious a man to lay himself open in ordinary con- 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

versation to every one who might wish to engage his 
attention, and afterwards to boast that he had been "in 
the confidence of the Duke;" and his habit of forming 
his own opinions, and acting upon them, without con- 
sulting others in the early stages, or divulging his inten- 
tions in the more advanced parts of his undertakings, no 
doubt gave an idea to casual observers that it was not in 
his nature to have friendly and confidential intercourse 
with any one. 

It is true, therefore, that he had few intimates, but 
all who did enjoy that happiness entertained the warmest 
feelings of affection and regard towards him. 

He was, no doubt, stern and inflexible in the per- 
formance of his own duty, and in exacting from others 
the due performance of what belonged to them. Unfor- 
tunately, he often had too much cause for apparent 
severity. The British army had never been assembled 
in such numbers, and, in fact, had never seen service 
upon such a scale ; and no doubt there were many 
individuals of all ranks utterly unfit for the duties now 
imposed upon them. Numberless instances may be 
selected in the pages of his correspondence, of conduct 
which, in any other military nation, would have been 
followed by severe punishment, or instant expulsion 
from the service, which he, in the kindest and most 
forbearing manner, notices with merely expressing a 
hope that the honour, the good sense (?), and the gentle- 
manly feelings of the delinquent will prevent a repeti- 
tion ! In his confirmation of the sentences of courts- 
martial, or in his comments upon the proceedings 
of the court, and in his answers to letters (which we 
do not see, but the nature of which we may fairly con- 
jecture from the tone of his reply), his language is 
always firm and unyielding ; but we find many in 



6 INTRODUCTION. 

which, though his sense of duty compels him to give a 
reprimand, or to convey an unpleasant communication, 
it is obvious that he does it with reluctance, and with 
an anxious wish to hurt t\\Q private feelings of the person 
as little as possible. And it is a well-known fact, that 
when the Dispatches were in course of compilation, he 
never would allow a name to be recorded (even of private 
soldiers) when it was connected with any misconduct ; 
because, although the person alluded to might have been 
dead, surviving relations might be wounded or distressed. 
The caution and apparent coldness to which allusion 
has already been made, was an essential part of his cha- 
racter ; and, perhaps, it is not too much to say that the 
eminent success of some of his great military measures 
may be mainly attributed to it. Secrecy — absolute 
secrecy — in the midst of thousands, including, of course, 
many who must be personally engaged, was not to be 
looked for : but he preserved a nearer approach to it 
than any other man. His officers might deem him close, 
and some of them might feel that he did not show them 
the confidence to which they might think they were 
entitled ; but he acted upon principle. He knew by ex- 
perience that every gossiping letter from the army to 
friends in England was very speedily communicated to 
the newspapers, who made use of this limited informa- 
tion as best suited their own political objects, and 
generally distorted the facts. He might occasionally feel 
nettled at the malignant and violent party-feelings so dis- 
played, or at the unjust and ungenerous comments passed 
upon himself (though that was the part respecting which 
he felt the least anxiety) ; but he knew that during many 
years of the war, the principal part (indeed, at times, the 
whole) of the information respecting the strength and 
disposition of his force was conveyed to the French 



INTRODUCTION. 7 

army, solely by the circuitous channel of the English 
newspapers. 

His forgiveness of positive injustice to himself is 
also a remarkable feature in his character. We do not 
here allude to the noble disregard which he showed to 
the ignorance, the vanity, and the presumption of many 
individuals at home, in different high assemblies, whether 
in the Houses of Parliament, or the Common Council of 
the City of London : that was the natural and instinctive 
disregard which the magnanimous Newfoundland shows 
to the snarling cur; and he might have a fair reliance 
upon the returning sense of justice from the majority of 
his fellow-countrymen when the first effect was passed. 
But we allude more especially to the way in which he 
overlooks the unceasing attempts of so many members 
both of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, to 
injure him in the estimation of their respective nations, 
which he had no means of repelling or explaining ; which 
were creating hourly dangers to the gallant men under 
his command ; and w T hich, with a weaker-minded or more 
petulant man, must inevitably have made him throw up 
the cause for which he was making such marked and 
extraordinary efforts. 

The buoyancy of his hopes and expectations was 
another most remarkable characteristic. Oppressed as he 
was (more especially during the first years of the Pen- 
insular war) by the consideration of questions which 
belonged to the Statesman, the Financier, and the Diplo- 
matist, rather than to the General, and to which we will 
venture to say no general was ever before subjected ; 
thwarted as he was, in all the more enlarged views which 
he took of the means by which difficulties were to be 
averted or overcome, he never flagged, he never gave way ! 
If we were to be guided merely by his official dispatches, 



8 INTRODUCTION. 

published in the Gazette of the clay, or such parts of them 
as the Government at home thought themselves justified 
in making public, we might never have ascertained his 
own opinions. The reference would have been to the 
past, and not to the future. We know that men in 
such situations, whatever may be their real feelings of 
doubt, or even despondency, must conceal them from the 
world at large. It is impossible to deny that there were 
times, at home, when the public were almost without a 
hope of ultimate success. His withdrawal at that mo- 
ment, although it would no doubt have been the cause 
of much obloquy to himself, and of triumph to those 
who had constantly predicted failure, would in all proba- 
bility have been felt by the nation as unavoidable ; and 
he had difficulties to contend with that must have 
weighed with the Government and the public if he had 
recommended such a step. A sense of his own arduous 
responsibility, a sense of duty to those under whom he 
was acting, would compel him in his " private " commu- 
nications to make known his private apprehensions, if he 
had them. 

How do we find this in his case, where every secret 
thought and every private feeling is laid open to us? 
No ignorance of the difficulties, no insensibility to the 
dangers, no unconsciousness of what (to most men) 
would have caused almost a hopelessness of success ! 
but, with a full sense of all this, there is a self-con- 
fidence, a belief, that as he was conscientiously acting for 
the best, the result would ultimately turn out for the 
best, which shows itself in every confidential commu- 
nication. 

Another very observable point in his character was 
the openness and candour with which he admitted any 
error which he might feel convinced at a later period 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

that he had committed. No man has probably passed 
through life (not so eventful, or pregnant with deeds so 
essentially affecting the interest of thousands, as his was) 
who has not felt, that, if certain events were to occur 
again, the conduct adopted would have been different. 
But most men would wish, and would probably attempt 
to make it appear, that they had done right. He, no 
doubt, intended to do right, and thought at the time 
that he had done so. But his sense of truth was such, 
his integrity was so great, that if at a later period he 
believed that failure had resulted from mistake or mis- 
calculation of his own, he had the honest, open, fearless- 
ness to avow it. 

His disregard of everything that could savour of self- 
interest as to rank, or pecuniary advantage, is most strik- 
ing. We do not say that men whose lives are daily in 
peril, and whose whole worldly interests are embarked 
in the profession they follow, are to be called grasping 
because they do their best to turn their position to ad- 
vantage ; but we believe that few instances can be ad- 
duced of a man starting in his profession with nothing 
beyond a younger brother's portion (whatever that might 
be) who so nobly and disinterestedly refused the allow- 
ances and pay offered to him by the foreign nations in 
whose service he was employed, and to which he was 
fully entitled from the military rank which he held in 
their armies, but which he knew the finances of their 
country could ill afford. 

The rewards afterwards bestowed upon him by the 
Parliament of his own country were, of course, to be 
regarded in a different light. He accepted them with 
gratitude, as proud proofs of his country's approval ! 

Ambition, avowed honourable desire of distinction, 
no doubt formed part of his character. But nothing of 



10 INTRODUCTION. 

this shows itself in his conduct ; no artificial struggle for 
elevation, no effort to place himself above those with 
w T hom he was acting : we cannot believe, however, that 
he was devoid of it. 

Disappointment at being deprived of what he con- 
ceived would have led to such distinction in his profes- 
sion, is observable only once in his long career. His 
letters upon what he felt to be superseding him in India, 
when troops were sent from that country to Egypt, are 
the only indication that he ever gave of such feelings. 
And, of course, his mortification was connected with the 
expectation of the professional reputation which he 
should have gained by it. 

We must all feel how wisely and inscrutably Provi- 
dence dispenses its arrangements ! Colonel Wellesley, 
commanding a comparatively small body of troops 
from India, which did not arrive in Egypt till too late for 
any display of military prowess or distinction, might 
have been cut off by disease or accident, and the world 
might thus have been deprived of the greatest military 
genius of our own or any other age ! ! 

This, however, is beside our subject, except as a 
further illustration of the command of temper, and of 
the high sense of duty, which distinguished him thus 
early in fife, and which shone with increased lustre in 
proportion to the brilliancy of his subsequent career. 
The innate, natural, and honourable feeling of am- 
bition did not desert him ; the disappointment of what 
he felt to be well-founded expectation did not induce 
him to retire in disgust; and the age and the country 
which he adorned have reason to be thankful for that 
frame of mind which induced him to continue his pro- 
fession. 

Without, therefore, any attempt to repeat the often- 



INTRODUCTION. 1 1 

told but never wearying tale of our great Duke's ex- 
ploits, or to give a repetition of the events of his life, we 
merely wish here to bring before his fellow-countrymen 
proofs of his feelings and principles under various cir- 
cumstances, as important characteristic points, and as 
showing, — 

1st. His confidence in himself, and buoyancy under per- 
sonal responsibility. 

2d. His forbearance, and forgiveness of injustice. 

3d. His firmness under home and foreign annoyances. 

4th. His natural feelings of secrecy and caution. 

5th. His disinterestedness as to money or rank, and his 
general candour and simplicity of character. 

6th. His placability as to the faults and failings of others, 
evinced by his feelings connected with subordination 
and courts-martial. 

These various points we shall establish by reference 
to his dispatches written at the time, under the impulse 
of the moment, and often under circumstances which 
might have caused the bravest mind to quail, or the 
coolest head to be excited; and showing in its native 
colors what, we believe we may venture to assert, was 
one of the most noble, great, and glorious spirits that 
ever existed in man. 



BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, AND SENSE OE 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 



An attentive perusal of the private inward feelings laid 
open before us in these Dispatches will prove to the reader 
that the caution, and what his political or other oppo- 
nents called his Eabian policy (which they, and indeed 
many rash and wrong-headed men, in his own army, 
at times almost considered as timidity), was combined 
with a buoyancy of hope, and a glimpse, even under the 
darkest cloud, of brighter though distant gleams, which 
few men possessed. 

The circumstances under which he was frequently 
placed were, indeed, enough to have oppressed the most 
cheerful mind, and at some moments the least prospect of 
success might have been looked upon as chimerical : but 
his spirit did bear up, and his hopes were eventually 
realised. They were not founded upon the careless ex- 
pectation or belief, which persons so often entertain, that 
" things will all turn out for the best," or that " when 
things are at the worst they must mend," and which are 
the only resource or consolation of weak minds ; but, with 
the hope, he always gives his ground for entertaining it. 

He had, no doubt, a very strong feeling of self-con- 
fidence. He did not allow that feeling to precipitate 
him into any unnecessary risk, and his natural caution 
led him to weigh and consider well before he decided. 
He had too many instances amongst the Spanish generals 



14 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

of the total failure which must follow such displays of 
arrogance, vanity, and presumption as they continually 
exhibited, and indeed boasted of, as instances of national 
courage and glory : and if at any time his own elastic 
spirit quailed, it was when those vain -glorious men 
destroyed whole armies, and wasted every resource, in 
spite of his utmost efforts to prevent them. 

But when the smallest prospect of success presented 
itself, his spirit seized and took advantage of it ; and we 
believe most firmly, that on more than one occasion he 
was almost the only man in his army who did entertain 
the feeling. 

At an early period, and when, it is true, that the cir- 
cumstances were not of such a pressing nature, we find 
him possessed of the firmness to take, and the fearless- 
ness to act upon his own views, and to carry out what he 
believed to be right. 

Troops were assembled at the Island of Ceylon with 
a view to certain expeditions, which were afterwards 
given up, in order to send a force to Egypt. Colonel 
Wellesley, for reasons which he gives in detail, decided 
upon sailing with those troops to Bombay, on their way 
to the Red Sea, instead of remaining at Trincomalee to 
await further orders. 

This did not meet with the approbation of the Hon. 
Frederick North, the Governor of Ceylon, who appears 
to have remonstrated officially. If misfortune or failure 
had followed, the Ceylon authorities would of course have 
shown that they ought not to be implicated, and that the 
whole blame must be laid upon him : and probably few 
officers of Colonel Wellesley' s standing at that time would 
have had the resolution to persevere, however strong his 
personal conviction might have been that he was right. 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 15 

He conscientiously believed himself to be so, and had 
the boldness to act upon his own judgment. 
In his reply to the Governor he says : — 

" The existence of your public letter upon the records of 
your government increases considerably my responsibility on 
this occasion. However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the 
grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay, and 
the urgency of the measure, so great, that I persist ; and still 
hope that it will meet with your approbation, and that of 
General Macdowall." (i. 71.) 

He eventually took the troops to Bombay, where 
General Baird assumed the command, and sailed to the 
Bed Sea. 

Colonel Wellesley was prevented by illness from 
going with the expedition, and returned to Serin gapatam. 
He was made a Major-general; and in 1803 was ap- 
pointed to command a portion of an army destined to 
act against the Mahrattas. 

He was invested by the Governor-general with con- 
siderable extra powers, and appointed to the chief command 
(subject only to General Stuart and General Lake) of all 
the British troops, as well as to the general direction 
and control of all the political and military officers within 
certain limits. 

These orders were communicated to the Government 
of Bombay ; and in virtue of them, General Wellesley 
opened a communication with that government respect- 
ing some of the troops stationed in the Guickwar ter- 
ritory, within that presidency, but under his military 
command. He wrote again, more than once, to com- 
plain that certain measures had not been taken, and it 
is obvious that he had no great confidence in the judg- 
ment of that government. 

We are not informed of the grounds upon which the 



10 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

Governor dissented from the General's views. Another 
officer, Major Walker, was apparently more in his con- 
fidence ; and though, as a military man, the latter was 
of course subordinate, yet his influence was probably 
paramount. We do not here contest the point of whether 
Major Walker's or General Wellesley's suggestions were 
preferable, but merely adduce the proof that the latter 
was quite prepared to incur the responsibility, if he felt 
that what he proposed would be fully carried out. 

In a letter to the Secretary of Government, with 
reference to certain disposition of the troops there, he 
says : — 

" I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our 
small forces in that quarter. If the Governor in Council thinks 
proper to adopt the suggestions of Major Walker, they must 
be carried into execution ; and / hope that I shall not be con- 
sidered responsible for the consequences." (i. 328.) 

General Wellesley felt that it was hopeless to contend 
against this, and in a letter very soon after to the Private 
Secretary of the Governor-general at Calcutta, he says, — 

" I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan (the Governor of 
Bombay) for the organization of the troops and the general 
defence of Guzerat : but although he cannot disapprove of it, it 
interferes with his little prejudices, and I see plainly it will 
never be carried into execution as it ought. Under these cir- 
cumstances I had serious thoughts of writing to the Governor- 
general, to request him to relieve me from the command in 
Guzerat ; but I have refrained, and shall persevere as long as I 
can." (i. 336.) 

Again he writes to the Governor of Bombay : — 

" I learn by your letter that you disapprove of my plan, and 
you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution. I 
certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure 
which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 17 

service : but I should be presumptuous if, after your opinion, 
I were to persist; and I should deserve to incur the se- 
verest responsibility for any misfortune that might arise." 
(i. 342.) 

In a letter to Colonel Murray, adverting to Mr. 
Duncan's letters, he says : — 

" After having objected to my plan, in principle as well as in 
detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has 
thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. / 
am not afraid of responsibility, God knows ! and I am ready to 
incur any personal risk for the public service : but under such 
circumstances I should be mad if I were to order this plan to be 
carried into execution." (i. 343.) 

And again he writes to Major Shawe : — 

" I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relin- 
quish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had 
acquiesced in my plan for the defence of those territories, he 
has written to say that acquiescence is not approbation : but that if 
I choose to be responsible for the consequences it shall be carried 
into execution. I should have no objection to taking upon 
myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recom- 
mended, provided I was certain that they would be carried 
into execution. But I know that these would be impeded, 
and I should incur blame when I should not deserve it." 
(i. 348.) 

And yet, with all these well-founded grounds for 
distrust, and conduct which had tended to break off 
friendly and confidential intercourse, we find that when 
his final departure from the army approached, consider- 
ing Mr. Duncan as a public servant, whose authority 
must be supported, such was his general disposition to 
forget and forgive, that he would permit no angry feel- 
ings to prevail, and the following is the conclusion of his 
official correspondence : — 

c 



18 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

" Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command, and 
consequently giving up the immediate communication which I 
have held with your government, allow me once more to return 
you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, 
favour, and kindness. Although at a distance, I shall ever be 
anxious for the honour and prosperity of your government, and 
I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in 
your service/'' (ii. 307.) 

He left that country on the 24th of June, 1804, and 
went to Calcutta. He was again sent to Seringapatam 
in the expectation of more service, but ultimately left 
India, and arrived in England in September 1805. 



A considerable time elapsed without bis being again 
in any situation that required correspondence upon pro- 
fessional subjects ; but at last, in June 1808, he was 
appointed to the command of that detachment of British 
troops which opened the Peninsular war. His success 
upon landing was brilliant, but the arrival of more 
troops, with senior officers, deprived him of the com- 
mand, and he returned to England; and the inquiry 
into the Convention of Cintra took place in November. 

In March, 1809, he was again sent to command in 
Portugal, where he arrived on the 2 2d of April. His 
military movements to Oporto were prompt and success- 
ful ; when he turned his attention to the Spanish frontier, 
and writes home with his usual cheerful anticipation of 
success to Lord Castlereagh, — 

" I think it probable that Cuesta and I shall be more than a 
match for the French army on the Guadiana, and that we shall 
force them to retreat. My instructions will then be important, 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 19 

and unless they are altered I shall be obliged to halt at the 
moment when my advance might be most important to the cause 
of the Spaniards. I wish the king's ministers to give me a lati- 
tude to continue my operations in Spain, if I consider them con- 
sistent with the safety of Portugal." 

His communications, personal or by letter, were 
always cheering to those under his command. Major- 
general Mackenzie had been left in charge of a small 
corps of observation upon the frontier near the Tagus, 
during Sir Arthur's expedition with the main body of 
the army to Oporto, and had apparently been led to 
expect an attack from the French upon his small force. 
Sir Arthur writes to him, giving his reasons why he does 
not think the attack probable, and having in his former 
letters to him taken all contingencies into his calculation, 
concludes with a short inspiring postscript :— 

" Look at your instructions, my dear Mackenzie, — act 
boldly upon them, and I will be responsible for all the arrange- 
ments." (iv. 323.) 

In June it was believed that the British Minister at 
Lisbon, the Honourable John Villiers, was about to retire. 
Sir Arthur writes to him, to express his regrets, and 
thanking him for the assistance which he had received. 
He announces the expected arrival of reinforcements, 
and the extension of his own authority to advance if he 
thought proper, and still retaining his characteristic tone 
of cheerfulness, concludes with these words : — 

' ' So that the ball is now at my foot, and I hope I shall have 
strength enough to give it a good kick. I should begin 
immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money." 
(iv. 384.) 

He afterwards did advance, at the request of General 
Cuesta, though evidently with a conviction that the 



20 BUOYANCY OE SPIRIT, 

movements proposed were not the most advisable; and 
he found it impossible to act cordially with him. The 
battle of Talavera took place, but with little benefit, in 
consequence of Cuesta' s retreat, which compelled Sir 
Arthur to do the same. He was naturally much morti- 
fied, as he felt that if Cuesta would have complied with 
his suggestions the prospect of success was good. 

But, in spite of all, his hopes do not desert him ; and 
he writes thus in his private letter to Lord Castlereagh, 
on August 1st : — 

" My public letters will give you some idea of our situation. 
It is one of some embarrassment, but of which I think I shall 
get the better ; I hope, without fighting another desperate battle, 
which would cripple us so much as to render all our efforts 
useless. I certainly should get the better of everything if I could 
manage General Cuesta ; but his temper and disposition are so 
bad that that is impossible." (iv. 523.) 

Lord Wellesley had been appointed to succeed Mr. 
Frere as the British minister with the Central Junta, and 
the first letter to him from Sir Arthur, after his arrival 
at Seville, is one in which his buoyant spirit seems 
almost to be breaking down : — 

" I wish I could see you, or send somebody to you ; but I 
cannot. I think, therefore, that the best thing you can do is to 
send somebody to me as soon as you can ; that is to say, if I 
remain in Spain, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, 
notwithstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing : 
but a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers 
lose their discipline and their spirit ; they plunder even in the 
presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and are 
almost as bad as the men; and with an army which a fortnight 
ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a 
French corps of half their strength." (v. 15.) 

The same state of affairs continued, and there was 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 2 L 

certainly nothing to justify hope : but yet we find, in the 
midst of his depressing circumstances, that bursts of 
cheerful projects still break out. He writes to Lord 
Castlereagh : — 

" My dispatches will give you an unpleasant account of our 
situation, than which nothing can be worse : we want everything 
and can get nothing." But still he adds, — "I acknowledge, 
however, that I go with regret; and I wish that I had been able 
to stay a little longer : not that I think I could have done much 
good." And then, kindling with the feeling of what he might 
have done, he continues, — " If we could have fed, and have got 
up the condition of our horses, we might, probably, after some 
time, have struck a brilliant blow upon Soult at Placentia, or 
upon Mortier in the centre." (v. 73.) 

No events of importance took place for some months. 
In the meantime Lord Castlereagh had left his office in 
England and was replaced by Lord Liverpool, to whom 
Sir Arthur reports in November : — 

"I am of opinion, that unless the Spanish armies should 
meet with some great misfortune, the enemy could not make an 
attack upon Portugal ; and the force at present is able to defend 
it. I conceive that till Spain shall have been conquered, and 
shall have submitted to the conqueror, the enemy will find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, if 
His Majesty should continue to employ an army in defence of it, 
and if the improvements in the Portuguese military service 
shouldbe carried to the extent ofwhich they are capable." (v. 268.) 

" In respect to the embarkation of the British army, in the 
event of failure in the contest which we may expect in Portugal, 
I have no doubt that we should be able to embark and bring away 
the British army; not including the horses." (v. 275.) 

" I do not think they will succeed with an army of 70,000, 
or even of 80,000 men, if they do not make the attack for two 
or three months, which I believe now to be impossible." (v. 310.) 

"During the continuance of this contest, in which there 
may be no brilliant events, and in which, after all, I may fail, I 



22 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

shall be most confoundedly abused, and in the end I may lose 
the little character I have gained ; but I should not act fairly by 
the Government if I did not tell them my real opinion, — which is, 
that they will betray the honour and interest of the country if 
they do not continue their efforts in the Peninsula, which in my 
opinion are by no means hopeless. 33 (v. 353.) 

Sir Arthur was created Viscount Wellington in 
August 1809. 

He had been always in the habit of drawing up 
a memorandum of the operations of the year; and a 
very valuable paper of that nature is placed amongst 
the dispatches, dated December 9, 1809. It was 
sent to Lord Wellesley with MS. comments of Lord 
Wellington's own, referring to the motives which had 
influenced him, or to information which had subse- 
quently reached him up to the period of his sending it, 
together with his own feelings as respected the different 
events. The concluding observations are not cheerful, in 
consequence of the wretched conduct of the Spaniards ; 
but the thorough-bred spirit breaks out. His very last 
words in a note are : — 

" If the Spaniards had not lost two armies lately, we should 

keep up the ball for another year. But, as it is ! but I 

won't despair ! " 

This is exactly the moment when we believe he was 
nearly the only man in bis army who did not despair. 

The Common Council of the City of London thought 
proper to pass judgment upon his proceedings, and 
presented an address to the King praying that his conduct 
might be inquired into. 

The only effect which this produced upon him is 
very tersely expressed in a letter to Mr. Villiers, as soon 
as he had received the information from England : — 

" You see the dash which the Common Council of the City 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 23 

of London have made at me ! I act with a sword hanging over 
me, which will fall upon me whatever may be the result of 
affairs here : but they may do what they please, I shall not give 
up the game here as long as it can be played." (v. 391.) 

In his letter to Lord Liverpool he says : — 

" I think it probable that the answer of the King to this 
address will be consistent with the approbation of the acts 
which these gentlemen wish to make the subject of inquiry, and 
that they will not be well pleased. I cannot expect mercy at 
their hands, whether I succeed or fail ; and if I should fail, they 
will not inquire whether the failure is owing to my own incapacity, 
to the faults or mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our 
means, or to the great power and abilities of our enemy. In 
any of these cases I shall become their victim ; but I am not to 
be alarmed by this additional risk, and whatever may be the con- 
sequences I shall continue to do my best in this country." (v. 392.) 

In a letter very soon after to Mr. Villiers, in which, 
from the great want of money for the payment of either 
British or Portuguese troops, he expresses his feeling 
that Great Britain had undertaken more than she could 
execute, he says : — 

" I have no objection to communicate to you, that the army 
in its present state is not sufficient for the defence of Portugal ; 
but the troops are recovering their health daily, reinforcements 
from England are expected, and if I can bring 30,000 effective 
British troops into the field, I will fight a good battle for the 
possession of Portugal, and see whether the country cannot be 
saved. I do not mean to say that more troops would not be 
desirable ; but it must be obvious to you that the Government 
could not give more. Circumstances have certainly altered 
since my letter of November, but the question for me is, Have 
they so altered as to incline me to think that with 30,000 men, 
which I have reason to believe. I shall have in a few weeks 
(together with the Portuguese army, which, by the bye, is better 
than I ever expected it would be), I shall not be able to save 
Portugal, or, at all events, to sell the country dearly ? 

" We should hold our ground as long as possible ; and, 



24 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

please God, / will maintain it as long as I can ; and I will 
neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on to those 
of the Ministers the responsibility for the failure by calling for 
means which I know they cannot give : nor will I give to the 
Ministers, who are not strong, an excuse for withdrawing the 
army from a position which, in my opinion, the honour and 
interest of the country require they should maintain as long as 
possible." (v. 412.) 

This was not merely the tenor of his official letters 
to the official authorities, either at home or in the 
Peninsula, for, amongst other valuable corroborative 
proofs, we find a private letter to his former friend 
and associate in India, Colonel Malcolm: — 

" Talavera was certainly the hardest-fought battle of modern 
days, and the most glorious in its result to our troops. It is 
lamentable, that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the 
Spaniards, the glory is the only benefit which we have derived 
from it. If the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own 
folly, and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose 
an army about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought 
them through. As it is, however, i" do not despair ! I have 
in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate 
myself ; but I must not shrink from it. I command an unani- 
mous army. I draw well with the authorities in Spain and 
Portugal, [nothing but his own generous and ardent spirit, we 
believe, would have thought so], and I believe I have the good 
wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances one may fail, 
but it would be dishonourable to shrink from the task." — Suppl. 
India, 232. 

In January, 1810, he writes home to Lord Liver- 
pool : — 

" I certainly think the army improved. They are better 
than they were some months ago. But still, these terrible 
continued outrages of the soldiers give me reason to apprehend 
that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken, and 
shall take, they will slip through my fingers as they did through 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 25 

Sir John Moore's, when I shall be involved in any nice operation 
with a powerful enemy in front." (v. 436.) 

He was very much pressed by the Spaniards, through 
Mr. Frere, to make a forward movement. He acknow- 
ledges that .it would be desirable, if it were practicable : 
but he had not the means — he could not bring 20,000 
men into the field. The Portuguese army was im- 
proving, but still sickly from want of clothing and 
provisions ; and therefore he says, — 

" I have, with great reluctance, given up all thought of 
moving at present." (v. 454.) 

But in a letter to Lord Liverpool, a few days after, 
his hopes and wishes again show themselves : adverting 
to the above proposal, and explaining the reason which 
had induced him to write to Mr. Frere, he adds : — 

" I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I 
propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances 
should permit" (v. 466.) 

But even lie considered it a very doubtful question, 
and it became necessary to consider what must be the 
alternative, 

" It is probable, that though the Spanish armies may be lost, 
the war of partisans may continue. When the aifairs of Spain 
shall be brought to that state, and when all regular resistance 
shall cease, and there will exist no probability of a renewal of 
the contest in that country, — the question will arise, Whether 
the continuation of the contest will afford any reasonable prospect 
of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to His 
Majesty's allies ? 

" Adverting then to the probability, that the whole or the 
greater part of the French will be disposable to be thrown upon 
this country, I should be glad to know whether it is the wish 
of His Majesty's Government that an effort should be made 
to defend it to the last ; or whether I shall turn my mind 
seriously to the evacuation of the country, and to the embark- 



26 BUOYANCY OE SPIRIT, 

ation of as large a body of people, military as well as others, 
as I can. 

"Whatever may be the force with which the enemy may 
invade Portugal, I am of opinion that, in all events, I shall be 
able to bring away the British Army" 

A change took place in the Spanish Government. 
Lord Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool, saying that 
the new members of it are persons of integrity, and 
more acquainted with the affairs of their country ; but 
he is apprehensive that they have been called too late 
to effect much good. Referring to the probability of 
any attack upon Portugal, he says : — 

" The enemy could not be in a situation for a considerable 
time to attack this country ; and though the time may come 
when it may be doubtful whether perseverance will hold out 
any prospect of advantage, I consider that it is a difficult ques- 
tion for the King's Government at the distance to decide; 
that it must depend upon events in Spain, upon the spirit 
and resistance of the people in Portugal, and in some measure 
upon the season of the year ; and adverting to the certainty that 
the army can embark, it would, probably, be best to leave to the 
officer commanding the period of evacuation as a military mea- 
sure." (v. 483.) 

Many men would have felt too happy at being able 
to leave the decision to the Government. The officer in 
charge of the army would thus have been sheltered under 
their responsibility ; and any censure which might be 
passed upon the conduct or conclusion of the undertaking, 
would be thrown upon them, and not upon him. 

But that was not a line of conduct consistent with 
his feelings. He had his misgivings : it was evident that 
he was not sanguine : he felt, apparently, a very strong 
probability that the army could not maintain its ground : 
but there was a possibility of its doing so. If that pos- 
sibility should arise, he was the man to take advantage 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 27 

of it ; but to do so with effect, it was necessary that he 
should be left to his own discretion and his own decision. 

But is there not something striking in the very lan- 
guage in which he urges this ? He leaves himself out of 
the question : he speaks of " the officer commanding " in 
the third person, as if he was giving an opinion referring 
to a military measure in Russia or America. Is it pos- 
sible to believe that any other man so deeply involved in 
a most arduous and trying proceeding, and who must 
have been fully aware of the weight of his opinion, would 
not have spoken of the course which he intended to pur- 
sue, instead of merely urging what " would probably be 
best?" 

The confidence in himself which made him offer the 
suggestion, was there : but the sense of duty to those 
under whom he was acting, made him defer to their 
judgment, as if he had no voice in the matter ! 

The French had at this time received great reinforce- 
ments, and had pushed forward with a view to attacking 
Cadiz. Lord Wellington sends many suggestions to 
General W. Stewart who commanded there, and con- 
cludes with the sort of cheering spirit that always dis- 
tinguished him, — 

" Every man who knows anything of the state of Spain, and 
of the sentiments of the people, must be certain that if Cadiz 
should hold out, and the Mediterranean islands continue in 
possession of the patriots, the Bonapartes may have the mili- 
tary possession of the country, but, sooner or later, they must 
lose it." (v. 512.) 

In another letter to General Stewart, after expressing 
his regret at the little progress made by the Spanish 
troops in their discipline, he adds : — 

" We must not be discouraged by these untoward circum- 
stances. The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the 



28 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

same appearance — they have always appeared to be lost — means 
have always appeared inadequate to objects — and the sole de- 
pendence has apparently been upon us. The contest, however, 
still continues, and is in its third year, and we must continue it 
as long as we can, as it is obvious that Great Britain cannot 
give us larger means than we have." (v. 578.) 

His cheerful views continue, and we find him writing 
to Col. Torrens, the Secretary to the Commander-in- 
chief, — 

" I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done to 
the army, or to any part of it. I am prepared for all events ; 
and if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general belief in 
England, although certainly not my own, I'll get out of it" 
(v. 590.) 

The necessity, however, continued, for being pre- 
pared against any emergency ; his tranquillity remained 
undisturbed, and on the 2d April we find him saying, — 

"All my preparations for embarking and carrying off the 
army, and everything belonging to it, are already made ; and 
my intention is to embark it as soon as I find that a military 
necessity exists for so doing. In short, the whole of my conduct 
shall be guided by a fair and cool view of the circumstances at 
the moment." (vi. 6.) 

He then discusses the different points for such em- 
barkation, giving his reasons for or against them, and 
deciding in favour of Lisbon. It is foreign to our 
purpose here to consider the military grounds upon 
which he comes to that conclusion : but his fourth 
reason is so characteristic of his buoyant (we had al- 
most said boyish) spirit, and is such a lively, playful 
representation of the case to be taken by a man in his 
anxious position, that we cannot refrain from quoting 
it: — 

" Fourthly, when we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 29 

like gentlemen, out of the hall-door (particularly after the pre- 
parations which I have made to enable us to do so), and not 
out of the back-door, or by the area ! 

" I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of the 
country, under your instructions of February 27. Depend 
upon it, whatever people may tell you, I am not so desirous 
as they imagine of fighting desperate battles : if I was, I might 
fight one any day I please. But I have kept the army for six 
months in two positions, notwithstanding their own desire and 
that of the Allies that I should take advantage of many oppor- 
tunities which the enemy apparently offered. 

"I am convinced, that if the Spaniards had followed my 
advice Spain would now have been out of danger. I am quite 
aware of the risks which I incur personally, whatever may be 
the result in Portugal. All I beg is, that if I am to be re- 
sponsible I may be left to the exercise of my own judgment. If 
the Government take the opinions of others upon the situation 
of affairs here, and entertain doubts upon the measures which 
I propose, then let them give me their instructions in detail, and 
/ will carry them strictly into execution." (vi. 9.) 

It is evident here that the Government were much 
alarmed : and this was the crisis of affairs. Officers 
in his own army were apparently doubtful as to the 
wisdom of his policy ; the Government were influenced 
by public opinion at home; and one word of doubt 
or vacillation, on the part of Lord Wellington himself, 
would have sealed the fate of the Peninsula. 

In this last paragraph of his dispatch are displayed 
two of the noblest characteristics of his nature : Indomit- 
able courage, if left to himself/ Implicit obedience, if 
controlled by others ! 



It is obvious, towards the end of the summer of 
1810, that in spite of his natural confidence, if duly 



30 

supported, he began to have doubts of what support 
he should receive from home. 

" Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations 
of the last year ; and it is obvions that a continuance of the 
same cautious system will lose the reputation which I had 
acquired, and the good opinion of the people of the country. 
Nothing, therefore, could be so desirable to me personally as 
that either the contest should be given up at once, or should 
be continued with a force so sufficient as to render opposition 
hopeless. 

" In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant 
of our own country, as well as of this (who, after all, would be 
but imperfectly protected in their person and property), would 
fall upon the Government. But seeing as I do more than a 
chance of final success, if we can maintain our position, I 
should not do my duty if I did not inform the Government 
of the real situation of affairs, and urge them with importunity 
even to greater exertion. 

" I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, 
that the Government felt no confidence in the measures they 
were adopting towards this country; and not an officer has 
come from England who has not told me that it was generally 
expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking ; 
and some have said that this expectation was entertained by 
some of the King's Ministers. 

" This is not encouraging, and I acknowledge that I have 
attributed the little exertion to the want of confidence of the 
Government in the result of the contest. 

" If Government are really in earnest, I recommend the fol- 
lowing measures/' (vi. 326.) [Which he proceeds to detail.] 

The state of responsibility in which he was placed 
was, indeed, perilous, under which none but a mind of 
the firmest class could have borne up. His care was 
not confined merely to the military charge of his own 
army ; he was looked to, in great measure by his own 
Government, and entirely by the half-informed British 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 31 

public, and the ignorant Spaniards (ill as they sup- 
ported him), as the person upon whom every arrange- 
ment depended. In fact, the weakness of the Spanish 
Government made it impossible to rely upon their judg- 
ment or firmness for any measure of precaution. The 
islands of Minorca and Majorca were threatened, or at 
least the forethought of Lord Wellington made him feel 
the risk they ran, from a sudden attack by a French fleet ; 
and though it formed no part of his duty to provide for 
their security, he was too well aware that if he did not, 
they might be lost by the supineness of their own Go- 
vernment. And with this weight upon him he writes 
to Mr. Wellesley:— 

"The security of the Balearic Isles is of the utmost im- 
portance. You and I (7, probably, more than you) will be 
considered responsible for everything that occurs, although we 
have no means in our power, and no power to enforce the 
execution of what is necessary. It is desirable that we should 
advert to everything, and recommend to the Spanish Govern- 
ment those measures which appear to us to be necessary." 
(v. 580.) 

In a correspondence with Mr. Frere a short time 
before, referring to a renewed application from Don F. 
de Saavedra, the Spanish War Minister, for British co- 
operation, he gives his reason for declining ; and he con- 
cludes by saying, — 

" With respect to the blame that will be transferred to us 
for the misfortunes which there is reason to apprehend will be 
the result of these operations, I am too much accustomed to 
receive blame for the actions of others to feel much concern upon 
the subject, and I can only endeavour not to deserve any for 
my own." (v. 291.) 

Admiral Sir George Berkeley seems to have made 
some communication to him about supplies ; he says in 
reply :_ 



32 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

" I am concerned that you should imagine that the measures 
taken for the supply of the army occasion an useless expense. 
If ever there was an officer at the head of an army interested (I 
may say personally) in keeping down expense, it is myself; for 
I am left wholly to my own resources, and am obliged to supply 
the Allies as well as the British from what I can get : and if I 
fail, God will, I hope, have mercy upon me, for nobody else 
will." (v. 419.) 

We do not learn what were the opinions alluded to 
in the following letter to the Admiral, but we must 
acknowledge the weight of Lord Wellington's argument, 
both in it, as well as in one to Mr. Villiers, which follows 
it, and which refers apparently to some similar sugges- 
tions : — 

" I am much obliged for the opinions you have communi- 
cated to me. I must consider onot nly what is desirable, but 
what is practicable ; and I must first look at the facts of the 
case, and consider the means in my power. 

" In case of the occurrence of a great disaster, it will be no 
justification for me to say that the plan was that of the Portu- 
guese Government, and that I would not oppose it, or that 
you approved and urged it. In the existing temper of the 
times, and for me particularly, such a justification will not be 
allowed." (v. 569.) 

He says, in one of his letters to Mr. Villiers : — 
" Men in your situation and mine must look at all ques- 
tions with a very different view, which is the main cause of any 
difference which may appear to exist between us. In my situa- 
tion I am bound to consider not only what is expedient, but 
what is practicable; and no general officer in these days can 
venture, even in a confidential dispatch to a minister, to specu- 
late upon advantages which it is not practicable to accomplish. 
If he ventures upon such speculations, the tables are imme- 
diately turned upon him ; and although none of the conditions 
or requisites of his speculation may have been performed, he is 
asked for what reason he did not acquire those advantages 
which he had described in his dispatches." (v. 326.) 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 33 

We have already given a letter addressed to Major- 
general Mackenzie (p. 19) in an earlier period of his 
operations, as an instance of the cheering and cheerful 
nature of his instructions to his officers. We meet with 
another of the same character addressed to General Hill, 
a year after, which we cannot help inserting : — 

" The plot seems to thicken in some degree, but with pru- 
dent management and decision I do not doubt that we shall get 
through. 

" If any point occurs to you on which you think you are not 
fully instructed, or you entertain any doubts, let me know it, 
and I will communicate my opinion immediately; and if you 
are obliged to act in any manner without waiting for my 
opinion, do so with confidence that I have every disposition to 
approve of everything you do. 

" 1 consider all my letters, though in a private form, to 
convey official instructions and authority upon every point." 
(vi. 82.) 

After the unexpected fall of Almeida, in the latter 
part of August 1810, the public confidence in Lisbon 
began to flag, and some disapprobation seems to have 
been expressed by the Governors there at his not having 
moved to succour the place. He replies : — 

" I request permission of the Governors of the Kingdom to 
say, that much as I wish to remove this impression on the 
public, / do not propose to alter the system of operations which 
have been determined upon. 

"I request the Government to believe that I am not insen- 
sible of the nature of their confidence ; but I should forget my 
duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to 
the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic 
to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system of 
operations which I have adopted, and which daily experience 
shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end." 
(vi. 384.) 

After the battle of Busaco, and when he was in full 



34 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

retreat to the lines, he writes, full of confidence, to Mr. 
Stuart : — 

" I am quite certain the French will not get Portugal this 
winter, unless they receive a very large reinforcement indeed. 
It is probable that they will not succeed even in that case." 
(vi. 454.) 

A little later, when within the lines, he writes to Mr. 
Wellesley : — 

"I have no idea what the French will — or, rather, what 
they can — do. / think it is certain they can do us no mischief, 
and that they will lose the greatest part of their army if they 
attack us. They will starve if they stay much longer, and they 
will experience great difficulty in their retreat." (vi. 502.) 

And afterward to Lord Liverpool he says : — 

" I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not, con- 
sider himself able to force our position : indeed I believe I have 
the means of beating the force now opposed to me. I think 
that the ' Moniteur,' of 23 November, shows that our position 
is considered so strong that it ought not to be attacked in front. 
I am also certain, that if the British should not be obliged to 
evacuate Portugal, the French must withdraw from Andalusia. 
I do not despair of holding my ground, and have taken 
measures to prevent the only inconvenience — a deficiency of 
supplies. The question whether I should attack has been well 
considered. I think I should succeed, but the loss must be very 
great. And what is to be gained ? failure would be the loss of 
the whole cause. 

" In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon my- 
self and General Cuesta not less than five corps d'armee. In 
this year I have had three, the most efficient in Spain, upon 
our hands for eight months. The Spaniards have made no 
move, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, 
transport, discipline, and everything. 

"Your Lordship will deem this a melancholy picture of 
prospects in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. 

" It is the result of defects in the national character : they 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 35 

have no army; no means of raising one; no authority to disci- 
pline one if they could raise it; no means to arm, equip, clothe, 
or feed anything which could be collected under that name. 

" If all this is true, our business is not to fight the French 
army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but 
to give occupation to so large a portion of it as we can manage, 
and leave the war in Spain to the guerillas." (vii. 51.) 

" Mr. Wellesley informs me that it is probable the Spanish 
Government will offer me the command of their armies, of 
which I apprise your Lordship by the earliest opportunity, that 
the King's Government may take the subject into consideration. 
If such an arrangement had been made a year and half ago, 
and the Spanish Government had seriously set to work to feed 
and pay their army, the cause would have been safe. It is 
impossible to say what will be the effect now. It will answer 
no purpose, excepting to throw upon me the additional trouble, 
and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure, if measures 
are not taken to feed and pay the troops. 

"I shall answer, that the acceptance of the command will 
depend upon His Majesty's commands, which will leave the 
question open ; and I request to have, by return of post, direc- 
tions what I shall do." (vii. 216.) 

The answer which he received authorised him to 
decline, and in a letter to the Honourable Henry Wel- 
lesley he says : — 

" The answer which I received, disapproved of my acceptance 
of the office, and I must acknowledge that I never expected that 
the proposition would be made. I propose, under the instruc- 
tions which I have received, to carry on such military operations 
as may lie in my power. I shall communicate confidentially, as 
I have done, with the Spanish authorities, and shall recommend 
such measures as may accord with my views ; and I can only 
say, that whether they attend to my suggestions or not, / shall 
continue to do the enemy all the mischief which the means at my 
own disposition will enable me." (vii. 484.) 

Again he says, rather later, in spite of this discou- 
raging prospect : — 



36 BUOYANCY OP SPIRIT, 

" I am glad to hear such good accounts from the north. 
[Alluding to affairs in the North of Europe.] God send they 
may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting 
tyranny. Whether true or not at present, something of the 
kind must occur before long j and if we can only hold out, we 
shall yet see the world delivered." (vii. 583.) 

In a private letter to Mr. Villiers, who had at that 
time given up the mission to Lisbon, he says : — 

" I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwith- 
standing that it was the opinion of every officer in the country 
that I ought to embark the army ; while, on the contrary, the 
Portuguese civil authorities contended that the war ought to be 
maintained on the frontier, for which we wanted, not only 
physical force, but the means of providing for the force which 
they would produce. 

" To this, I believe, nothing but something worse than firm- 
ness could have carried me through the nine months' discussion 
with these contending opinions. To this, add, that people in 
England were changing like the wind, and you will see that I 
have not much to look to but myself." (vii. 593.) 

In June, 1811, after describing to Lord Liverpool 
the state of his army, and the last reports that he had of 
the position of the French, he says : — 

" With this force it becomes a question whether any and 
what operations shall be undertaken. With the fine and well- 
equipped army which we have, and with our cavalry in such 
good order as it is, I am anxious not to allow this moment of 
the enemy's comparative weakness to pass by, without making 
an effort." (viii. 111.) 

He then proceeds to discuss various points, and con- 
tinues : — 

" The next operation which presents itself is the siege of 
Ciudad Rodrigo. This enterprise promises the best, and I am 
tempted to try the enterprise. I may be obliged to abandon it, 
and in a case where the relative force of the two armies will be 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 37 

so nearly balanced, it is impossible to foresee all the results. I 
propose to put the army in motion, if circumstances afford a 
chance of success." 



The question, Who was to take Lord Wellington's 
place in case of any calamity? has often occurred; and 
it is almost a fearful thing to look back upon. Without 
disparagement to those officers who, by seniority in the 
service, must have succeeded to the command until they 
could be relieved or superseded, it is no injustice to say 
that they would have been involved in an awful respon- 
sibility; for which, perhaps, few would have felt them- 
selves prepared. 

Lord Wellington's confidence in himself, no doubt, 
was a most valuable quality, and carried him through 
many difficulties ; but his life was beyond his own con- 
trol, and in looking at the immense interests concerned, 
at this more remote period, when all temporary excite- 
ment has passed away, it cannot be denied that the risk 
does appear too great ! 

We read his own feelings upon the subject, though 
they do not appear to have had full weight with those 
upon whom the matter rested : — 

" I am sorry to inform you that there is reason to apprehend 
that Sir Thomas Graham will be obliged to quit the army on 
account of his eyes. 

" I mention it in case your Lordship should think proper to 
make provision for the event of any accident happening to pre- 
vent me from continuing to hold the command. 

a As far as I am concerned, I certainly should prefer that no 
officer should be sent out. There are few who understand the 
situation of second in command of these armies. Unless he 
should be posted to command a division of cavalry or infantry, 
and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary occasions, 



38 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

nothing to do ; at the same time that his opinion relieves me 
but little from responsibility, and that, after all, I must act 
according to my own judgment in case of a difference of opinion. 
There are but few officers who should be sent from England as 
' second in command 3 who would not come here with opinions 
formed, probably, on very bad grounds, and with very extrava- 
gant pretensions. To this add* that when necessary to detach 
a body of troops in any situation, but few would be satisfied to 
remain with that detachment, unless it should consist of nearly 
the whole army. 

" If, therefore, Sir Thomas Graham should be obliged to go, 
I am not desirous of having anybody sent to fill his situation, as 
far as I am concerned; and I am convinced we shall go on 
better if nobody is sent." (ix. 209.) 

Sir Thomas Graham was obliged to quit the army, 
and Sir Edward Paget had been sent out. He was, 
unfortunately, taken prisoner on the retreat after Burgos, 
in November 1812, which gave rise to the present 
discussion. 

The rank of Marshal, which had been conferred upon 
Sir William Beresford as head of the Portuguese army, 
had already created much embarrassment with general 
officers who were his seniors in the British service. 

The question now under consideration, of the second 
in command, naturally involved this point. 

Lord Wellington was Marshal-general, in virtue of 
which he commanded both the British and Portuguese. 
Any officer succeeding to the command of the British, in 
consequence of his rank in that service, would not neces- 
sarily command General Beresford (who held the Portu- 
guese rank of marshal, though junior as an English 
general), unless he were also made marshal-general, and 
Lord Wellington submitted the point to the Government 
at home. 

" The Commander-in-chief having decided that officers in 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 39 

the British and Portuguese services should rank with each other 
according to the dates of their commissions, there is no doubt 
that Marshal Beresford, holding the rank of marshal, ranks 
next to me in the Allied army. I hold the rank of Marshal- 
general. 

" His Majesty's Government have thought proper from time 
to time to appoint a general officer to be second in command to 
the British army (senior in rank in the British service to Sir 
William Beresford), on which officer it has been the intention 
that the command of the Allied army should devolve, in case any 
circumstance should deprive me of the command. 

" In case circumstances should so deprive me of the com- 
mand which I now hold over the Allied army, as Marshal- 
general of the Portuguese, either the second in command of the 
British must be made Marshal-general likewise, or Marshal 
Beresford must quit the army at a moment when his absence 
might be interpreted to his disadvantage ; or he must assume 
the command of the Allied army, and not the officer selected by 
His Majesty's Government as the person on whom they wish it 
should devolve. 

■■ In case Government should think proper to send any officer 
to replace Sir Edw. Paget, it is desirable they should advert 
to the circumstances affecting his situation/' (ix. 585.) 

It does not appear to have been then clearly de- 
cided upon by the Government at home ; for we find 
a further letter on the subject to Marshal Beresford : — 

" I am glad that our ideas agree about your military situa- 
tion. It is certain that Government have always thought it 
necessary to have an officer here, selected by them, to succeed to 
the command, in case I should be deprived of it ; and there are 
some so partial to old practice and precedent, that they do not 
like a departure from either, in not calling this officer ' the second 
in command.' This officer might have been very useful in the 
days of Councils of War, &c. ; it may look very well in a news- 
paper to see that such a general is ( second in command ;' but 
there is nobody in a modern army who must not see that there 
is no duty for the second in command to perform, and that the 
office is useless. It is at the same time inconvenient, as it 



40 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

gives the holder pretensions which cannot be gratified except at 
public inconvenience." (ix. 608.) 

He says again, in a letter to Lord Bathurst : — 

" What Marshal Beresford and I ask for is a settlement of 
the question : not in his favour, if the Government deem it 
expedient that it should be otherwise ; but that he should not 
be in the awkward predicament of being obliged to claim the 
command against the wishes of his own Government, or of 
quitting the army at a critical moment, in case of the event for 
which it is intended to provide. 

" I cannot state positively, but I do not think he has any 
intention to retire, if the question is decided against his rank. 
I know that I would not retire, and I shall exert all the influence 
I can possess over his judgment to induce him to remain. 
But the point must be settled. 

" In my opinion, the office of second in command in these 
days, when Councils of War have been discontinued, and the 
Chief is held severely responsible for everything, is not only 
useless but injurious. A person without defined duties, except- 
ing to give flying opinions, from which he may depart at 
pleasure, must be a nuisance at moments of decision ; and 
whether I have a second in command or not, I am determined 
to act according to the dictates of my own judgment, being 
certain that / shall be responsible for the act, be the person 
whom he may, according to whose opinion it has been adopted. 
One person in that situation may give me a little more trouble 
than another ; but substantially I must be indifferent whether it 
is the Marshal or any of the generals who have been named. I 
must be out of the way when any one of them should be called 
upon to act in command, and I can have no preference to one 
officer over another." (x. 41.) 

In a letter to Marshal Beresford he says : — 

u It is obvious to me that the question is not understood in 
England. If it is decided against you, it must be by an 
arrangement with the Portuguese Government, to which you 
must always be a party. 

(( Jn whatever way it may be decided, I recommend to you 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 41 

not to be induced to resign. What we have here is the army. 
You cannot be in any other than a distinguished situation, 
whatever may be the decision ; and I earnestly recommend to 
you not to relinquish it. I beg you not to decide till you 
know what the decision is, and the mode in which it is brought 
about." 

The question was decided by the Government in 
favour of sending out an officer senior to Marshal Beres- 
ford, to whom, ten days after, he writes again : — 

" I enclose an extract from Lord Bathurst's letter regarding 
the command, from which you will see that the business is 
settled as you supposed it would be. However, being settled, 
I do not conceive that it is any business of yours to inquire in 
what manner or on what principles." (x. 121.) 

But the question about the second in command, or 
who was to succeed in case of anything befalling him, 
was still left unsettled ; because, although the British 
Government had appointed an officer senior to Marshal 
Beresford in the British service, and who was evidently 
intended by them to succeed to the general command, 
it could not have given him seniority over a Portuguese 
Marshal. 

" I most fully concur in Sir John Hope's appointment. I 
am quite certain that he is the ablest man in the army. 

" The question about Sir W. Beresford occurs again. You 
mean that Sir J. Hope shall command the Allied army in case 
any accident occur to me. Who is next to me in the allied 
British and Portuguese armies till that accident happen ? Have 
you settled anything with the Portuguese Government what 
becomes of Sir W. Beresford' s rank of marshal ? It is most 
desirable that something should be settled; for although Sir 
William is gone to Lisbon, he will probably return soon, and if 
circumstances should render it expedient that we should not 
move forward on this side, as I shall be desirous of going into 
Catalonia, I must leave some person in command here." 
(xi. 143.) 



42 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

" If you wish that Sir J. Hope should have the command in 
the event of my quitting it, you should settle with Portugal that 
that arrangement is to take place. If you do not, Marshal 
Beresford, as a marshal, must have the command. The Portu- 
guese Government would make Sir J. Hope Marshal-general, in 
succession to me, if they acquiesce. 

" Marshal Beresford talks of eventually going to England in 
the winter. If I retain the command, and should not enter 
further into Prance this winter, I ought to go into Catalonia, to 
put matters on a better footing than they are. How I am to 
settle the rank and pretensions of the gentlemen left behind me, 
I am sure I do not know." (xi. 208.) 



The Spaniards seemed at length to have been con- 
vinced of the comparative inefficiency of their own gene- 
rals, and of the military superiority of Lord Wellington ; 
and, in spite of their national vanity, conferred upon him 
the command of their armies. 

It had been often talked of, though perhaps never in 
earnest, and his distrust of every military arrangement in 
the country had invariably made him reluctant to accept 
it, even if it had been offered. But having now entered 
upon the soil of Spain, having taken possession for a 
time of the capital, and having found in every affair 
where Spanish troops were, or professed to be, engaged, 
how utterly worthless they were under existing circum- 
stances, he gave way, for these reasons : — 

" I am informed that the Spanish Government have con- 
ferred upon me the command of their armies. 

" The circumstances affecting the decision on this subject 
have altered; and it is impossible that operations can be suc- 
cessfully carried on by British and Portuguese armies, and with 
Spanish troops, without some concert. Indeed, as the Spaniards 
have lost nearly all their cannon, and all their cavalry, they 
cannot act separate from the Allies ; and it is expedient on every 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 43 

ground that the general command should be vested in one 
person. 

" I have not thought proper, therefore, to decline." (ix. 470.) 

He had made his arrangements by the end of March, 
1813, for the approaching campaign, and with his usual 
sanguine cheerfulness writes to Mr. Wellesley, expressing 
his entire confidence, if he had any other people to deal 
with but the Spaniards, who had done little or nothing 
about money : — 

" I wish and propose to open the campaign on the 1st of 
May, and to aid the several Spanish corps ; but, from all I hear, 
I am afraid that none of them will be ready. We shall be so ; 
I hope, completely ; and if there was money I should entertain 
no doubts of the result of the next campaign : but I have cer- 
tainly the most obstinate and worst-tempered people to deal 
with that I have yet met in my life. 

"Depend upon it, the next campaign depends upon our 
financial resources. I shall be able in a month to take the field 
with a larger and more efficient British and Portuguese force 
than I have yet had ; and there are more Spanish troops clothed, 
armed, and disciplined, than have eVer been known; and we are 
making daily progress towards getting out of the chaos in which 
I found matters." (x. 240.) 

" I never saw the British army so healthy or so strong. 
We have gained in strength 25,000 men since we went into 
cantonments in the beginning of December, and infinitely more 
in efficiency!" (x. 357.) 

He commenced his movements on the 19th of May, 
and quitted Portugal for the last time. The battle of 
Vittoria took place on the 21st of June, and he advanced 
to the Pyrenees immediately. He writes to the Govern- 
ment as to his future movements : — 

" It is a common error to believe that there are no limits to 
military success. After having driven the French to the frontier 
of France, it is generally supposed that we shall immediately 



44 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 

invade France; and some even expect that we shall be at Paris 
in a month. 

" I entertain no donbt that I could enter France to-morrow, 
and establish the army on the Adour ; but I could go no 
further. So far for the immediate invasion of France ; which, 
from what I have seen of the negotiations in the north of 
Europe, I have determined to consider only in reference to the 
convenience of my own operations." (x. 613.) 

Here was the bold and resolute general, whose 
arrangements and forethought had been attended with 
all the success which he could have anticipated, com- 
bining caution with confidence. Not seduced by the 
brilliancy of his advance so far, — not dazzled by the 
glory which his brave army had acquired, — not run 
away with by the intemperate ardour of those who (as 
we have just read) calculated upon being at Paris in a 
month, he exercises his judgment and authority to 
repress (which is perhaps sometimes more difficult than 
to excite) the ardour of his victorious troops. 

His ultimate decision upon the advance into Erance 
was naturally dependent, in a great measure, upon the 
state of the war on the German frontier. The Allies had 
been very successful; and some offer appears to have 
been made to him, or, at all events, some suggestion had 
been thrown out for him, to change the scene of his glory 
from the Peninsula to the North. But he was not to be 
tempted or dazzled, even by the splendid prospect of 
commanding the masses that were assembled from every 
power in Europe ; and he answered with his usual wil- 
lingness to comply with orders, but offering, with the 
simple, honest, and proud consciousness of his value where 
he was, his reasons against such an appointment. 

His reply to Lord Bathurst, on the 12 th of July, 
1813, was:— 

" My future operations will depend a good deal upon what 



AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 45 

passes in the north of Europe. However, the Government and 
the Allies may depend upon it that / will do all that I can. 

" In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince 
Regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his Government 
please. But I would beg them to recollect, that the advantages 
which I enjoy here consist in the confidence that everybody feels 
that I am doing what is right ; which advantage I should not 
enjoy (for a time, at least) in Germany. Many might be found 
to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany ; 
but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should 
be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should 
be left in the Peninsula, it is best that I should remain with it." 
(x. 523.) 

In the latter part of that year it appears to have been 
a question with the Government at home, whether it might 
not be more advantageous to employ a British army in 
Holland or in the north of Europe, in preference to the 
Spanish frontier, and that some proposition of the sort 
had been made to Lord Wellington. 

(e In regard to the scene of operations, it is a question for 
the Government, and not for me. With about 30,000 men in 
the Peninsula, we have now for five years given employment to 
at least 200,000 French, as it is ridiculous to suppose that 
either the Portuguese or the Spaniards could have resisted for a 
moment. If we were withdrawn, it is much more likely that he 
would make peace with the Peninsula, and turn against the 
Allies the 200,000 men, of which 100,000 are such troops as 
their armies have not yet had to deal with. 

" The change of scene of the operations of the British army 
would put it entirely hors de combat for four months at least, 
even if the new scene were Holland ; and they would not then 
be such a machine as this army is. 

"Does any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an 
army in our position more than he would feel any 30 or 
40,000 British troops laying siege to a fortress in Holland ? If 
it be only the resource of men and money of which he will be 
deprived, and the reputation he will lose by our being in this 



46 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, ETC. 

position (further advanced in the French territory than any of 
the allied powers), it will do ten times more to procure peace 
than ten armies on the side of Flanders. 

" It is the business of the Government, and not mine, to dis- 
pose of the resources of the nation. I wish, however, to impress, 
that you cannot maintain military operations in the Peninsula 
and in Holland : you must give up one or the other, as the 
British establishment is not equal to two armies in the field. 

" I do not wish to make complaints, but if you look at every 
branch of the service here you will find it stinted. 

" You are also acquainted with the state of our financial re- 
sources. We are overwhelmed with debts, and I can scarcely 
stir out of my house on account of public creditors waiting for 
payment of what is due to them. 

tf I draw your attention to these facts, to show that Great 
Britain cannot extend her operations without starving the service 
here, unless additional means should be used to procure what is 
wanted." (xi. 384.) 

We have thus established what we set out by pre- 
mising, that he was gifted with a feeling of self-confidence, 
and an elastic buoyancy of spirit, that have seldom been 
more strikingly displayed, and never, perhaps, more 
severely tested. 



FORGIVENESS OE INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF 

CHARACTER. 



A singular power of overlooking and forgiving what 
men, in all conditions of life, might not unreasonably 
consider as injustice to themselves, seems to have dis- 
tinguished him from a very early period of his profes- 
sional career. In every case of the sort which is brought 
to our notice, we find that, strongly as he may have felt 
it, he invariably brings it to a conclusion by looking at 
the public, rather than the personal result. It would not 
be in human nature that he should not feel it, but his 
equanimity, his temper, and his exalted sense of duty, 
enabled him to view it in the most favourable and 
placable light. 

The first, and indeed, perhaps, the most striking, 
because the most important instance of this, is furnished 
by his letters in India in the year 1801, when he was 
suddenly, and, as he thought, unfairly, superseded in a 
military appointment, which he felt justly was of vital 
importance to his future professional prospects. 

In the latter part of the year 1800 a force was 
ordered to assemble at Trincomalee, under Colonel 
Wellesley, with Colonel Champagne as second in com- 
mand, to be applied, amongst other objects (if required), 
to co-operate with any British force then employed in 
Egypt. 



4S FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

An attack upon the Isle of France was also projected; 
and Colonel Wellesley was ordered to proceed there, if 
the plan should appear to be practicable. The Governor- 
general, in a private letter of the 1st December, 1800, 
expresses to Colonel Wellesley his feeling that — 

' ' Great jealousy will arise among the general officers in con- 
sequence of my employing you ; but I do so because I rely upon 
your good sense, decision, activity, and spirit, and I cannot find 
all these qualities united in any other officer in India who could 
take such a command." (i. 36.) 

Colonel Wellesley was at this time thirty-one years 
of age, and it would not have been surprising if such an 
eulogy from such a man had tended to abate the modesty 
and simplicity of character which we shall show that he 
possessed, and retained unimpaired. 

The Governor-general's letter continued : — 

" If you succeed in taking the Isles of France and Bourbon, 
I mean to appoint you to the government of them, with the 
chief military command annexed. But I consider Mysore to be 
a greater field for you, where you might be more useful to the 
public." 

Three weeks after, the Marquis Wellesley writes 
again : — 

11 It is necessary that I should inform you, that if circum- 
stances ultimately determine me to attempt the expedition to 
Egypt, it will require so large a force as to occasion the necessity 
of my employing one or two of his majesty's general officers. 
You will judge whether your best post would not be Mysore. 
Either Sir James Craig or General Baird, or both, would pro- 
bably be employed in the service against Egypt; and I appre- 
hend that in neither of tfeese cases your situation would be very 
eligible." (i. 47.) 

All these expeditions, after many changes of plan, 
were ultimately abandoned, and that to Egypt was fixed 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 49 

upon, under the command of General Baird, with Colonel 
Wellesley as second in command. 

General Baird had not arrived, and Colonel Wellesley 
decided, upon his own responsibility, upon taking the 
force to Bombay, on their way to their ultimate desti- 
nation, the Red Sea. 

The Governor-general writes to him : — 

" I am persuaded that a full consideration of the question 
will induce you to agree with me, that the extent of the force 
rendered it necessary to appoint a general officer to the chief 
command, while the sudden call to active service precluded the 
possibility of removing you from the second in command with- 
out injuring your character. You will, however, exercise your 
judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to 
Mysore : but my decided opinion is, that you will best satisfy 
your public duty, and maintain the reputation of your public 
spirit, by serving cheerfully and zealously in your present 
situation." (i. 75.) 

Cheerfully and zealously was the way in which he 
always performed every duty, and he remained with 
the expedition ; but we learn by his private letters how 
deeply he felt it. 

Ip a letter to his brother Henry he says : — 

" I shall always consider these expeditions as the most 
unfortunate circumstances for me that could have occurred, and 
as such I shall always lament them. I was at the top of the 
tree in this country. The Governors of Fort St. George and 
Bombay placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received 
strong and repeated marks of their approbation. 

" But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded 
upon any service I may have rendered. 

" Has there been any change of circumstances that was 
not expected when I was appointed to the command ? If there 
has not, my supercession must have been occasioned by my 
own misconduct, or by an alteration of the sentiments of the 
Governor-general! I have not been guilty of robbery or 

E 



50 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

murder, and he has certainly changed his mind : but the world, 
which is always good-natured to those whose affairs do not 
exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect 
both. 

" I did not look, and did not wish for the appointment, 
and it would probably have been more proper to give it to some- 
body else; but when it was given to me, it would have been 
fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to 
lose it. 

" I put private considerations out of the question, as they 
ought to have no weight either in my original appointment or 
my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in 
which I have been treated on the occasion. 

" However I have lost neither my health, spirits, or temper, 
in consequence thereof. It is useless to write upon a subject 
of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever." (i. 82.) 

In another letter, a few days later, to the Hon. 
H. Wellesley, he says : — 

" My former letters will have shown you how much this 
will annoy me : but I have never had much value for the public 
spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and 
convenience when it is necessary." (i. 84.) 

Judging by the remarkable taciturnity which dis- 
tinguished him to the end of his life, in all cases strictly 
personal, his feelings must have been very much excited 
upon this occasion to have induced him to give vent to 
them in such terms. 

But whatever they might be, no rancour or bitter- 
ness existed toward General Baird, who arrived at 
Bombay and assumed the command, with Colonel Wel- 
lesley under him. He did not, however, accompany the 
expedition. He was seized with an intermittent fever, 
which lasted till after the fleet sailed : and though he 
had intended to follow it, he was attacked with another 
disorder, which required him to seek a colder climate, 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 51 

and compelled him to relinquish the idea. He reported 
this, of course, to General Baird (who had then sailed), 
and we annex a part of his letter, exemplifying strongly 
the quality of his mind as regards the forgiveness, or 
one may say the forgetfulness, of personal annoyance. 
After mentioning the state of his health, he adds : — 

" I should be mad if I were to think of going at this 
moment. As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely 
acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accom- 
panying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid> 
and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me : 
and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such 
treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding 
going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what 
they are at this moment. As I lmow what has been said, and 
expected, by the world in general, I propose, as well for my 
own credit as for yonrs, to make known to my friends and to 
yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have 
behaved to me, but the causes which have prevented my de- 
monstrating my gratitude by giving you every assistance in the 
arduous service which you have to conduct." (i. 89.) 

Before he recovered and left Bombay, he wrote to 
Colonel Champagne, who had been nominated as his 
second in command, upon the first assembling of the 
troops at Trincomalee, and who was probably fully aware 
of his disappointment : — 

" I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have 
caused my removal from the command ; but I conclude that 
the Governor- general found that he could not resist the claims 
that General Baird had to be employed. I believe you know 
that I always thought that General Baird had not been well 
used, when I was called to the command. But I do not think 
it was proper that / should be disappointed more than he was, 
in order that he might have no reason to complain. However, 
this is a matter of little consequence to anybody but myself, 
therefore I say no more about it. 



52 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

" Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, 
but said he should regret my doing so ; and for this reason, and 
because I saw in the General the most liberal intention to allow 
me to render him the services I could, / determined to proceed 
upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and 
cannot join the armament. 

" I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my repu- 
tation and future views ; but it cannot be helped, and to things 
of that nature / generally contrive to make up my mind. 33 (i. 99.) 

This is the last letter which we find upon the sub- 
ject. It shows that to the last he was deeply impressed 
with what he considered a severe blow to his pro- 
fessional character, but it tends to throw out with addi- 
tional lustre the high principle which induced him to 
overlook it all, and the high sense of duty which regu- 
lated every motive and every action. 

The Governor-general had given him the assurance 
that he should be allowed to resume the command in 
Mysore ; but his official application to Lord Clive, the 
Governor of Madras, is so simple, that it really deserves 
insertion. 

After stating the reasons for his not going with the 
army to Egypt, he says : — 

" I acknowledge, that though I expected to return under 
your lordship's orders more worthy of your favour than I have 
been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satis- 
faction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed 
in me, nor the favour with which all my endeavours to serve 
the public were received by you; and if your lordship should 
think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an 
adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained 
your approbation will, I hope, gain it again." (i. 97.) 

He resumed the command at Seringapatam, where 
he remained upwards of a year. He was made a Major- 
general in April 1802. 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 53 

Early in 1803 the state of the Mahratta powers 
made it necessary to send a division of the British army 
into their territories. Lieutenant-general Stuart had the 
chief command of the troops in the Madras Presidency, 
and Lord Clive, the Governor, recommended to him 
that Major-general Wellesley should be selected for the 
command of the advancing detachment. 

Previous to that advance, amongst the numerous 
communications to General Stuart (his chief), is one 
which again shows so strongly his sense of duty and 
subordination, combined at the same time with such 
an honourable consciousness of his own power and con- 
fidence of success, that it cannot in justice be omitted : — 

" If you should take the command of the detachment your- 
self, I hope you will do me the favour to allow me to accompany 
you, in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that 
country, in a military point of view, was learned when I was 
in it, and I shall do everything in my power to make myself 
useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the 
command, and should be pleased to entrust it to me, I shall be 
infinitely gratified, and shall do everything in my power to for- 
ward your views." (hi. 22.) 

General Stuart did not take the command, and 
General Wellesley was invested with very full powers, 
seldom, perhaps, entrusted to an officer of his com- 
paratively junior rank, and thus commenced that bril- 
liant career which has shed such a glory upon himself 
and his country. 

But notwithstanding the feelings of honest pride and 
exultation which must have accompanied the glorious 
successes of the campaign, notwithstanding the almost 
unparalleled confidence which was reposed in him by 
all the superior authorities, and notwithstanding the un- 
usually extensive powers with which he was invested, 



54 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, - 

he never seems to be dazzled by the splendour of his 
position, or mn away with by the distinction which he 
was daily acquiring. 

His own glory seems to be left out of his considera- 
tion. His view^s were entirely fixed upon the future 
benefit and advantage of the country for which he was 
fighting, and the effects which would be produced when- 
ever he should be removed from his present exalted 
station. 

This is strongly exemplified in a letter addressed to 
the Government of Bombay (with which he had not had 
entire reason to be satisfied) on Dec. 5, 1803 : — 

" In conducting the extensive duties with which I am 
charged, it has been my constant wish to conform to existing 
rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so 
that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, 
everything might go on in its accustomed channel. I do not 
comprehend, and cannot say that I admire the system, accord- 
ing to which the Guickwar government is carried on, but this 
probably proceeds from ignorance of the subject; and if I 
were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would 
be inconsistent with the existing system. I am, therefore, very 
desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part than I 
have hitherto, and that matters should be conducted as usual. 

" Whenever the Governor in Council may think proper to 
call for my opinion upoD any subject, I will give it to him to 
the best of my judgment; and I will do so whenever I may think 
it necessary, in all matters which have a relation to our general 
situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into 
the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to 
comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never 
intended that I should be charged." (i. 537.) 

Having brought the war to a successful termination, 
the army was broken up, and he returned by Seringa- 
patam, and ultimately resigned all his military powers 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 55 

on the 29th of June, 1804. Prom thence he went to 
Calcutta. 

In November, the state of affairs induced the 
Governor-general to reappoint him to the command in 
the Deccan, and he proceeded as far as Seringapatam. 
Here he was again attacked with fever, and the state of 
the country appearing to be more settled he did not 
go further. This decision seems to have been a source 
of anxiety to him ; and in a letter to the private secre- 
tary of the Governor-general, .in January 1805, he gives 
his reasons : — 

" I acknowledge that I have determined not to go, but not 
without doubt and hesitation. I know that all classes look up 
to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. 
I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan, and 
the same state of affairs which now renders my presence there 
desirable may exist for the next seven years. I should not think 
it necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than 
the Governor-general should stay in India, and I conclude that 
he intends to go in February. Having considered whether my 
presence there for one, two, or three months would answer any 
purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not. 
In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly w r hether the 
Court of Directors or the King's Ministers have any claim upon 
me to remain for a great length of time in this country. 

" I have served the Company in important situations for 
many years, and have never received anything but injury from 
the Court of Directors,* although I am a singular instance of an 
officer who has served under all the governments ; and there is 
not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of 
disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or 
even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or 
civil authorities with whom I have served. 

" The King's Ministers have as little claim upon me as the 

* We find nothing in these Dispatches to explain this. 



56 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknow- 
ledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations 
that military service in India would be considered in the scale in 
which similar services are in other parts of the world. But I 
might have expected to be placed on the staff in India ; and yet, 
if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, 
General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. 
This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject 
of a good deal of conversation. 

" If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of 
the British empire, or to ensure its peace, I should not hesitate 
a moment about staying, even for years ; but these men or the 
public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because 
my presence may be attended by convenience. 

" But this is not the only point. I have considered whether, 
in the affairs of India at present, my arrival in England is not 
desirable ? Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the 
increase of the military establishments, and to explode some 
erroneous notions upon this subject ? Are there not a variety of 
subjects upon whici verbal explanation is necessary ? 

" I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go to the 
Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity to England, I 
consult the public interests not less than I do my own 
wishes." (ii. 518.) 

In a later letter to Major Shawe, the Private Secre- 
tary to the Governor-general, dated Feb. 3, 1805, he 
says : — 

" I now feel an anxiety only about my departure for 
England, which I cannot describe. I have no confidence in my 
own judgment in any case in which my own wishes are involved. 
This is the cause of the great anxiety which I have felt, and 
still feel, upon these subjects. I know that my presence in 
England would be useful, and I am certainly very anxious to go 
there. 

" I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which 
his own wishes are concerned; and I have not come to this 
determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees with me 
upon every part of the subject." (ii. 572.) 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. "57 

He arrived in England in September 1805. 



We have in other parts detailed his occupations from 
that time, till he was sent out the second time to 
Portugal. 

No man could have been insensible to this mark of 
confidence (after all that had happened), in being 
selected as the man upon whom the military fame of his 
country was to rest ; but nothing shows itself in his 
language or conduct. On the contrary, there is the 
same simplicity as ever ; and when he is informed by 
our Minister to the Central Junta, that persons in autho- 
rity at Seville had suggested his appointment to the 
command of the Spanish army, he replies thus : — 

" I am much flattered at the suggestion. I have received 
no instructions from Government upon that subject; but I 
believe that it was considered an object of great importance in 
England that the Commander-in-chief of the British troops 
should have that situation, but one more likely to be attained by 
refraining from expressing it, and by leaving to the Spanish 
Government themselves to discover the expediency of the 
arrangement, than by any suggestion on our parts. 

" I concluded that you had been made acquainted with the 
wishes of Government ; but if you had no knowledge of them, I 
do not conceive that your insinuations upon the subject are 
likely to have any effect. That which will prevent the accom- 
plishment of this object is the jealousy of the Spaniards." 
(iv. 389.) 

At rather a later period he writes to Lord Castle- 
reagh : — 

" I think the first part of this letter will give you my opinion 
respecting one notion you entertained, viz. that the Spaniards 
might be induced to give the command of their armies to a 
British commander-in-chief. 

" If such offer should be made to me, I shall decline to 



58 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

accept it till I should receive His Majesty's pleasure; and I 
strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk 
of the loss of your army, not to have anything to do with 
Spanish warfare, on any ground whatever, in the existing state of 
things. The jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most 
attached to us, is so rooted that even if they were induced in 
their present difficulties to cede Cadiz to induce me to remain in 
Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could 
spare would be safe in that place. 

" You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the command 
of the armies of Spain/' (v. 89.) 

His judgment upon the Spanish character was a 
most correct one, and was abundantly proved on many 
subsequent occasions. 

But although his natural good sense, and the total 
absence of all vanity, made him hesitate (indeed we may 
say, virtually refuse) to entertain any proposition respect- 
ing the Spanish command, advantageous as it would 
have been if frankly granted, he felt the difference of his 
position in Portugal, where he was made Marshal- 
general, and which he accepted without difficulty. In a 
letter to the British minister he says ; — 

u I have received a letter from the Prince Regent from the 
Brazils, appointing me the Marshal-general of his army, with 
all the power and privileges held by the Due de la Foens. I 
believe that is w r hat I had before, and was certainly as much 
as was necessary, or as I could manage ; and I do not see any 
reason for altering our arrangements, and the practice under the 
one appointment, even though the new one may be different." 
(v. 199.) 

The Spanish Government and their military leaders 
in succession had so constantly rejected all his sug- 
gestions, that he had been compelled to break off all 
connexion with their army. Many efforts were made to 
induce him to renew his co-operation with them j but he 
resolutely declined. General Areyzaga had succeeded 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 59 

General Eguia ; but he appeared to be equally incapable, 
and his whole army was destroyed or dispersed at 
Ocana on the 19th of November. 

Lord Wellington was at Seville when the General 
commenced his march, and in more than one conversa- 
tion with the ministers and members of the junta com- 
municated to them his conviction that they would be 
defeated. But the first official information of the move- 
ment was received at Badajoz, the very day before the 
defeat. He gave a written answer to the communi- 
cations the following day ; too late, of course, to avert 
the calamity, but recording the accuracy of his views. 

It was, at all events, some satisfaction to him to be 
able to say, a little after, — 

" I understand that the people of Seville are informed of my 
opinion upon the late expedition, and that they have expressed 
an anxious desire that the Government should attend to what I 
shall recommend to them in future." (v. 316.) 

We do not adduce this with any reference to the 
military view of the question, but merely to prove that, in 
spite of their national pride and vanity, they could not 
help acknowledging the justness of his views ; and to 
show how very quietly and unostentatiously he felt that 
acknowledgment. 

A feeling appears to have existed, that with the 
numerous discontented German soldiers serving in the 
French army, more advantage might have been taken to 
induce them to desert. Mr. Villiers had received sug- 
gestions to this effect, and had communicated them to 
his own Government, and Lord Liverpool had written 
about it to Lord Wellington. 

The latter, feeling how little real ground there was 
to complain, was naturally distressed at finding that 



60 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

his friend had written home without having consulted 
him : — 

" I wish that you had done me the favour to have referred 
the authority to me, upon which you founded your report on 
the subject of German deserters in your dispatch to England, 
before you sent it home, as I could have proved to you that it 
was incorrect, not only in those statements respecting transac- 
tions whilst I commanded the army, but also respecting the 500 
Germans stated to have deserted upon a former occasion. 

" Several people in England have given credit to this state- 
ment, supported as it now is by your authority ; and it is sup- 
posed that I have neglected the important means pointed out of 
diminishing the enemy's forces. Now I must tell you a secret 
upon this subject, and that is, that we have lost more Germans 
by desertion than the French" (v. 317.) 

Mr. Villiers was apparently hurt, and Lord Welling- 
ton writes : — 

" I am much concerned that anything in mine should have 
hurt you. You certainly never communicated to me the infor- 
mation on which you founded your despatch. If I had known 
that your opinion, ' that much might be done to distress France 
by inducing foreigners to desert/ was founded upon reports, I 
should have requested you not to send home those reports,, as 
they would make an impression injurious to me upon false 
grounds. You naturally imagined that the facts were known to 
me, and that from an erroneous opinion I had neglected this 
mode of annoying the enemy. 

u You were right in bringing it before the Government, 
under the impression that I had neglected the subject : but what 
I regretted was, that I had not an opportunity of showing you 
that I had not neglected it, and that you were misinformed as to 
the facts." (v. 325.) 



The Principal Souza, as he was called, and the Patri- 
arch (the Bishop of Oporto), had both been appointed 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 61 

Members of Regency by the Court at the Brazils. The 
former was apparently a man of a very meddling dis- 
position, and probably was very jealous of the power and 
weight of a foreign general. The latter, upon Sir Arthur's 
first arrival in Portugal, had professed a great regard for 
him; but was probably influenced afterwards by the 
same feelings as the Principal ; and in the beginning of 
January, 1811, Lord Wellington expresses his opinion 
of them thus to Mr. Stuart : — 

" The conduct of the Patriarch and of the Principal is very 
improper. I am convinced from their conduct, as well as from 
other circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that 
these persons are endeavouring to form an Anti-English party, 
which affords another reason for removing the Principal from 
Lisbon." (vii. 92.) 

" My opinion is, that there is a plot on foot against the 
English, at the head of which are the Bishop and Souza ; and 
that they want to be able to show that they protested against 
our pretensions to command their army." (vii. 101.) 

A few weeks later he says : — 

" I have lately received several anonymous letters, which 1 
suspect have been written under the directions of the Principal, 
the Bishop, &c; and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you 
will send me any papers you have in the handwriting of either 
of those persons, or their secretaries, &c." (vii. 314.) 

" Baron Eben has made some curious discoveries, and has 
given some papers written by those personages, which tend 
to show their folly equally with their mischievous dispositions. 
Among other plans, they have one for libelling and caricaturing 
me in England! They complain that I have had hunting- 
parties, and that I ate a good dinner at Oporto instead of pur- 
suing Soultl" (vii. 321.) 

" I have this day discovered that some of the anonymous 
letters to me are written by the Principal ; and I suspect others 
by the Bishop. But this last is not so clear. These are men to 
govern a nation in difficult circumstances ! 



62 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

u One of the anonymous letters is positively written by- 
Principal Souza. Two others, I think, by the Bishop ; but of 
this I cannot be so certain, as his note to Baron Eben is written 
upon good paper, with a good pen ; the letters written by the 
same persons to me are upon bad, brown paper, with a bad pen. 
The characters in both are very similar, and I have but little 
doubt are written by the Bishop. It would be very desirable to 
see more of his writings, if you can get some. If I can prove 
the fact clearly, I shall send the letters to the Prince Regent at 
the Brazils, that he may see what clever fellows the Governors of 
the Kingdom are." (vii. 322.) 

A person of the name of Stockier had proposed to 
publish a book, upon which Lord Wellington writes to 
Mr. Stuart: — 

" I return Stockier' s paper, which I have not had leisure to 
read. The Government may publish any nonsense they please ; 
it is entirely a matter of indifference to me : but I think they 
had better take care how they endeavour to set the people of 
the country against those who have saved them. They are 
much mistaken if they think they can do me any harm by such 
nonsense, or that they can themselves stand for a moment after 
they have convinced the people that the English, and I in par- 
ticular, have not done my best for them. I am entirely in- 
different as to Stockier and his book!" (vii. 354.) 

" I am decidedly of opinion, that unless the Portuguese 
Government alter their system entirely, it will be impossible for 
the British army to remain in the country. Has any magistrate 
been yet punished, or even dismissed, for neglecting his duty ? 
Has any alteration been made in the old system of allowing 
every booby to do as he pleases, provided that he cries ' Viva,' 
and attends the levees of the Government and the Ministers ? 

" A fresh invasion would find us exactly where we were last 
year, and I do not think it would be safe to trust the king's 
army in this country." (vii. 476.) 

u I have so repeatedly received anonymous letters from the 
Patriarch and the Principal, that at last it is necessary to put an 
end to a practice which is carried on in the most barefaced 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 63 

manner. I now enclose one, which I beg you will look at, 
merely that you may be able to recognise the writing again in 
case it should come in question, and that you will then forward 
it, as directed, to the Patriarch. I have not read it." (viii. 52.) 

" I have no doubt but that the letter was written by the 
Patriarch, but as you entertain a doubt, I am much obliged by 
your stopping it. 

" To send [back] an anonymous letter to any one is to 
accuse him of writing it, the meanest action of which any man can 
be guilty. It is not very proper, perhaps, to accuse a man in 
the Patriarch's situation, of being guilty of such an action ; but 
he positively ought not to be accused if there is any the slightest 
doubt. I, therefore, acquiesce entirely in your retaining the 
letter." (viii. 67.) 

Here ended any further notice from him of this 
miserable and contemptible affair. Whether the parties 
suspected ever had reason to believe that they were de- 
tected, we do not know ; but though Lord Wellington 
still had abundant proofs of want of cordiality and sup- 
port from the Governors of the Kingdom, we find no 
repetition of wretched and paltry personalities. 

We have seen how nobly and magnanimously he 
could put up with all this unmerited calumny, and that 
the indignation he might naturally feel at such contempt- 
ible injustice did not prevent the continuation of his 
public duties with those who were implicated. 



But we now have a more gratifying task before us. 
We have already adverted to the feeling of doubt and 
discouragement which had pervaded the public mind in 
England, to such an extent that the Government were 
dubious as to the line of policy they ought to pursue in 
regard to the war ; and that, in fact, if Lord Wellington 
had himself given way, all must have been brought to a 
close. 



64 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

His firmness saved the cause : his skill, his calmness, 
and the admirable combination of daring, when required, 
and of caution, when necessary, had produced their effects 
upon the minds of his fellow-countrymen. The tone of 
the debates in the House of Commons, upon questions 
relating to Portugal, had changed. Members who had 
held decided language against a continuance of the war, 
had retracted many of their opinions ; and the following 
picture of Lord Wellington's position and character, in a 
most brilliant speech of Mr. Canning's, on the 26th of 
April, was greeted with approbation by many who 
had formerly held very different opinions. He de- 
scribed him as 

u a man whose natural genius and military experience insured 
the accomplishment of all that was attainable by human sagacity. 
" Follow him from the fatigues of the day to repose in his 
tent : when, instead of consolation, he found accusation ; instead 
of encouragement, misrepresentation and obloquy ; all his 
dangers magnified, and all the means of the enemy exagge- 
rated ; every one of his measures traced to temerity or compul- 
sion, and all the movements of the enemy to wisdom and military 
skill. When the House took all this into its consideration, it 
was impossible not to ascribe his steady and unaltered persever- 
ance to real magnanimity and true valour. Whilst exposed to 
such misrepresentation, he never deigned to notice any of the 
unfounded statements which he saw published : he determined 
not to reply to them in words, but to let the result put the 
calumnies and calumniators to shame; and steadily prosecuting 
his purpose, he forbore throughout all his correspondence from 
introducing one word expressive of discontent. If there was 
anything which could not be contemplated without admiration, it 
was a man exposed to such misrepresentation, and yet disdaining 
to indulge in any expression of his feelings : deliberately charged 
with the two most opposite feelings of general temerity and joro- 
crastination, and yet calmly pursuing that wise and salutary 
course which had brought his country to that happy state when 
Parliament could look back without regret, or look forward 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF- CHARACTER. 65 

with hope, and when gentlemen were at length enabled to dis- 
cuss the question with very considerable advantages." — Pa? j L 
Debates, xix. 773. 

One of the most signal proofs of the changes we 
have adverted to, was a letter written within three days 
of this debate by Mr. Whitbread, M.P. for Bedford, 
who had been one of the most decided objectors to the 
line of policy at home and the general conduct of the 
war abroad. His opinion had changed, and he had the 
manliness and the honourable candour to write to Lord 
Wellington. The Dispatches do not, of course, contain 
the letter itself, but we gather its tenor and purport by 
the reply i — 

" I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th 
April, which I received last night ; and I beg to return my thanks 
for the mode in which you have taken the trouble of informing 
me of the favourable change in your opinion respecting affairs in 
this country. 

" I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that 
persons for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose 
opinions were likely to have great weight in England and 
throughout Europe, had delivered opinions, erroneous as I 
thought, respecting affairs in this country; and I prized their 
judgments so highly that I was induced to attribute their con- 
duct to the excess of the spirit of party. 

" I assure you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by 

the approbation of , and yourself, and others, that 

which gives me most pleasure is to be convinced that such men 
could not be unjust towards an officer in the service of the 
country abroad ; and that the opinions which they had delivered 
were the real dictates of their judgments upon a fair view of all 
the circumstances which had come to their knowledge. To the 
gratification arising from this conviction to one who seems des- 
tined to pass his life in the harness, you have added that which 
I received from your obliging letter, and I assure you that I am 
very sensible of the kindness which induced you to write to me." 
(vii. 585.) 



66 

The change of the seat of war, and the final removal 
of the British array (as a body) from Portugal, in May 
1813, had caused a cessation of the personal hostility on 
the part of some of the Governors of that kingdom, 
and we have no repetition of the odious and vexatious 
proceedings of that nature from thence. 

But the same spirit now broke out in Spain. He 
had been accustomed to every sort of neglect, and injury, 
and almost insult, from that Government, from a very 
early period, which he had borne with his usual com- 
placency; and though he had often been tempted, and 
had threatened to give up their cause and withdraw, he 
had always felt the injury which such a course would 
inflict upon the general cause throughout Europe, and 
made the most vigorous efforts to repress his indignation 
and continue his services. 

For a time, after they had become convinced of the 
utter incapacity of their own generals, and had conferred 
the command of their armies upon him, matters went on 
better. The Spanish troops were improved and brought 
forward; but, notwithstanding the success which attended 
him, there was a party at the seat of government who 
continued bitterly indisposed towards him, and almost 
every pledge and condition entered into with him was 
broken. 

After the siege of San Sebastian a most violent and 
malignant libel was published against the English troops, 
in a paper called the " Duende," founded upon a letter 
written to the War Minister, by the Conde de Villa 
Fuentes, the "Xefe Politico" of Guipuzcoa, complaining 
of the conduct of our soldiers in the storming of the 
place. It charged the officers employed there with 
having ordered or suffered the sack and plundering of 
the town from a feeling of commercial revenge. 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. C7 

Lord Wellington, in his letter to Sir Henry Wel- 
lesley, says: — 

" I need not assure you that this charge is most positively 
untrue. Several persons urged me, in the strongest manner, to 
allow the town to be bombarded, as the most certain mode of 
forcing the enemy to give it up. This I positively would not 
allow ; and yet, if I had harboured so infamous a wish as to 
destroy the town from motives of commercial revenge, or any 
other, I could not have adopted a more certain method than to 
allow it to be bombarded. It was set on fire by the enemy. 

" The ' Xefe Politico/ the author of these complaints, must 
have been as well aware of these facts as I am. 

" In regard to the plunder by the soldiers, I am the last 
man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. I never 
saw, or heard of a town taken by storm, that it was not plun- 
dered. 

" I lament the evils sustained by the unfortunate town as 
much as any man can ; but a person like the ' Xefe Politico ' 
should take care not to attack the character of honourable and 
brave men, who are incapable of being influenced by the in- 
famous motives attributed to them in the libel." (xi. 173.) 

"If it is published in England I shall prosecute the printer. 
/ do not know how long my temper will last, but / never was so 
much disgusted with anything as with this libel; and I do not 
know whether the conduct of the soldiers in plundering San 
Sebastian, or the libels of the 'Xefe Politico' and 'Duende/ 
made me most angry." (xi. 185.) 

" There is no end to the calumnies against me and the army, 
and I should have no time to do anything else if I were to begin 
either to refute or even to notice them. Very lately they took 
the occasion of a libel in an Irish newspaper, reporting a sup- 
posed conversation between Castanos and me (in which i" am 
supposed to have consented to change my religion to become 
king of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the 
grandees), to accuse me of this intention : and then those fools, 

the Duques de and de , and the Visconte de , 

protest formally that they are not of the number who had given 
their consent to such an arrangement ! ! ! What can be done 



68 FORGIVENESS OE INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

with such libels and such people, excepting despise them, and 
continuing one's road without noticing them ? 

" I should have taken no notice of the libel about San 
Sebastian, if it had not come before me officially in the letter 
from the Minister of War; nor shall I of this second libel in the 
i Duende,' although it is obvious that it comes from the Minister 
of War." (xi. 199.) 

" In regard to these libels, I acknowledge that I cannot dis- 
cover either law or justice in the Spanish law of libel, and I do 
not know how to proceed under it. 

"What can be called ' a libel mischievous to the State/ if 
it is not one in a servant of the Government to call upon the 
people of Spain to take vengeance on our officers? 

" If the charge were true, it cannot be proper for a servant 
of the Government, proprietor of a newspaper, to call upon the 
people to revenge themselves. One would suppose that such 
an act would be punished by the law. It appears, however, 
that it is entirely innocent. 

"If such a paragraph as that in the f Duende' had been 
published by an officer of the Government before I entered Spain 
in 1812, and the author had not been punished, or formally 
disavowed, I should never have entered the country, and none 
of the events would have occurred which have delivered it from 
the enemy. 

" As we are now stationed, I wait till I know the conduct 
and decision of the Spanish Government before I take any fur- 
ther steps ; being determined, if they do not completely vindicate 
us, I shall make known my opinion to the King's Government, 
that they ought not to risk their army here where an officer of 
the government has published such an atrocious libel, and then 
called upon the people of Spain to take revenge for facts falsely 
charged upon our officers, the law giving no redress, and the 
Government keeping their officer in his office and taking no 
notice of his conduct. If I was to decide, I would not keep the 
army in Spain one hour." (xi. 232.) 

" I think it advisable that you should have one of the best 
lawyers consulted, and see whether the ' Duende' cannot be 
brought to punishment for that part of his paper where he calls 
on the people of Spain to revenge themselves. The only mode 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 69 

of getting the people in authority to do anything is to frighten 
them." (xi. 247.) 

The "Duende" was prosecuted at the suit of the 
Ambassador before the Junta de Censura, and acquitted! 

The Government published some statements, upon 
which Lord Wellington says: — 

" I have perused the statement published by the authority 
of the Government on the 20th October, which I trust will 
have the effect of effacing the injurious impressions attempted to 
be made by the l Xefe Politico ' of Guipuzcoa, and by the infa- 
mous libellers of Cadiz, and will frustrate the still more infamous 
attempts of the latter to excite the animosity of the people of 
this nation against the British army." (xi. 258.) 

A little later he says to Sir Henry Wellesley : — 

" I agree very much with the British Government about 
these Spanish libels, and think, that being written by the most 
insignificant of the human race, and having no circulation 
excepting in Spain, and that which the English newspapers give 
them, they are quite undeserving of our attention. 

" The only reason I noticed the libel in the f Duende' was, 
that it affected Sir Thomas Graham and the officers of the army ; 
and I was convinced that it was written under the direction of 
that greatest of all blackguards, the Minister at War. If it had 
not been so, I should have wished it to have passed unnoticed/ 7 
(xi. 300.) 

He afterwards writes home : — 

" I have sent to Sir Thomas Graham all the libels, and the 
copy of the publication by the Spanish Government. 

" The fact is, that the libels were published in the 'Duende' 
by an officer in the War Department, who is the editor of that 
paper, and they were part of a scheme to reconcile the Spanish 
public to my removal from the command. There is one of them 
in which the people of Spain are called upon to rise and revenge 
the supposed injury done to San Sebastian, upon which I. pro- 



70 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 

posed to make a complaint to the British Government, if the 
Spanish Government, as usual, took no notice of the matter. I 
made no secret of this intention, which is, I believe, the reason 
why they published what they did." (xi. 313.) 

Some of these aggravating circumstances might, per- 
haps, have been classed under the head of Foreign An- 
noyances, referable to the public service, instead of in- 
cluding them in the class of Personal Injustice to himself. 
It is true that they were connected with other officers, 
and with the service at large : and their effects (if his 
enemies in the Spanish Government had succeeded) 
would have fallen more upon straggling and unprotected 
soldiers of his army, than upon himself. 

But we have been induced to place it here, from 
observing the deep interest which he took in it. " I do 
not know how long my temper will last," " I never was 
so disgusted," are phrases that we do not meet with on 
any other occasion ; and we see in the last letter, from 
which we have made an extract, that however atrocious 
the act was, and however fatal it might have proved to 
the lives of many of his gallant soldiers, if the revengeful 
feelings of the Spaniards had been roused against them, 
he considered it mainly directed against himself, as a 
foreign officer commanding the Spanish army, and as part 
of a scheme to inflame the nation, and thus to lead to 
his removal. 

We have seen the efforts which he made to repress 
his indignation and to continue his command, with a 
view to the public interest ; and the speedy termination of 
his connexion with the country gave him no opportunity 
of showing how far he could have condescended to re- 
conciliation with men who had treated him so infamously, 
and where he had felt himself impelled to call their chief 
War Minister " the greatest of all blackguards ! " 



AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 71 

We have no reason to doubt that, if necessary, he 
would eventually have overlooked the offence, upon 
public grounds ; and, in conformity with what we have 
seen in all other instances, that, even in this exasperating 
case, "his temper" would have recovered, and " his dis- 
gust" would have subsided, and that it would have still 
further tended to confirm our opinion of his general and 
habitual Forgiveness of Injustice to himself. 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 



Intimately connected with the characteristic which we 
have just been considering (so much so, indeed, as to be 
hardly separated from it, excepting that one had refe- 
rence to personal, and the other to public considerations) 
is the firmness and forbearance with which he bore up 
against the incessant (and at times almost ruinous) ob- 
stacles which beset him throughout the greatest part of 
his Peninsular career, and the temper and forgiveness 
with which he was always tempted to treat the authors 
of them. 

They proceeded partly from his own country, and 
partly from the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. 
The two latter were so intermixed — operating often at 
the same moment — that, though proceeding from dif- 
ferent persons, it is difficult to separate them ; and it 
may be best, therefore, to take notice of them as they 
arose. But those originating in his own country arose 
from two sources, — the Government and the Public. 

It was not from the Government (properly so called) 
that his principal embarrassments arose : he might have 
had his doubts, at times, whether Great Britain had not 
undertaken more than she would be enabled to execute, 
but he acknowledges on several occasions that the Minis- 
ters had done their utmost. 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 73 

In a letter to Lord Castlereagh, of August 25, 1809, 
lie says : — 

a It may be satisfactory to you to know, that I do not think 
matters would have been much better if you had sent your large 
expedition to Spain instead of to the Scheldt." (v. 86.) 

The unfortunate termination of that expedition 
had created a strong feeling in this country, that the 
same expenditure of blood and treasure might have been 
better bestowed in augmenting Sir A. Wellesley's army. 
He gives his reasons for the opinion expressed above, 
and absolves the Ministers. And this is not confined to 
his official communications to them, for we find similar 
feelings in his private letters to Mr. Villiers. In January 
1810:—, 

" I do not mean to say that more troops would not be de- 
sirable ; but it must be obvious to you that the Government could 
not give more ; and we could neither feed nor pay more without 
increase of our pecuniary means, which all my communications 
forbid me to expect. Nor will I endeavour to shift from my own 
shoulders on to those of Ministers, who are not strong, the re- 
sponsibility of failure, by calling for means which I know they 
cannot give." (v. 413.) 

It is true that the Government had difficulties to 
contend with, which were materially increased, if not 
created, by the tone of certain members of the House of 
Commons. 

The British people, taken as a mass, are generally 
just and generous, and grateful when they have reason 
to believe that public services are honestly performed. 
But there is no denying that political violence frequently 
obscures this feeling ; and hostility to the reigning autho- 
rities and the party in power, causes a bitterness towards 
all who are employed under them. 

Sir Arthur's early success upon his first landing 



74 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

created, perhaps, an exaggerated feeling of triumph and 
exultation throughout all England ; and the interruption 
of that success, consequent upon his rapid supercession 
(arising from an unforeseen and unfortunate coincidence, 
in no degree reflecting blame either upon him or the 
Government at home), consummated by the disappoint- 
ment of the nation at the Convention of Cintra, with 
which Sir Arthur's name as an executive officer was 
mixed up, caused a revulsion which was perhaps equally 
unreasonable. A few worthies in the House of Commons, 
and the learned and erudite members of the Common 
Council of London, were the persons who led the cry. 
The most rancorous hostility was displayed by persons 
who could have no personal feelings against him, who 
could not pretend from their professions or pursuits to 
any military knowledge which should justify them in 
pronouncing an opinion upon his fitness as a soldier ; 
but he was employed by a Government to which they 
were opposed, and therefore it was not inconsistent with 
their notions of honour and honesty to misrepresent 
him and his deeds, of which they really could know 
nothing. 

But this was the fact : the embarrassments of the 
Government at home were greatly increased by the lan- 
guage and conduct of these men ; and nothing is more 
striking than the calm, firm, and temperate way in which 
Sir Arthur views it. 

In one of his letters to Lord Liverpool he says : — 

" I assure you, that what has passed in Parliament respecting 
me has not given me one momenfs concern, as far as I am per- 
sonally concerned: it has given my friends an opportunity of 

setting the public right. But I regret that men like Lord 

and others should carry the spirit of party so far as to attack an 
officer in his absence, should take the ground of their attack 



JFIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 75 

from 'Cobbett* and the { Moniteur/ and should blame him for 
events over which he could have no control, and for faults which, 
if committed at all, were not committed by him." (v. 524.) 

In a large army totally inexperienced in warlike opera- 
tions upon a large scale, with officers of all ranks, who, 
if they had ever been upon service, could have seen little 
more than a flying, short-lived expedition (such as that 
to the Helder, &c), it is not wonderful that there should 
have been many vain men who would be mortified at the 
exposure of their deficiencies, and therefore discontented 
with him under whom they were placed ; and who would 
write home in terms of disapprobation of their com- 
mander. And it is not wonderful that there were many 
persons ready in this country to receive, to report, and 
to exaggerate every one of these crude representations, 
if it suited their own general tone of politics, and their 
own views, either in Parliament or in the columns of the 
press. Most of them could know nothing of military 
affairs : they sheltered themselves under the pretence of 
guarding the finances of the country. They predicted 
failure because they apparently wished it, and they 
nearly produced it by the daily impediments which they 
interposed. It was their hatred of " the Government" 
that influenced them ; they felt that if they could thwart 
the military operations abroad, if they could stop the 
supplies requisite to carry them on, and if they could 
thereby create an impression in the public mind that the 
measures of that Government were impolitic, and that all 
the blood and treasure were fruitlessly thrown away, they 
should effect the object they had at heart. 

An ingenious writer,* in defence of the conduct 
pursued by the Opposition of that day, has recently had 

* "Edinburgh Review," July 1853, p. 218. 



76 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

the candour to acknowledge tins, and seems to con- 
sider that he offers sufficient grounds for it. 
He says : — 

" We may be permitted to allude to the charge frequently 
brought against the Whigs for their marked opposition to the 
war carried on in Spain by the Duke, and their non-appreciation 
of his full worth. 

" We, in 1853, must remember, that half a century ago the 
great issue had joined upon the Peace or War question. The 
Tories in office knew failure to be the loss of place and power; 
while the Whigs, who really believed themselves to be better 
capable of governing for the interests of the country, thought a 
temporary reverse not too dearly bought, if it put the helm into 
their hands." 

And, with the utmost complacency, he goes on to 
say: — 

" If, in the life-and-death struggle, some temporary injustice 
may have been done to the Duke, how nobly has it been atoned 
for, when all differences merged into one national unanimity of 
respectful esteem and admiration ! ! ! " 

This fine piece of sentiment, translated into common 
language, would seem to imply, " We did him all the 
mischief we could till we found it hopeless, and then we 
changed our tone." 

It may be very liberal, after a lapse of nearly half a 
century, " distinctly to disclaim" as this gentleman does, 
" the coarse diatribes of l Cobbett' ivho re-echoed the lies 
of the ' Moniteur ; ' but they were most unscrupulously 
resorted to in those days, without exciting any such 
expression of virtuous indignation. 



It was not, therefore, from the Government that he 
met with coldness or want of support. But we must 
acknowledge that it was from the Horse Guards, the 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 77 

head of his own profession, where ancient customs and 
former habits still prevailed, and from whence he did not 
meet with the ready acquiescence or assistance that he 
thought he had a right to expect. 

Pushed forward by his talents, which many of his 
official political colleagues w 7 ere fully aware of, it cannot 
be concealed that his prominent position threw many of 
his professional contemporaries into the shade. This 
could not be said to apply to his military distinction in 
India. The nature of the service there is so essentially 
different, the number of officers of " the king's service" 
employed there is comparatively so small, that Jus pre- 
eminence was not likely to interfere with established 
customs, or to excite professional jealousy. But that 
service laid the foundation of his future fame, and pointed 
out an individual of comparatively junior rank, who in 
Europe must have undergone a much longer probation 
before he was likely to have been equally brought for- 
ward. The nature and extent of English military service 
was at that time almost entirely confined to limited, tem- 
porary, and fugitive expeditions, generally undertaken 
upon the spur of the moment, and, unfortunately, never 
leading to permanent benefit. A few thousand men 
were collected for a comparatively unimportant object, 
and generally returned after loss and discomfiture, in 
spite of the personal bravery and individual gallantry 
of those concerned. The habits and ideas, therefore, 
of those in authority were of a very limited nature. We 
do not impugn the good will, or the good intentions, of 
those who were at the head of the military profession ; 
but in fact, up to that time, their knowledge and expe- 
rience did not extend to service upon an enlarged scale. 

The first expedition entrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley 
was very much of the class above described. A sudden 



78 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

and unexpected call from certain individuals in Spain, 
who were smarting under the usurpation of Napoleon, 
roused the feelings of this country. It was supposed 
that a few thousand men, with a few thousand spare 
stands of arms to distribute amongst " the patriots," as 
they were called, would be of service. The proposed 
expedition was very limited in extent, and was evidently 
ordered without any very definite idea of wJiere it was to 
go, or what it was to do ! Sir Arthur was known to be 
an active, intelligent officer, though not of high standing ; 
and it did not appear derogatory to the rest of the pro- 
fession, or an infringement of the rule or custom which 
on former occasions had placed even a prince of the blood 
in command, to entrust it to him. 

It has been said, indeed (though we know not with 
what truth), that in a very early stage of the proceedings 
there were those who demurred to his appointment ; and 
as the urgency of the Spaniards increased, and the feelings 
of this country responded, the moderate views which had 
placed a small force under the command of a not unknown, 
but junior officer, were extended ; additional troops were 
ordered for the service, and senior officers were appointed 
to command them. 

We shall not follow the military progress. We have 
merely adverted to the nature of the whole proceeding 
to show that Sir Arthur, in his subsequent position as 
the Commander-in-chief of the largest force ever em- 
bodied and sent out by Great Britain, was associated 
with, and acting under, persons of long-established 
habits, which did not readily accommodate themselves 
to his more enlarged views. And hence arose many dif- 
ficulties, many obstacles, from the Home authorities, which 
it required more than ordinary equanimity to struggle 
with. 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 79 

As the army increased in amount by the reinforce- 
ments sent out, and the distance from the point of 
debarkation increased by his advance towards the 
Spanish frontier, all the difficulties arising from total 
inexperience of service (and, perhaps, the erroneous 
nature of our military organisation) increased in an 
accumulated degree. It would not be fair to blame the 
Horse Guards for all these defects, which were now 
painfully brought to view nearly for the first time ; but 
it is undeniable that the rules and customs of the Com- 
mander-in-chief's office at home were ill-calculated to 
abate the evil. 

Sir Arthur writes a doleful letter to the Secretary of 
State, in June 1809, upon his advance towards Spain 
after the capture of Oporto. He points out most forcibly 
the total want of power in the hands of a commander to 
repress or to punish the outrages of which he complains ; 
and he adds : — 

"We all know that the discipline of armies must depend 
upon the diligence of regimental officers, I may order what I 
please : but if they do not execute what I order, I cannot expect 
that the soldier will be regular. 

" There are two incitements to men of this description to 
make them do their duty as they ought : fear of punishment, 
and hope of reward. 

" The first cannot be given individually, for these evils are 
committed by whole corps ; and the only way they can be punished 
is by disgracing them. I may and shall do this to one or two, 
but I cannot venture to do it by more ; and then there is an end 
to the fear of this punishment, even if those who received it were 
considered in England as disgraced persons rather than martyrs." 
(iv. 406.) 

This, perhaps, was attributable to the nature of our 
military law, which, as he says in the same letter, "is 
not strong enough to maintain discipline upon service." 



80 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

But the want of the alternative, viz. the power ofReicard, 
was very much, if not altogether, attributable to the rules 
of our office and our officials. 

" As to the other incitement to officers to do their duty 
zealously, there is no such thing. We who command have not 
the power of rewarding, or promising a reward, for a single officer 
in the army ; and we deceive those who are placed under us, if 
we hold out to them that they shall derive advantage from the 
exertion of that power in their favour. 

" You will say in answer to all this, that British armies have 
been in the field before, and that these complaints have not ex- 
isted." 

This is exactly what we have already stated, that the 
rules of our office were founded upon old customs and 
habits inapplicable to the emergency of the times, and 
Sir Arthur reasons in the same way. He goes on to 
say :— 

" I answer : first, that armies are larger, operations more 
extended, and the exertions required are greater; secondly, 
that our law, instead of being strong in proportion, has been 
weakened ; and, finally, that it is only within late years that the 
Commanders-in-chief abroad have been deprived of all patronage, 
and, of course, of all power of incitement to the officers under 
their command. 

" It may be supposed that I wish for the patronage to gratify 
my own favourites ; but I declare most solemnly, that if I had 
it to-morrow there is not a soul in the army whom I should 
wish to promote, excepting for service performed. 

" We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to 
fight ; but take my own word for it, that either defeat or success 
would dissolve us." 

He seems to have had additional grounds of com- 
plaint ; not only for being debarred (as we have seen) 
from conferring, by his own authority, reward for good 
service, but actually that, either from inadvertency or 
from a pertinacious determination to keep the authority 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 81 

entirely in their own hands at home, men who had been 
sent to England in disgrace were sent ont to him again. 
In June, 1809, he writes home to the Military Secre- 
tary:— 

" I enclose a letter received from Staff-surgeon , not 

because I am apprehensive that the Commander-in-chief should 
listen to the reports of an inferior officer, to the prejudice of his 
superior ; for if we are fit to be trusted, our characters are not 
to be injured by defamatory reports of this description : but 
there are not wanting in England channels for circulating de- 
famation of this kind. 

" Mr. Staff- surgeon was sent home some time ago in 

consequence of a complaint against him, and because he is a 
person of a temper with which no one can agree. But, notwith- 
standing, he was sent back here ; and considering that it was 
still desirable that he should not serve with the army in Portugal, 
I lately ordered that he should return to England with sick and 
wounded prisoners. This drew a remonstrance, to which I paid 
no attention, and then he commenced his inquiries into the con- 
duct of his superior officer. 

"I shall be obliged to the Commander-in-chief if he will 
prevent his being sent back to Portugal." (iv. 424.) 

The question of Bank, of officers serving in the Por- 
tuguese army, had been a source of much embarrassment 
from a very early period. 

With a view to the formation of an efficient Portuguese 
army, deficient as that nation was in the class of persons 
suitable for officers, it was proposed to introduce British 
officers. As an inducement to gentlemen to accept the 
duty, it was agreed to give one step of British rank, to 
remain permanent when the foreign service might ter- 
minate, and again one step in advance in Portuguese 
rank during the continuance in that service. 

This led to much inconvenience when the two armies 
were acting together. A junior British ensign received 

G 



82 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

his lieutenancy for going into the Portuguese service, in 
which he was then made a captain, and thus became 
senior to all British lieutenants. In the commencement, 
when the numbers were comparatively limited, this was 
not much felt, but it afterwards became very embarrass- 
ing. Sir Arthur had many communications with the 
home authorities, and made various suggestions with a 
view to remedy the evil. He was very long before he 
could obtain any decision, which at last was against the 
view which he had taken. 

In a letter to Lord Castlereagb he says ■ — 

"My opinion always has been, that the mode of applying 
the services of British officers has been erroneous : many {all in 
the inferior ranks) are useless. Besides, the selection of those 
sent out has been unlucky; and the decision on the question I 
sent home has been made without reference to circumstances, or 
to the feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was 
to operate, and just like every other decision I have ever seen 
from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and stones." (v. 87.) 

Some months after this, to show the practical incon- 
venience of the working of this mode of transacting 
business, we have a letter to Marshal Beresford : — 

"I never know to what regiment the Horse Guards will 
appoint an officer whom I recommend for a commission ; and I 
am, therefore, unwilling to send Mr. Dunlop to any particular 
regiment, lest he should not be posted to it." (v. 306.) 

With the peculiar delicacy that marked all Sir 
Arthur's communications, avoiding, in a marked manner, 
all personal allusions, we have no present means of know- 
ing to whom reference is made in the following letter to 
Lord Liverpool ; but it indicates pretty clearly that he 
had not implicit confidence in the discretion or discrimi- 
nation of those upon whom the selection depended ■ — 

" I wrote to you the other day about general officers. I 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 83 

only beg you not to send me any violent party men. We 
must keep the spirit of party out of the army, or we shall be in 
a bad way, indeed." (v. 393.) 

There is no doubt that the enormous expenses of the 
war, including the immense advances of money, arms, 
and stores of every kind sent to the Allies, imposed very 
heavy duties upon the Government. It would be too 
much to say that they were inert or sluggish ; they had 
their difficulties to contend with in Parliament and else- 
where : but, unquestionably, what might appear to be 
merely official routine, and the usual course of transact- 
ing business at home, created fearful anxiety, and caused 
the greatest inconvenience to those who were abroad, 
and who were entirely dependent upon England for 
everything ! 

Writing home to Lord Liverpool on the 1 bth January, 
1810, Sir Arthur says : — 

" We have received no intelligence of any kind from England 
since the 20th of last month. It would be very desirable if the 
packets were dispatched regularly, even though the Ministers 
should not write. The newspapers contain intelligence which 
it is desirable we should have. 

" It would, also, be very desirable if an early answer were 
sent to our requisitions for supplies, stating only whether they 
would be complied with in the whole, or to what extent, and in 
what probable period. If we cannot have them we should know 
it, in order to make other arrangements, and narrow our system 
in proportion to the deficiency of our means in time." (v. 434.) 

It really seems an extraordinary thing, that in exe- 
cuting the duties of a great empire like Great Britain, it 
should be necessary to impose upon the commander of 
its largest army the duty, in detail, of applying to the 
Secretary of State, and a member of the cabinet, upon 
the subject of how the soldiers were to cook their dinners. 
The subject did not come within the ordinary scope of 



84 FIRMNESS UNDER IIOME ANNOYANCES. 

the Secretary of State's arrangements, but it had been 
properly referred to the proper office, that of the Com- 
mander-in-chief, and not acted upon : and reference to 
Lord Liverpool seemed to be Sir Arthur's only chance 
of getting a decision. 

" I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote many months 
ago [28th September, 1809 — this letter being dated, 14M March, 
1810] to the Commander-in-chief, and no answer has yet been 
returned ! 

" The inconveniences of this delay in giving an answer are 
daily increasing, and will be most severely felt by the troops, if 
they should be engaged with the enemy before arrangements 
are made for providing for the carriage of their camp-kettles, 
discussed in that letter. 

" I beg only to mention, that the soldiers cannot cook their 
food unless they have camp-kettles !" 

The solemn sarcasm in this last sentence, announcing 
an important truth to the Secretary of State, is invalu- 
able, as showing the way in which business was done in 
those days in the office where such matters ought to be 
arranged. 



The Government itself was in a very precarious con- 
dition soon after this time ; and no doubt the firmness 
of his rulers, which would have tended greatly to main- 
tain and encourage Lord Wellington in his trying posi- 
tion, was much wanting. He evidently felt it, for we 
find him writing to Admiral Berkeley in April, — 

" The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them 
and myself into a scrape. But what can be expected from men 
who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a-week ? 
A great deal might be done now if there existed in England 
less party and more public sentiment, and if there was any 
Government." (vi. 21.) 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 85 

The restricted power in his hands of rewarding those 
whom he might think deserving pressed upon him with 
increased force, as the exigencies of service, and the ne- 
cessity for stimulating individual exertions, or rewarding 
individual merit, increased. 

In a letter to the Military Secretary of the Com- 
mander-in-chief in August, 1810, after again urging the 
claim for promotion for different officers, he again ad- 
verts to the condition in which a commander of the 
forces on service was placed ; with, at the same time, 
the same noble, disinterested statement of his own views, 
that we have seen on former occasions : — 

a I am tempted to communicate my opinion upon the dis- 
posal of the patronage of the troops on foreign service. In all 
services excepting that of Great Britain (and in that in former 
times), the commander of an army employed against the enemy 
in the field had the power of promoting officers, at least to 
vacancies occasioned by the service. 

" It was pretty nearly the case formerly in our own service, 
and I believe the greater number of the general officers of the 
higher ranks of the present day were made lieutenant-colonels 
by Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, &c. 
But how is it now ? I, who command the largest army that has 
been employed against the enemy for many years, have not even 
the power of making a corporal I 

" It is not known to the army and to strangers, and I am 
almost ashamed to acknowledge the small degree (I ought to 
say nullity) of power of reward which belongs to my situation. 

"I do not entertain these opinions because there are any 
officers attached to me for whom I desire promotion. All my 
aides-de-camp have been promoted in their turn in their regi- 
ments, or are to be promoted for carrying home the account of 
victories. The consequence of the change of system to me, 
would be only to give me the power of rewarding the services of 
those who exerted themselves zealously. 

" I have been induced to communicate these opinions from 



86 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

a strong conviction of their truth, and not, I assure you, from 
any interest I feel in the result. / would not give one pin to 
have the disposal of every commission in the army." (vi. 304.) 

The irregularity of the arrangements respecting the 
sailing of the packets, both to and from England, was 
very great. We have already recorded his sense of the 
inconvenience of their not coming at fixed periods from 
England (p. 83), and we find that he suffered equally by 
the uncertainty of their being sent from Lisbon. 

It arose, probably, from some considerations of eco- 
nomy at home, which, in the momentous condition of 
the Peninsula at that time, would seem to be mis- 
placed. 

" I am concerned to hear that the rule respecting the packets 
cannot be adhered to. It is most convenient to the army and 
to my public business, and I acknowledge that I do not see the 
necessity of breaking through a rule to send off a packet every 
Sunday, if there should be one in the Tagus. 

" However," (he adds, with his usual willingness to submit 
to any personal inconvenience, and to make the best of it,) "it 
is no business of mine, and I shall accommodate myself to any 
plan that may be adopted" (v. 295.) 

It would have appeared most natural that the British 
officers employed with the Spanish armies, not as Spanish 
officers, but for the purpose of transmitting correct intel- 
ligence, upon which the British movements must be 
essentially dependent, should have been placed under the 
control of the Commander-in-chief of the British army, 
who would, in fact, be the surest and best medium of 
communication with the Government at home, as he 
would be in possession of information from all points. 
But the same spirit which pervaded every arrangement 
was equally shown in this ; and those officers had been 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 87 

made independent of him. He writes to Lord Liver- 
pool: — 

" Having observed a considerable difference in the reports 
transmitted of recent events in Castille, I have the honour 
to enclose a correspondence which I have had with Colonel 
Carroll. 

" Although I have no longer any control over the officers 
thus employed to report the operations of the Spanish armies, I 
trust that my interference in the affair will be approved of; as 
it must be of the first importance to His Majesty that the in- 
formation furnished to his Government, and his servants, and 
officers in the Peninsula, should be accurately correct/' (v. 402.) 

He uses the expression of no longer having any control 
over these officers ; but it does not appear from any- 
former part of his correspondence that they had been 
loithdrawn from him. It may have been so * but it is 
probable that, in the earlier stages, the persons so ap- 
pointed had been officers connected with his own army, 
and employed under his orders to act with the Spaniards. 
As the service continued, it is probable that officers were 
sent out from home, under specific appointments from the 
Horse Guards or the Secretary of State, and were thus 
independent of him. 

The custom of confining all promotion to the au- 
thorities at home was still adhered to ; and we are not 
surprised to read the following almost indignant remon- 
strance from one who was smarting under the re- 
striction. 

He had expressed the same feelings before, and 
pointed out how injurious it was to the service at large, 
but no attention was paid to his suggestions ; and it is 
only wonderful that any man under such overpowering 
circumstances, and who must have been aware, even 
with all the native modesty of his character, how really 



88 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

important he was, should have been found who did not 
resent the treatment or quit the service : — 

" I enclose a letter which has been received by the Commis- 
sary-general, upon which I have only to observe, that if it is 
the desire of the Government to carry on extensive military 
operations, they must leave some power of reward for zeal, in- 
telligence, activity, and ability, in the power of those who are to 
stimulate their inferiors ; and if the system proposed in the 
enclosed letter is to be adopted, it would be better that the 
heads of departments in England should take upon themselves 
the detailed management of concerns here, and make themselves 
responsible for them. 

"I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship's attention to the 
mode of promoting, not only commissaries, but the officers of 
the army. 

" With the largest concern to manage that has lately [he 
might have said, ever] been entrusted to any officer in the 
British army, and with the heaviest responsibility that ever was 
placed upon any, / have not the power of promoting a man of 
any rank or description whatever; and the trial will certainly 
have been made in my person (whether with success or not still 
remains to be ascertained), with how small a proportion of the 
power of reward, an officer in command of an army can carry on 
the service. 

IS I assure your Lordship that I have no desire to possess the 
power of promoting officers of the Commissariat (which it is the 
design of the enclosed letter to retain in the hands of the Com- 
missary-in-chief), or that of promoting officers of the army. I 
am not acquainted even with their names or their persons, ex- 
cepting in the service ; and excepting to reward their services, 
or to stimulate their exertions, it must be a matter of indifference 
to me whether they are promoted or not." (vi. 389.) 

He had written to Colonel Torrens, the Military 
Secretary of the Commander-in-chief, repeating and 
strongly urging certain promotions, and expressing some 
surprise that the officers alluded to had not been noticed, 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 89 

and adding his own observations upon the principles 
which seemed to regulate promotions. 

This seems to have given umbrage, for in a letter 
soon after he says: — 

" I observe from some expressions in your letter of the 28th 
August, and the general tenor of your observations, that I trod 
upon tender ground. The sooner I quit it, therefore, the better. 
When I wrote to you, I had no intention of making any invi- 
dious statement of the advantages which any set cf individuals 
had derived from the system of promotion which had been 
adopted. I adverted to what is generally understood in the 
army ; and as I purpose to drop the subject entirely, about the 
result of which / do not care a pin, I shall not enter into any 
proof of my statement." (vi. 417.) 

In another letter to Colonel Torrens he says : — 

" Let us drop the subject of army promotions altogether, for 
I assure you I feel no interest in it excepting with a view to 
the public good; in which I may be mistaken. My opinions 
went against the system, not against the mode of carrying- 
it on. 

" I am much obliged to you for relieving me of Major- 
general and Colonel . I have no public objection to 

make to the former, but he has been guilty of many little im- 
proprieties, which render him a discreditable person with the 

army ; and Major-general , who commands the division, 

had urged his removal so strenuously, that I had determined to 
send him word that he had my leave to quit the army. 

" Sir David Dundas will be the best judge whether this will 
be sufficient authority to hold the language which he proposes 
to hold to him. In these times I should prefer avoiding to 
employ him, and give no reason ; and I should have acted 
accordingly." (vi. 458.) 

In a letter to Colonel Gordon, Commissary-in- chief, 
Lord Wellington says : — 

" It may be very proper to frame rules for a department, and 
to conduct a department according to the rules : but that is not 



90 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

the mode in which the service can be carried on ; and if the 
attempt is persevered in, the army will be lost on some fine day, 
on account of the total incapacity of the officers. 

" I may be wrong, but I have objections to all those rules 
which prevent the promotion of officers of merit. There is no 
power of rewarding extraordinary services or merit; and under 
circumstances which require unwearied exertion, we appear to be 
framing regulations to prevent ourselves from commanding it, 
by the only stimulus, honourable reward by promotion ! 

" These are my decided opinions. They go to the principle 
of our proceedings, and not to any particular case. I wish to 
know whether, in any service in the world, a man has been ever 
placed at the head of such a concern as I am now conducting, 
without having the power of selecting the person to fill such 
office ? An assistant commissary is found the most capable in 
the whole department, and he cannot be made a deputy com- 
missary because he has not served five years, and there are 
other assistants senior to him ; who, though very good men, and 
able to do the duty of assistant, are not equal to the duty for 
which Mr. Ogilvie was selected, notwithstanding that there were 
many deputy commissaries with the army ! ! ! 

" I hope the gentlemen in London will be so kind as to be 
responsible for all that passes here, and bear all the abuse, mis- 
representation, &c. &c, which he must make up his mind to 
who is honoured with the command of the British troops on 
foreign service." (vi. 566.) 

The Board at home appear again to have had some 
objection to the course which had been pursued with 
the army, of appointing persons to act with the Commis- 
sariat. Lord Wellington indignantly writes : — 

" I hope that I have not been induced (in the confidence 
that the King's Ministers would approve of my measures) to 
make temporary appointments, required for the service, of gentle- 
men, to whom anybody in London can by his orders prevent 
their salaries being paid. If this is the case, I am sincerely 
desirous that the Government would consider of the appointment 
of some other officer to conduct their concerns in this country, 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. , 91 

as I am utterly incapable of managing them if I am to be treated 
in such a mamier." (vii. 262.) 

The obstacles and impediments thrown in his way 
by the military authorities, the head of his profession, 
founded upon old rules and customs, and maintained in 
great measure for the gratification of personal power at 
home, were galling enough. But here was a depart- 
ment, (certainly most necessary, and indeed indispen- 
sable to the military branch, but) which was composed 
entirely of civilians ; and though the head of it in Eng- 
land, at the moment we are treating of, was a military 
man (Colonel Gordon), it was essentially a civil depart- 
ment. 

When Lord Wellington took the field, it is not too 
much to say, that there was hardly a commissary who 
knew or could execute the duties required on service. In 
a part of the letter from which we have quoted above, 
Lord Wellington says, — 

" The only duty they learn in England is the superintend- 
ance of deliveries hy a contractor, and comparing the accounts 
with the vouchers." 

And yet this was the office setting up its narrow, 
minded rules against the only man who had ever seen 
service upon an extended scale; and whose knowledge 
was founded upon actual experience. For, though it is 
true that Lord Wellington's European fame was compa- 
ratively recent, he had served his apprenticeship with 
respect to feeding his army in a country where the 
number of mouths to be fed exceeded by many thou- 
sands those under his present command. His actual 
soldiers in India might not exceed his Peninsular army 
in numbers ; but the habits of that country and that 
service, required that the camp-followers must live, and 



92 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

the head which provided for the one had also to provide 
for the other. 



Prom motives of economy at home, an order had 
been sent out forbidding the sending home any more 
prisoners ; founded, in all probability, upon the assump- 
tion, that as they were taken in the Portuguese cause 
they were to be deemed Portuguese prisoners, but 
leaving out of consideration that the Portuguese had not 
means of bestowing them, or securing them :■ — 

" I have received your Lordship's letter respecting the French 
prisoners in this country, and the directions will, of course, be 
attended to ; but I am apprehensive that we shall experience 
much inconvenience in having so many prisoners to take care 
of, at the same time that we have other important objects to 
attend to. 

" It is in vain to expect any assistance from the Portuguese 
Government to provide for the removal of these prisoners, or for 
the care of them at Lisbon, or in any distant part of the world. 
That, as well as everything else, must fall upon me; and I must 
take the best care of them I can." (vii. 105.) 

The difficulties arising out of the relative rank of 
officers in the British and Portuguese services was still 
a source of much embarrassment. Lord Wellington had 
made urgent applications to have general officers sent 
out to him, and the following letter shows that though 
the Horse Guards must have been as well aware of the 
circumstances, and might have seen, without the neces- 
sity of his pointing it out, that objections might be urged 
against some whom they seem to have selected, they did 
not do so, but left the labour, and threw the odium, if 
such should arise, upon him : — 

" I have received your letter regarding the generals who are 
to come. In respect to General Murray, I think him a very 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 93 

able officer ; and there is no man whose assistance I should have 
been more desirous of retaining than his, except in this country. 
He is senior to Marshal Beresford, and left us on a question 
arising out of that seniority. I have hitherto gone on perfectly- 
well, without having to decide one question of rank between the 
services. 

" I attribute this as well to the temper of the army as to my 
own management ; but if a general comes here who appeared, 
when he was here before, disposed not to avoid those questions, 
but to bring them into discussion unnecessarily, the difficulties 
of managing this intricate machine will be vastly increased. I 
would, therefore, prefer to pass sub silentio his desire to be 
employed. 

" General H. Clinton is also a very able officer, who would 
be very useful ; but why is a man to volunteer his services in 
a situation where he does not approve of what is going on ? 
I have men enough of this description here already." (vii. 237.) 

There still remained the original wish on the part of 
the office at the Horse Guards to retain the power over 
regiments in their own hands ; and orders were given by 
the Commander-in-chief that certain regiments should be 
sent home. 

Lord Wellington writes to the Secretary of State, 
in Sept. 1811, saying: — 

" I have received orders from the Duke of York to send 
regiments home, &c. &c, upon which I should wish to be informed 
what is the practice of the service. If H. E-. Highness directs me 
to draft two battalions into one, there is no material diminution 
of force here ; but he has lately directed me to send home three 
regiments, which would make a diminution of about 600 rank 
and file, which becomes a little important. 

" I do not know whether I am right or wrong, but I con- 
sider you responsible for the force I have here ; and although I 
should be sorry to be the cause of any unpleasant explanation 
on a subject of this kind, I think it right to inform you that I 
have received these orders, and that I consider that I must obey 



94 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

them : bat if it should be possible, it is desirable that you should 
come to an understanding with H. R. H. regarding the recall of 
troops from this country." (viii. 266.) 

" Your Lordship and His Royal Highness are the best judges 
of what description of troops it is expedient that this army 
should be composed. I beg leave, however, to submit, that some 
of the best and most experienced soldiers, the most healthy and 
capable of bearing fatigue, are in the 2d battalions ; many of 
which are much more efficient, and have always more men for 
duty in proportion to their gross number, and fewer sick, than 
any of the 1st battalions recently arrived, which had been at 
Walcheren ; and it is certain that this army will not be so 
strong by the exchange of new for old soldiers. 

"I have thought it proper to submit this matter, assuring 
you at the same time that it is entirely indifferent to me ; and 
that whatever orders I receive upon the subject will be imme- 
diately obeyed" (ix. 52.) 

And in a subsequent letter he says : — 

" I would strongly recommend you to try to prevail upon 
the Duke of York to order, that whenever a battalion (which 
has no second or first battalion at home) should fall below 350 
men, these men should be formed into four companies ; and the 
officers and non-commissioned officers of six companies should be 
sent home to receive and form drafts. These will answer all 
the purposes of a second battalion. 

11 Two battalions so reduced, might with advantage be formed 
into one, upon service, till the six companies of each sent to 
England to be filled up, should return." (xi. 180.) 

The Secretary of State was the medium of commu- 
nication with the home authorities ; and if the nobleman 
filling that office had issued these orders, it might not 
have been so astonishing. A man might be an excellent 
minister, and an able member of a cabinet, without 
being a practical soldier; and the idea of maintaining 
official regularity, or any other reason, might have 
appeared sufficient to him to order home second bat- 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 95 

talions, weakened as they no doubt were by service : 
but the authorities from whom these orders did come 
were soldiers ; and it would not have appeared necessary 
to require a suggestion from the commander abroad to 
convince them that a seasoned man was of more value 
than a new one. But we suppose that the rules of office 
hampered the authorities at home, and certainly crippled 
those abroad. 

Some rules of the same stringent nature, emanating 
from home, called for remonstrance six months later. 
Invalids were ordered not to be sent home till their 
accounts were settled. 

" In truth, my dear Torrens, the difficulties we labour under 
are but little known in England. How is it possible for any 
officer to come to a settlement, by a correspondence, with one 
who has to settle the accounts of probably 500 men going to 
England at the same moment ? It is quite impossible ! And 
the consequence is, that the poor men are detained three, four, 
or five months, to the loss of many, till the correspondence 
respecting their accounts is finished. 

" If a soldier makes a claim at Lisbon, the officer who has to 
settle the claims before they go to England must detain as 
many as one transport will contain, till the claims of one shall 
be inquired into by post; every letter now requiring three 
weeks to get an answer. 

" I am convinced that it is impossible to attain H. It. H/s 
object in this country without detaining men three or four 
months after the necessity of their going to England is 
pronounced." (ix. 423.) 

A letter to the Duke of York himself, proves that 
there was a very rigid adherence to form in that office. 
It might be very necessary, but no doubt it must 
at times have thrown much additional labour upon one 
who was already almost overburthened, like Lord Wel- 
lington. But his patient, enduring disposition, and 



96 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

his strict sense of obedience to orders, shows itself as 
usual : — 

" In regard to the subjects referred to in Y. R. H.'s letter, 
one of them was suggested to me by Colonel Gordon, who was 
my Quarter-master-general; and knowing that he possessed 
your confidence, and was in the habit of communication with the 
heads of departments at the Horse Guards, I consented to his 
writing to England on those subjects. 

" It did not occur to me that they were official communications, 
and I allowed him to make them because he had suggested what 
was proposed, and appeared to understand the arrangements; 
and because I believed that he was in the habit of writing to 
your Royal Highness. 

" I am aware that the staff-officers of the army are attached 
to me to communicate with my inferiors, but not to carry on my 
communications with my superiors ; and, therefore, I should not 
have allowed Colonel Gordon to write, even upon the subjects 
referred to, if I had considered what he was writing at all of a 
nature of an official communication." (ix. 488.) 

We do not learn from anything in the Dispatches 
what were the subjects alluded to ; but Lord Wellington 
accounts for what he acknowledges to be an infringement 
of official rules, so simply and so naturally, that it is 
difficult to divest one's self of regret that it should have 
appeared necessary to the Commander-in-chief to take 
official notice of it. 

In a letter soon after to the Military Secretary, 
Colonel Torrens, he states the difficulties to which he is 
subjected by the change of officers, which (though, 
perhaps, not entirely) were dependent, in great measure, 
upon the arrangements at home : — 

"I have frequently mentioned the inconvenience from the 
constant change of officers in every important department, or 
filling every situation of rank or responsibility here. No man 
can be aware of the extent of this inconvenience, and the labour 
which these constant changes occasions is of a most distressing 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 97 

description. No sooner is an arrangement made, the order 
given, and the whole in train, than a gentleman comes out, who 
has probably hut little knowledge of the practical part of his duty 
in any country, and none whatever in this most difficult of all. 
Nobody in the British army ever reads an order or a regulation 
in any manner but as an amusing novel, and the consequence is, 
that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into 
execution, every gentleman proceeds according to his own fancy ; 
and then, when the arrangement fails (as it must if the 
order is not strictly obeyed), they come upon me to set matters 
to rights; and thus my labour is increased tenfold." (ix. 602.) 

He had occasion to write upon the same subject 
soon after : — 

" It is no encouragement to those who are performing their 
duty in this country to see, that when they have attracted the 
notice of the officers under whom they are serving, and have been 
recommended for promotion, others are preferred who have 
quitted the arduous service, probably to solicit from the 
Medical Board the promotion these have deserved. 

" I have frequently made you acquainted with the incon- 
venience felt by the constant change of the officers employed in 
every branch. One of the principal causes of these changes is 
the practice of going to England to apply for promotion, which 
ought to be acquired by service here : and I do not see the utility 
of my forwarding recommendations of the heads of departments 
of those officers whom they deem deserving of promotion, if to 
those recommendations are to be preferred the claims and 
applications of those who quit the service to go home to make 
them: 3 (ix. 625.) 

" I have proofs that every promotion by the Medical Board is 
a matter of application and intrigue. I shall send home papers 
which I have received from , in regard to his promo- 
tion ; in which you will see, that this gentleman was excited by 
* * * to prevail upon Sir Thomas Graham, to prevail upon me, 
to recommend him for a situation which * * * did not think he 
ought to fill, and to which he refused to appoint him. What is 
all this but intrigue and attention to private applications, instead 
of claims grounded upon public services ? Then can it be 

H 



98 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

supposed that I can be the victim of these doings without 
complaining ? What interest can I have in these concerns, 
or what have I to say to any of these Medical Officers ? *- 
(x. 72.) 

The question about sending home men, or drafting 
horses, upon orders received from the Horse Guards, was 
one which gave infinite trouble. It is impossible to say 
here what were the reasons at the office at home ; but 
Lord Wellington did not conceive them to be applicable to 
the army abroad. There are many letters filled with 
details which it would be needless to recapitulate here ; 
but it must be owned that his reasons against the orders 
are very substantial, at the same time that he says, — 
" Give me orders and they shall be obeyed" The follow- 
ing phrases occur in various places : — 

" I prefer having one officer or soldier who has served one 
or two campaigns, to having two or three who have not ; and I 
should be very unwilling to part with the officers of the 2d 
Hussars (German Legion). 

"I wish the Secretary of State and the Commander-in- 
chief would send me positive orders. What they order, shall be 
obeyed, coute qui coute: but if they leave matters to my 
judgment, I shall never do anything which, in my judgment, 
may be prejudicial to the service here." (x. 75.) 

" His Royal Highness and I, unfortunately, take a very 
different view : he, one referable to the whole army and the 
general service ; I, to the particular service under my charge. 
H. R. H. must be right ; but I wish that, being so, he would give 
me a positive order. He may depend upon it, it shall be obeyed; 
but when he conveys wishes and suggestions, and leaves it to my 
discretion, he must excuse me if I take my own view of the case. 

" New soldiers not only do no service, but by filling the 
hospitals they are a burthen to us. For these reasons I am so 
unwilling to part with the men whom I have formed into 
provisional battalions, and I never will part with them as long 
as it is left to my discretion. 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 99 

" The second battalions, some of which have now been four 
years in this army, are the best troops we have, and will render 
good service in the next campaign in the way that I have 
organised them. It could not be expected that I should send 
away nearly 2000 of these soldiers at a moment when every 
man is an object. But let the orders that they shall be sent 
come, and they shall be obeyed with alacrity ; and you shall hear 
no complaints. 

" The same is the case in regard to the cavalry ; indeed 
stronger ; and if I were now to choose, I should prefer by far to 
give the horses of the fine regiments of English hussars to the 
old regiments here, and keep the officers and soldiers of the 
latter." (x. 76.) 

" I am one of those who are incredulous respecting the diffi- 
culty of procuring horses in England. One thousand horses for 
the cavalry in this last winter would have given the army the 
service of three, if not four, regiments ; from which, by orders 
from the Horse Guards, I have been obliged to draught their 
horses, very much against their will. Surely horses of five and 
six years old cannot be wanting in England \" (x. 175.) 

" I do not mean to complain of the Duke of York's decision 
to take from us four regiments of cavalry, but a remount of 
700 horses at the end of last campaign, and permission to take 
100 from each of the English hussars (which they would have 
been better without), would have given us now 1200 additional 
cavalry, would have enabled me to keep that number in reserve 
towards the close of the campaign, when a great effort will be 
made by the enemy; and all the dissatisfaction would have 
been avoided which has been the consequence of the draf&|ig 
the horses from those regiments." (x. 400.) 

In a letter to the Duke of York himself, who had 
written to him in reference to some of the objections 
which we have quoted respecting the drafting or sending 
home battalions, we find that the question was still un- 
decided as late as Dec. 1813, and that the Duke was 
apparently very reluctant to abide by Lord Wellington's 
recommendations : — 



100 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

"I had the honour of receiving Y. R. H/s letter in regard 
to certain opinions regarding the weak battalions of this army. 
I assure Y. R. H. that I am perfectly ready to adopt any measure. 
It is a matter of perfect indifference to me personally whether 
the army is strong or weak; or whether I am to carry on 
operations in France, Spain, or Portugal; but I hope Y. R. H. 
will consider that if the public interests require that I should 
do so during the winter, it is expedient that the veteran soldiers 
should remain with the army. I certainly did not consider 
Y. R. H.'s letters to be an order to send back to England all 
these battalions; nor do I consider that they have been so 
understood by H. M.'s Government; and the correspondence 
on the subject shows they were not so considered by the Secretary 
of State. However, Y. R. H/s orders shall be obeyed, as soon 
as I know positively what your wishes are ; and I now beg to 
have Y. R. H.'s orders whether to draft these battalions or not, 
and under what regulations and restrictions ; and whether to 
send them home or not, either after drafting them, or leaving in 
them their men." (xi. 372.) 

In writing at the same time to Lord Bathurst, he 
says : — 

" I enclose a letter from the Commander-in-chief on the 
subject of sending home three battalions of British infantry. I 
cannot pretend to hold the post I have taken, if there is any 
material diminution of our force. It is indifferent to me whether 
I carry on the war in Trance, Spain, or Portugal ; and I only 
beg that I may not be expected to diminish the force under my 
command till I have distinct orders to do so/' 

Whether he ever did receive distinct orders, we do 
not learn. The whole management of the affair must 
strike a dispassionate observer at this remote period as 
singular. The measure had been in agitation since the 
early part of Sept. 1811 (p. 93), when we first read 
Lord Wellington's objections. The Commander-in-chief 
retained his. opinion up to the middle of Dec. 1813, as 
we have just seen. Lord Wellington says, throughout 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 101 

all his correspondence, " Give me orders!" and yet no 
orders are given ! 

If the Commander-in-chief was convinced of the pro- 
priety of his own arrangements, he might have enforced 
them by a word ; if his Royal Highness felt the weight 
of Lord Wellington's arguments, he would have relieved 
the mind of the latter by abandoning the project, and 
the army would have been benefitted by adopting the 
plan suggested of consolidating two weak battalions, as 
in p. 94. 



Most of these remonstrances to the powers at home 
of one branch of the service were before he moved, and 
with reference to the means and efficiency of the army 
itself ; but the parts of Spain to which his efforts were 
soon directed were connected with the coast, and in- 
volved a connexion with the navy, for the protection of 
his communication by sea. He had written to the naval 
commanders, stating his wants and wishes ; but, unfor- 
tunately, the regulations of the service under the home 
authorities divided their commands ; and however willing 
or able either of them might be, his authority only 
extended to a certain point, and he could give no orders 
to the officer in command beyond it. 

Lord Wellington had adverted to this difficulty in 
letters to the Government before, but apparently without 
effect, as we find by a letter to Mr. Stuart at Lisbon, in 
which he says : — - 9 

" It will be very inconvenient, and increase the difficulties of 
my situation very much, if the communication by sea along the 
coasts of Portugal and Gallicia should not be secure. I had 

written to on the subject, and have received an answer 

which proves that, in our country, it is better to suffer any 



102 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

public inconvenience than to venture to suggest a measure as a 
remedy which is to be carried into execution by another public 
department. In future, therefore, I shall complain of incon- 
veniences when they are severely felt, and shall not trouble 
Government with suggestions of remedies or preventatives" 
(ix. 456.) 

Writing to the Secretary of State, he makes frequent 
and repeated remonstrances about maritime co-opera- 
tion : — 

" I am afraid you will think me very troublesome about our 
want of ships of war on these coasts. 

" I am certain it will not be denied, that since Great 
Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been 
left in such a situation, and that at a moment when it is most 
important to us to preserve, and to the enemy to interrupt the 
communication by the coast. If they only take the ship with 
our shoes, we must halt for sice weeks! 

" I hope it will not be deemed unreasonable to request to 
have the navigation of the coast secured for me, without which 
you must not expect success." (x. 522.) 

" The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon and Coruna are 
delayed for want of convoy ; the blockade of San Sebastian is 
not kept at all, and the enemy have introduced supplies of 
different kinds. 

" In the attack of a maritime place, some assistance has 
generally been received from the navy; but the soldiers are 
obliged to work in the transports to unload the vessels, because 
no seamen can be furnished. 

" I have never been in the habit of troubling Government 
with requisitions for force, but have carried on the service to the 
best of my ability with what was placed at my disposal ; and if 
the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than one frigate 
and a few brigs and cutters, I must be satisfied, and do the best 
I can : but I hope you will let me know positively whether I am 
or not to have further naval means.'''' (xi. 17.) 

" I complain of an actual want of naval assistance. I know 
nothing about the cause of the evil ; I state the fact, which 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 103 

nobody will deny, and leave it to Government to apply the 
remedy or not as they may think proper. I assure you that 
there is not an hour in the day in which some statement does 
not come before me of the inconvenience resulting from the 
want of naval means ; and even while writing this letter, the 
Commissary-general has been here to complain that his empty 
provision-ships are detained at Santander for want of convoy" 
(xi. 118.) 

u It is very desirable that some arrangement should be fixed 
and made known, under which officers will be able to get from 
England those equipments which they want. We can get 
nothing in these countries ; and those who have been here as 
long as I have, feel very uncomfortable for the want of a variety 
of articles which they can only get from England. 

" I cannot understand why the rule regarding the packets 
should have been made more strict lately ; and I know that I, 
among others, am suffering from it, not having even a second 
saddle." (xi. 123.) 

" It appears to be the opinion of Admiral Lord Keith that 
there is a want of regularity and system in the application for 
convoys : which opinion his lordship states to be confirmed by 
his experience of similar want of regularity in former joint 
services of navy and army in which his lordship had been 
employed. I wish his lordship had stated his reasons for be- 
lieving that there was irregularity (independent of his suspicions, 
founded on experience of former services). I believe there is 
a great difference between the service in this country and those 
on which he has heretofore been employed with the army. 
This is no joint service. All that is required is to give convoy 
to the supplies for the army coming from England and else- 
where, and to convoy back the empty transports. 

" That which an army wants does not always require many 
ships to carry ; for instance, the great coats were ordered round 
early in August, and are now (Nov. 1) in one ship at Oporto, 
waiting for convoy. All the stores wanted at particular seasons, 
such as at this moment tents, are supplied in general by one, or 
at most, two ships. 

" I beg once more to impress the absolute necessity that we 



104 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 

should have the maritime communication constant and secure, if 
it is intended that I should maintain a large army on this 
frontier ; and it is obvious that stinted naval means will not 
answer." (xi. 239.) 

It may be quite true that the exigencies of the 
service in all parts of the world rendered the task of the 
Admiralty in making arrangements to meet them a very 
difficult one. But the present difficulty, which is so 
repeatedly and forcibly urged, would have required little 
(indeed it may fairly be said, no) additio?ial force ; a 
better distribution of what was already there, or some 
modification of the technical etiquette of the service, 
would have done everything, 

Here again, as we have pointed out before in refer- 
ence to other departments, the old existing rules of office 
were the obstacle. The north coast of Spain and the 
west coast of Portugal were two separate naval commands ! 
A ship sent from Lisbon or Oporto was under the orders 
of one commander ; when she reached Coruna she 
came under another. Whether more could have been 
done by any better system or arrangement between these 
naval commanders it is not now easy to pronounce, but 
hence arose the evils and delays complained of. 

This does appear to be an inconvenience of a nature 
which might have been remedied by the authorities at 
home, if they had thought fit; but it remained to the 
last! 

Many of these obstacles and impediments might, 
perhaps, have been unavoidable; but it is clear that 
Lord Wellington suffered much under the weight of 
them. They are not adduced here with a view to ani- 
madvert upon the rules or habits of the service, or to 
insinuate that there was any reluctance to act for the 



FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 105 

best ; but we lay them before the reader to prove, what 
we set out with stating, that he had an extraordinary 
power of submitting with patience to what he could not 
avert or amend. 

" Give me orders and they, shall be obeyed!" was his 
maxim and his practice, at whatever cost to his own 
private convictions. 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 



In the commencement of our remarks upon the subject 
of annoyances, we divided them under two heads, Home 
and Foreign. The former have furnished so very 
extensive a field, and one so much more prolific in proofs 
of what he had to submit to than we had anticipated, 
that we have thought it better to collect the remarks 
upon his foreign impediments under a separate head. 

In the very early stage of his connexion with the 
Portuguese Government he had no special ground of 
complaint. We find one letter, in consequence of the 
refusal of General Freire, commanding the Portuguese 
army, to co-operate with him in his first advance ; but 
that was merely the act of an individual : — 

" I have written to General Freire : as to his plan of opera- 
tions, I do not see what purpose it is to answer ; and I certainly 
can never give my sanction to anything so useless, and so 
crudely digested, so far as even to promise to communicate with 
or aid the person who is carrying it into execution. 

" I shall execute the orders which I have received from my 
Government without the assistance of the Portuguese ; and 
General Freire will have to justify himself with his prince and 
the world for having declined to stand forward upon this inte- 
resting occasion, and for having refused to send me the assist- 
ance which it is in his power to give." (iv. 72.) 

It will be almost impossible to separate the Portuguese 
from the Spanish grievances. They proceeded, certainly, 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 107 

from totally different parties, and influenced possibly by 
very different motives ; but they often arose at the very 
same time, and were injurious to the operations in which 
he was engaged, whether he were on one side of the 
frontier or the other. 

The Spanish difficulties were generally more of a 
military nature, arising from the ignorance, the caprice, 
or vanity and incapacity of their officers, — not unac- 
companied by the most gross falsehood in almost every 
statement respecting their own force, or their promises 
of supplies to the British, and the most infamous failure 
in fulfilling any one of them. 

The Portuguese were different, but equally em- 
barrassing. The neglect was universal, from the highest 
officer of state to the lowest juiz da fora. Every 
promise was violated — every suggestion was disre- 
garded ; the means of carrying up stores and food 
to his army were in many cases so scandalously neg- 
lected, as nearly to reduce them to starvation ; the 
means of removing his wounded were not provided ; 
and yet, so great was his regard for constituted autho- 
rity in the territories of an ally, that he never attempted 
to rectify the abuses by the physical power which he 
had in his own hands, but invariably confined himself 
to remonstrance, passing through the minister of his 
own country. 

The Government, during the absence of the Prince 
Regent in the Brazils, was in the hands of a Council 
of Regency ; many of whom, no doubt, were persons 
more actuated by views of personal interest or im- 
portance than by any more patriotic motive. 

Sir Arthur very early became conscious of the total 
incapacity (to say nothing worse) of many of them ; but, 
however desirable he might have felt it to recommend, 



108 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

or even to force a change, by putting out or substitut- 
ing any member, lie recommended the British Minister 
at Lisbon not to shake their authority, which depended 
upon the soundness of their appointment from the 
Brazils. 

After his successful expedition against Soult at 
Oporto, he moved to the frontier of Spain, with the in- 
tention of co-operating with Cuesta. Even at that early 
period his grounds of complaint began, and from the 
very first place where he halted after crossing the 
frontier he writes to Mr. Villiers at Lisbon : — 

" I shall be obliged to you to mention to the Government 
the great inconvenience which the army has felt ever since its 
arrival in Portugal, for the want of the assistance of the civil 
government to procure the supplies it has required, parti- 
cularly of carriages and mules. For the latter I have written 
to you, I believe, not less than ten letters : but they have not 
yet assisted the British army with one ; and the magistrates 
of the country have rather prevented than aided us in procuring 
carts." (iv. 472.) 

Previous to his advance into Spain he had a fore- 
taste of the people whom he was going to assist. He 
tells Mr. Frere,— 

" I can only say, that the obstinacy of this old gentleman 
[Cuesta] is throwing out of our hands the finest game that 
any armies ever had." 

And again he says to Lord Castlereagh : — 

" My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a very 
curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentle- 
man at the head of an army need be. He would not alter 
his position, even to insure the safety of his army, because it 
might be injurious to himself." 

With the contempt which he must have felt for the 
military (and, indeed, private) character of his intended 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 109 

coadjutor, he yet gives way upon principle, and thus 
modestly concludes his letter to his own Government : — 

" I hope I acted right in giving way, more particularly as 
the operation was to be carried on in Spain ; and the argument 
used to me was, that the safety of Cuesta' s army depended upon 
my compliance." 

A little later he writes to Mr. Frere : — 

" It is impossible to express to you the inconvenience and 
risk we incur from the want of means of conveyance, which 
I cannot believe the country would not furnish, if there existed 
any inclination. 

" Though to me, personally, there has been much civility 
from all classes, it has not been the case with the army in 
general. The officers complain that the country gives unwill- 
ingly the supplies we have required ; and we have not procured 
a cart or a mule for the service of the army. This does not look 
promising, and I shall certainly not persevere if our prospect 
of good treatment does not improve. 

" We really should not be so ill off in an enemy's country , 
as we should there take by force what we should require." (iv. 
488.) 

" I have been obliged to intimate to Cuesta that I could 
attempt no further operation till I should be made certain of 
my supplies for transport, and regular provisions from the 
country. 

" I lament the necessity which obliges me to halt, and will 
oblige me to withdraw from Spain if it should continue. I can 
only say I never have seen an army so ill-treated in any country. 

" It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply 
our wants. The French army is well fed ; the Spanish army 
has plenty of everything ; and we alone, upon whom everything 
depends, are actually starving." (iv. 496.) 

" I find General Cuesta more and more impracticable every 
day. It is impossible to do business with him, and very un- 
certain that any operation will succeed in which he has any 
concern. He contrived to lose the whole of yesterday (July 23), 
in which, although his troops were under arms and mine in 



110 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

march, we did nothing, owing to the whimsical perverseness of 
his disposition. His want of communication with his officers 
of the plan settled with me for the 22d (July), and his absence 
from the field, were the cause that we did the French but little 
mischief on that day." (iv. 498.) 

" I have not been able to follow the enemy as I could wish, 
on account of the great deficiency of the means of transport, 
owing to my having found it impossible to procure even one 
mule or a cart in Spain." (iv. 499.) 

With the little confidence which he had in the real 
honest integrity of the Spanish authorities, he felt it 
necessary to be very punctilious in his dealings with 
them. 

Don Martin de Garay (the Spanish War Minister) 
had addressed him upon some subject, and the following 
is his letter to Mr. Frere, conveying, in the most civil 
terms that official correspondence would permit, his 
plain and unequivocal opinion that Don Martin had 
told a falsehood ! — 

" I shall be very much obliged to him if he will understand 
that I have no authority — nay, that I have been directed not 
— to correspond with any of the Spanish Ministers ; and I 
request that he will, in future, convey to me, through you, the 
commands which he may have for me. I shall thus avoid the 
injurious and uncandid misrepresentations of what passes, which 
D. Martin has more than once sent to me, apparently with a 
view of placing on the records of his government, statements of 
my actions and conduct which are entirely inconsistent with the 
truth, and to which I have no regular means of replying. 

" It is an unfounded assertion, that the first account the 
Government received of my intention not to undertake any 
new operation was when they heard that I had left Cuesta 
alone to pursue the enemy. The statement is not true ! And 
supposing it to be true, and that Cuesta was exposed when 
alone, it was his fault and not mine. 1 had given him fair 
notice. 

" It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situa- 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. Ill 

tion of D. Martin de Garay to sit down in his cabinet and write 
his ideas of the glory which would result from driving the 
French through the Pyrenees ; and I believe there is no man 
in Spain who has wished so much, or sacrificed so much, to 
effect that object as I have. 

" It is a positive fact, that during the last seven days the 
British army have not received one-third of their provisions ; 
that at this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers 
dying in the hospital for want of common assistance and 
necessaries ; and that I can get no assistance of any description 
from the country. 

" I positively will not move, nay more, I will disperse my 
army, till I am supplied with provisions and means of transport 
as I ought to be." 



At this time the Marquis Wellesley had relieved Mr. 
Prere as British Minister to the Central Junta. 

Sir Arthur gives him a general statement of the 
military affairs, the position and condition of the British 
army, and the state of the Spanish troops, which was 
wretched. 

He repeats his complaints of the wants of his army, 
and says : — 

" If the Government have not already made great exertions 
to supply us, and if we do not immediately experience the effects 
by receiving a plentiful supply of provisions and forage, we must 
move away. There is this day, again, no bread for the soldiers." 
(v. 13.) ' 

And yet, with all these exasperating circumstances, 
he tries to make the best of it, and concludes his letter 
thus : — 

" I must do the late British Minister the justice to declare, 
that this deficiency is not to be at all attributed to any neglect 
or omission on his part. It is to be attributed to the poverty 



112 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

and exhausted state of the country; to the inactivity of the 
magistrates and people ; to their disinclination to take any 
trouble, excepting that of packing up their property and running 
away when they hear of the approach of a French patrole ; and 
to their habits of insubordination, and disobedience of, and to 
the want of power in, the Government and their officers." 

The picture was, alas ! an accurate likeness, calcu- 
lated to excite nothing but contempt for all classes ! 

The following contemptuous letter to General Cuesta 
was, apparently, well-deserved : — 

" In regard to the assertion in your Excellency's letter, that 
the British troops sell their bread to the Spanish soldiers, it is 
beneath the dignity of your Excellency's situation for you to 
notice such things, or for me to reply to them. The British 
troops could not sell that which they had not ; and the reverse 
of the statement of your Excellency is the fact at the time the 
armies were at Talavera, as I have myself witnessed frequently 
in the streets of that town,''' (v. 25.) 

In another letter to Cuesta he says :— 

" Since I joined your army, the troops have not received 
upon an average half a ration, and on some days nothing at all. 
I can procure no means of transport ; and I have not received 
even an answer to a request I made, to have a remount for the 
cavalry of only 100 mares, which would be entirely useless to 
the Spanish cavalry. 

" Under these circumstances, your Excellency cannot be 
surprised that I should think that the British army has been 
neglected and ill-treated ; or at the determination which I now 
communicate to you, that if they are not more regularly supplied 
I shall march them back to Portugal." (v. 33.) 

His resolution was at length taken, and on the 
18th August he writes : — 

" I hope your Excellency [General Eguia, who had suc- 
ceeded General.Cuesta,] will occupy the posts on the Tagus this 



FOREIGN AOTOYANCESv 113 

night. But if you should not do so, I can only say that my 
troops shall be withdrawn to-morrow night, whether relieved 
or not." (v. 50.) 

General Eguia had an interview with Sir Arthur, 
arid promised redress for all the evils \ but, as visual, 
nothing was done. Similar complaints, which had been 
laid before General Cuesta more than a month before, 
had been transmitted by him (as he averred) to the 
Supreme Central Junta at Seville ; and if any measures 
had been taken, supplies might have been forwarded, 
even from a distance : but nothing was received. 

The Government might have given orders ; but, as 
Sir Arthur observed, — 

" Orders are not sufficient. The Junta may have issued 
orders to supply the deficiencies, but, from want of arrange-?, 
ment, there are no persons to obey, and this army would 
perish." 

He writes again to General Eguia, who had for- 
warded to him some of the evasive subterfuges from the 
Central Junta, and probably containing some of their 
gasconading projects of active operation :— 

" I have received your Excellency's letter, enclosing one" 
from the Minister of War at Seville. He has been entirely 
misinformed. 

" He forgets that we have no food ; our cavalry, from want, 
were scarcely able to move from their ground ; artillery-horses 
unable to draw the guns; that I have no means of moving, and 
my soldiers are worn down by want of every description. 

" It is extraordinary that the minister did not advert to 
these circumstances, which have been frequently laid before him, 
or that he should have proposed to me any operation of any 
description, to which he must have known that I was unequal ; 
but his having omitted to advert to them, sufficiently accounts 
for their continued existence" (v. 54.) 

A Senor Don Luis de Calvo had been appointed 



114 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

Commissary-general to the Spanish army. Who or what 
he was we have no means here of ascertaining, and many 
may be of opinion that it is of little consequence, and 
that he is unworthy of further notice. But, unfortu- 
nately, he was now in a situation of great importance, 
deeply affecting the interests, if not the existence of the 
British General and his army ; and it illustrates forcibly 
the difficulties of Sir Arthur's position, in being placed 
at the mercy of such men. 

In reply to his first communication to Sir Arthur, 
promising abundant supplies in three days, and that in 
the mean time the magazine at Truxillo should be given 
to him, the latter replies with some bluntness ; — 

" I have received the same assurances from every Spanish 
Commissioner who has been employed with us ; and although 
your rank is higher and your powers are greater than those of 
the other Spanish officers who have been with me, I acknow- 
ledge that I feel no confidence in your assurances ; and I give no 
credit to the accounts of resources on the road [in what place is 
not known], or of the magazine at Truxillo." (v. 57.) 

In a letter very shortly after to Marquis Wellesley 
he notices 

" an injurious and unfounded assertion of this said Don 
Luis de Calvo, who had said, that c the want of provisions was 
a mere pretext for withdrawing from Spain ; and that it was 
false, for that there was plenty. 3 " (v. 64.) 

And in proof of De Calvo's falsehood, Sir Arthur 
sends a copy of a letter (of which the original was in 
his possession), from an alcalde in one of the towns 
to Mr. Downie, a British Commissary, stating that 
he had received directions from Don L. de Calvo to 
send to the Spanish head-quarters the very provisions 
which Downie had procured for the British. 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 115 

u And this," adds Sir Arthur, indignantly, " is the honour 
and good faith, and this Don L. de Calvo is the gentleman in 
whose assurances I was to place confidence ! ! 

" These reports and insinuations against me may do very 
well for the people of Seville, but the British army will not 
soon forget the treatment it has received." (v. 64.) 

General Eguia had also descended so low as to put 
forward the same insinuation, as to the pretended 
grounds for withdrawing the British. Sir Arthur re- 
plied to his letter, but in reporting the fact to Marquis 
Wellesley he says : — 

" Until the insulting assertion was withdrawn, it was im- 
possible for me to continue any correspondence with General 
Eguia after I had replied to his letter, which I hope I did with 
the temper which became my situation and character. In his 
reply he has left the charge of making use of a false pretext 
where it stood ; and I have, therefore, not given him any reply 
upon that or any other subject on which he has addressed 
me." (v. 63.) 



Notwithstanding the boasting and vapouring which 
seemed to be inherent in the Spanish character (though 
at a later period the peasantry showed much more per- 
severance and personal courage), it is undeniable that 
at this period of the war Sir Arthur formed a most just 
opinion of their value as soldiers. 

It was clear, from what we have seen, that he had 
no reason to estimate very highly the talent or the cha- 
racter of those in authority ; and in justice to the lower 
orders it may be fair to assume, that want of confidence 
in their superiors might lead to the character which he 
ascribed to them. 

In a long and most able dispatch to Marquis Wel- 
lesley, after the British had retired beyond the Spanish 



116 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES; 

frontier, and giving his reasons for so doing in detail, 
he proceeds to a most dispassionate consideration of 
future plans and projects : — 

" 1st. Shall I again join in co-operation with the Spaniards V\ 

He argues the question in all its bearings, and con- 
cludes by saying, — ; 

" It does not appear to be necessary, and not very desirable. 

" 2d. Is there no chance of resuming the offensive ? At 
present, I see none; and hereafter, certainly none. The same 
causes which changed the late operations from offensive after a 
victory to defensive, would still exist. 

" But I come now to another topic, of serious consideration, 
and that is the frequent — I ought to say, constant and shameful ' 
misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We in 
England never hear of their defeats and flights. In the battle of 
Talavera whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off in my 
presence, when they were neither attacked nor threatened, but 
frightened, I believe, by their own fire. 

" I refer for evidence upon this subject to General Cuesta's 
own orders, in which, after extolling the gallantry of his army in 
general, he declares his intention to decimate the runaways; 
which he did ! 

" I can easily conceive the unwillingness of officers in com- 
mand to report their misbehaviour in presence of the enemy, 
for no honour can be acquired ; and in this way I account for 
the numerous histories we have of the bravery of the Spanish 
troops ! 

" I have found, from experience, the instances of misbe- 
haviour to be so numerous, and those of good behaviour so few, 
that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be 
depended upon. 

" Upon every ground, therefore, it is my opinion, that I 
ought to avoid entering into any further co-operation with the 
Spanish armies." (v. 78.) 

In pursuance of the same subject he writes to Lord 
Castlereagh : — 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 117 

" It is lamentable to see how bad the Spanish infantry is* 
It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with them. 
It is said that sometimes they behave well, though I acknow- 
ledge that I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill* 
The practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutre- 
ments, and clothing, is fatal to everything, excepting a re- 
assembling of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly 
perform the same manoeuvre the next time an occasion offers. 

" Nothing can be worse than the officers ; and it is extra- 
ordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this 
nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, 
so little progress has been made in any one branch of the mili- 
tary profession by any individual. 

" I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, 
composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the 
existing Government. They have attempted to govern the king- 
dom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and 
systems, with the aid of what is called enthusiasm, which is no 
aid to accomplish anything, and is only an excuse for irregularity 
in everything, and the want of discipline and subordination of 
the armies." (v. 84.) 

Sir Arthur was created Viscount Wellington, and 
assumed his title on the 16 th of September. 

He had occasion to communicate with the officers in 
command of the French army, respecting prisoners, and 
wounded men. Latterly General Eguia had detained 
a French officer, who had come to the Spanish lines 
with an answer. Eguia had been apprised of the con- 
tents of the letter, and in order to avoid all suspicion, 
had been requested to open any which might be sealed. 
But he still detained the officer. Lord Wellington 
reports this : — 

" The consequence of this unwarrantable act must be a ces- 
sation of all intercourse between me and the French on the sub- 
ject of our prisoners, and the consequent aggravation of their 
captivity. I would write to you officially , only that I think it is 



118 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

too bad to be made the subject of a dispatch, and that if it were 
to be known in England it would create such an irritation 
against Eguia and the Spaniards in general that they would not 
easily remove." (v. 182.) 

" I acknowledge that the refusal to send back le Capitaine 
Thevenon (the officer above alluded to) surprised me; as I 
imagined that i" had some claim to the favourable consideration 
of the Spanish Government. But when I consider that this 
officer came into the Spanish lines under my protection, to bring 
me a letter, on a subject equally interesting to the Spanish 
Government, and as I have a right to claim him, I am still more 
astonished. The pretences for detaining him are as idle as the 
detention of him is improper, and ungracious to me personally. 
In respect to the subject of the correspondence, no suspicion 
could have been entertained, as I desired the Spanish Com- 
mander-in-chief to open and read all letters. 

" If this principle is to be adopted, it will be more difficult 
than it is for a British army to give assistance to Spain. The 
temper manifested may perhaps only be personal to me, though 
I had hoped I had established some claim for consideration from 
the Spanish Government." (v. 221.) 

The Spaniards were again defeated in the beginning 
of December, in La Mancha and in Old Castille. 

Mr. Frere (brother to the former minister) had been 
appointed as Minister to the Spanish Government upon 
Marquis Wellesley's departure, and Lord Wellington 
writes to him: — 

" I lament that a cause which promised so well a few weeks 
ago should have been so completely lost by the ignorance, folly, 
presumption, and mismanagement of those to whom it was in- 
trusted. 

" If they had preserved their two armies (or even one of 
them), the cause was safe. But no ! nothing will answer ex- 
cepting to fight great battles in plains, in which their defeat is 
certain. They will not credit the accounts I have repeatedly 
given them of the superior number of the French: they will 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 119 

seek them out, and find them in all parts superior to them- 
selves/' (v. 324.) 



His Spanish embarrassments were now in some 
degree diminished, as he had left the country and given 
up everything like military co-operation. 

His Portuguese difficulties, however, increased. As 
yet they had been mainly confined to the inefficiency or 
want of energy of inferiors, now they began to show 
themselves in the constitution of the Government itself. 

Some arrangements had been made by the Prince 
Regent in the Brazils connected with the formation of 
the Regency at home, which Lord Wellington did not 
approve of. He writes to Mr. Villiers : — 

" I can account for the arrangement of the Regency as far 
as I am concerned, only by the desire in the Government of 
Brazil to weaken the British influence over the army in this 
country, by a division of the authority placed over it. However, 
the persons who formed this arrangement appear to me to be 
entirely ignorant of the national character of Englishmen, and 
particularly of those who were the objects of the arrangements, 
in thinking that by such means they could obtain their views." 
(v. 199.) 

The Government thus formed, working through the 
medium of the British Minister, urged measures respect- 
ing pay, provisions, &c. for the Portuguese army. Lord 
Wellington offered various suggestions to meet the diffi- 
culties, but they were not acceded to; and at length 
worn out, he writes to Mr. Villiers: — 

" I have done with the Portuguese Government ! I have 
performed my duty by suggesting measures for the relief of the 
great distress under which they labour. My letters will relieve 
me from any blame for the misfortunes which must be the con- 
sequence of this mode of proceeding ; and from this time for- 
ward I shall not write a line excepting in answer to questions 



120 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

j>ut to me, or to propositions which may be forwarded for my 
consideration/' (v. 243.) 

Upon the same subject, writing to Admiral Berkeley, 
he says : — 

" I do not know what to make of the Portuguese Govern- 
ment. -■ I cannot bring my mind to doubt their good inten- 
tions; but you will scarcely believe, that although their army is 
starving, and they have no money to buy provisions, they have 
hesitated, and indeed refused, to adopt two propositions made 
by me, which would have relieved all their difficulties, and 
would have given them magazines. / have done with them" 
(v. 445.) 

We now begin to feel the influence that exerted itself 
against him. For some reason the Senhor de Souza;, in 
the Brazils, whose brother was the Portuguese Minister 
in England, seems to have had a hostile feeling towards 
him. The Patriarch (the Bishop of Oporto), and Dom 
Miguel de Forjaz, though they disliked each other, pro- 
bably from a jealousy of their respective weight in the 
country, seemed to have believed that Lord Wellington 
and the British Ministers at Lisbon had combined with 
the De Souzas against them. 

Lord Wellington writes to Mr. Stuart : — 

" The Patriarch and De Forjaz have their faults, but I am 
convinced that we cannot change either, excepting for the worse; 
and I shall be obliged if you will assure them, not only that I 
will not be any party to the promotion of any change in the 
Government, but that I shall do everything in my power to sup- 
port their authority and the continuance of the Government in 
their hands." (vi. 21.) 

" The principal strength of the Regency consists in the 
regularity and legality of their appointment by the Prince 
Regent; and I know of no person whose assistance as a col- 
league would compensate for the loss of this advantage, by their 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 121 

making any addition or alteration by their own assumed and 
illegal authority." (vi. 60,) 

In his communications to the Government at home 
he says :• — j 

' - The Local Government do not feel themselves sufficiently 
strong in the support of the Government in the Brazils. 

" The King's Minister will have acquainted you of the 
existing party in Portugal, not favourable to the French, nor 
hostile to the British influence over the Portuguese coun- 
cils, but jealous of the authority of the local Government, 
and undermining its influence, and paralyzing its power, 
by private intrigues through friends and relations in the 
Brazils. 

" This party can only be resisted by cordial support to the 
local Government in Portugal, and till that is done our efforts 
must fail." (vi. 318.) 

Senhor de Souza was, however, appointed a Member 
of the Council of Regency. The anti-British feeling was 
apparent, and the measures proposed by them were such 
that Lord Wellington wrote to Mr. Stuart : — 

" In order to put an end to these miserable intrigues, I beg 
that you will inform the Government that I will not stay in this 
country, and that I shall advise the King's Government to with- 
draw the assistance which His Majesty affords them if they inter r 
fere in any manner with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's 
staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the 
army, or with any of the points which under the original ar- 
rangement were referred exclusively to him. 

" It appears that the Government have lately discovered that 
we are all wrong; they are impatient for the defeat of the 
enemy, and, like the Central Junta in Spain, call out for a battle. 
If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spaniards, 
and the cause would now have been safe ; but now, having the 
power, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving 
the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless sug- 
gestions of the Portuguese Government. 



122 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

" I am much hurt at this change of conduct of the Regency, 
which I must attribute to the persons recently introduced into 
the Government." (vi. 387.) 

" I can only declare this, that if I find the Government hesi- 
tating, and alarmed by the mob of Lisbon, I shall forthwith 
embark the army, and the Portuguese nation will have the satis- 
faction of losing itself by the pusillanimity of the Government. 

* I attribute much to the conduct of the Government, and 
particularly of the new members of it. If these foolish fellows 
cannot be kept in order we must get rid of them ; and one mode 
is, that I shall insist upon Souza' s being sent away." (vi. 398.) 

" At all times, and under all circumstances, I have possessed 
the confidence of the Government, and their object has been to 
forward my views for the public service. And till the late 
change, I never received any observation except of confidence in 
the measures which I recommended. But the Principal Souza 
is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition, that 
we cannot go on as we have hitherto as long as he continues a 
member of the Government. 

His Majesty's Government will be the best judges of what 
measures ought to be adopted. I have already desired Mr. 
Stuart to give notice to the Regency, that if they continued to 
interfere with the military operations I should recommend to 
His Majesty to withdraw the army." (v. 410.) 

The same system of interference went on, and he 
writes to Mr. Stuart, — 

" I beg you will inform the Regency, and above all Principal 
Souza, that His Majesty has entrusted me with the command of 
the army ; I will not suffer them or anybody else to interfere : 
that I know best where to station my troops, and I shall not 
alter my system upon any suggestion of theirs. 

" I am responsible for what I do, and they are not. As for 
Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him from me, that I have had 
no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he 
has been a member of the Government ; and that no power on 
earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment 
after I shall have obtained His Majesty's leave to resign, if Prin- 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 123 

cipal Souza is to remain either a member of the Government or 
to remain at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I 
shall; and I will take care that the world shall be made 
acquainted with my reasons." (vi. 466.) 

Much of the conduct which was pursued by the 
leading members of the local Government from this 
time, October 1810, till he finally marched out of the 
country, though most injurious to the army, partook 
so much of personal hostility to himself, that the notice 
which justice to him requires us to take of it is more 
appropriately classed, and has been stated, in that por- 
tion of our remarks which refer to his personal Forgive- 
ness of Injustice. 

But the general bitterness of feeling against the 
British continued to display itself more extensively. 
All the subordinate magistrates and the executive 
officers of police, &c. were quite aware of the sentiments 
of their superiors, and ready to take advantage ; and we 
may probably concede, without injustice, that British 
officers (particularly the juniors) were not likely to smooth 
the difficulties arising from Portuguese arrogance and 
impertinence. 

A complaint had been forwarded to him of an officer 
(not named) for violence in enforcing a billet at Lisbon. 
He writes to Mr Stuart : — 

" Having read the inflammatory report of the Judge of Police, 
and of the Juiz dos Barrios, and of the Secretary of State, on 
the complaint, I am not astonished that complaints on this sub- 
ject should be frequent at Lisbon, where, if they did not receive 
encouragement from these high authorities, there ought and would 
be none. 

" I have long seen the inutility of complaining to the Govern- 
ment on the conduct of any of the public servants, or on any 
subject whatever. I shall therefore not make any complaint of 
the Judge of Police, who, instead of endeavouring to conciliate, 



124 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

or, as was his duty, enforcing the necessary law of billets, has 1 
done everything* in his power to aggravate. 

" The case is so flagrant, and the conduct of the magistrate 
has been so improper, that if I could entertain any hopes that 
the truth would reach the Prince Regent of Portugal, I would 
address his R. Highness on the subject. 

" I only hope that the time is not far distant when the British 
army, tired of such conduct, will impart to the British nation 
the disgust which it must occasion, as well as the desire to leave 
to its fate a country in which, by the Government and the higher 
orders, they have been so unworthily treated." (viii. 134.) 

" It is my opinion, that a change in the Government in 
Portugal is become absolutely necessary. The Prince Regent's 
servants have, in fact, no influence over the proceedings of the 
local Government, who have done everything to defeat their 
measures. 

• "It is a matter of astonishment that such a spirit should 
exist among people who absolutely depend for their existence 
upon the continuance of H. R. Highnesses protection of their, 
country; but so it is! The truth is, that they have been 
ashamed of the influence and power which they had been in- 
duced to give to British officers in their army. The contrast of 
the conduct of the Spaniards is perpetually occurring to them : 
the Spaniards reproach them that they have no country, and that 
there are no Portuguese; and the object of the local Govern-* 
ment appears to be, to diminish the reputation and the influence 
of British officers as much as they can : and with this view they 
oppose every measure proposed by us." (viii. 270.) 

We have already noticed as a peculiar characteristic, 
his. power and his willingness to forget and forgive ; and 
a part of his correspondence at this period strongly 
exemplifies it. 

After all the indignities to which he had been 
exposed personally, and after all the injuries inflicted 
on his army, by neglect and wilfulness, it is not every 
man who would have been willing to hold out the hand 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES, 125 

of reconciliation in the manner which we now see re4 
specting the Principal Souza. 

He had expressed himself in the strongest terms as 
far back as Oct, 1810, declaring, as we have seen 
(p. 122), that nothing should induce him to remain in 
the country if the Principal continued at Lisbon. The 
Principal, however, still remained, and we find Lord 
Wellington again repeating (Sept. 1811), as we have 
just read, " that a change in the Portuguese Government 
was absolutely necessary." 

Reference to the Brazils led to no improvement ; 
indeed the local Government at Lisbon were in reality 
supported from thence. Lord Wellington, with his 
usual placability and forbearance, writes to Lord 
Liverpool: — 

" Unless the British Government take up the subject, and 
bring these gentlemen to a proper understanding of the nature 
of their situation and their duties, we must only jog on as we 
can. If Government would follow my advice, they would make 
the Prince of Brazils understand, that if he and his ministers* 
and his servants in this country did not exert themselves, the 
assistance of the British, both in money and troops, should 
be withdrawn." 

The Prince of Brazils, however, would not dismiss, 
the Principal : but as he expressed a willingness to 
receive with more favour the services of Dom Miguel de 
Porjaz, towards whom he had for some reason a dislike, 
and who was esteemed by Lord Wellington the best 
member of the local Government ; the latter, writing 
to Mr. Stuart, says : — 

" It is obvious to me, from everything that has passed, that 
the Prince will not dismiss Principal Souza; but the orders 
which have been lately received here, and the promise which the 
Prince makes to receive favourably the services of Dom M. de 



126 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

Forjaz, render the dismission of the Principal an object of less 
importance. 

" I have therefore taken advantage of the receipt of the 
Prince's letter to put an end to the uncomfortable state in which 
I have so long stood in respect of the Government. 

"We shall now start afresh, and must endeavour to carry the 
business on as well as we can \ n (viii. 346.) 

The above letter was written in October 1811. His 
old enemy, Principal Souza, was still continued in power, 
and probably (notwithstanding Lord Wellington's mag- 
nanimity) was as troublesome as ever ; but we have no 
further mention of him till the following February. 

The Marquis Welles! ey was Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs at this time, and no doubt the daily 
difficulties arising from the temper of the Portuguese 
Regency had induced the British Government to lay the 
case strongly before the Prince Regent in the Brazils. 

Mr. Sydenham, a confidential friend of Marquis 
Wellesley's, had been in Portugal, and had had much 
communication with Lord Wellington ; in the course of 
which the latter says that " he may have expressed his 
feelings;" but in a letter to Mr. Stuart, of Feb. 1812, 
he says : — 

"I am positively certain, not only that I did not desire 
Sydenham to make any complaint to Lord Wellesley; but I 
will go further, and declare positively, that I desired him to tell 
Lord Wellesley that it was, in my opinion, best to take no further 
steps to endeavour to remove the Principal ; as it appeared from 
the Prince's letter to me that his removal was so very repugnant 
to his feelings, that the matters which had been in dispute were 
at an end, and that I should endeavour to work on as well as 
I could. 

u I do not know what to say to the order for the removal of 
the Principal. If it were to come direct to Portugal, I should 
say it ought to be obeyed ; for the same reason that I said the 
order for his appointment should be obeyed. But it appears that 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES, 127 

it is sent to England, and entrusted to Lord Wellesley's discre- 
tion, who, I think likely, will entrust it to ours, 

" We should certainly do better without the Principal. The 
truth is, the man is mad, and he cannot act with common sense 
upon any occasion. But if he were removed, though we should 
go on better, as we should get rid of the perpetual talkings about 
affairs and doing nothing, things would still not go on as we 
would wish. 

" However, upon the whole, I am rather inclined to remove 
him ; but I shall not decide till I have considered the matter." 
(viii. 561.) 

The consent to his removal had, however, been given 
from the Brazils, and had apparently been referred to the 
British Government. They had written to our Minister 
at Lisbon, who in his turn had communicated with Lord 
Wellington, who writes in reply : — 

" It is not necessary to enter upon the natural defects of his 
mind and character. My objections to him, and my recom- 
mendation that he should be removed, were founded upon his 
opposition to the measures which I proposed. 

"The Prince Regent refused, however; and although the 
determination was not communicated to me in very gracious 
terms, I determined not to press it. I afterwards, in October 
1811, received a letter from the Prince, which appeared to offer 
a favourable opportunity of being reconciled to the local Govern- 
ment ; and I offered and requested that everything might be buried 
in oblivion. 

" In the meantime, His Majesty's Government having inter- 
fered with their influence, His Royal Highness has consented that 
he should be removed; and the question is, whether we should avail 
ourselves of it. 

"It is obvious that the consent of the Prince has been ex- 
torted from him ; and though Principal Souza should be removed, 
he would retain the influence which he possesses. Nothing would 
be gained ; and he would be considered as a martyr to English 
influence, and his popularity would increase. 

" I cannot but admit that it would be desirable that he 



128 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

should be. removed ; but upon the same principle that on the 
last occasion I would not urge the Prince to remove him, I do 
not recommend that advantage should be now taken of H. E. H.'s 
fetter." (ix. 91.) 

Having, as we have seen, determined to forget and 
forgive the former want of cordiality between himself 
and the Principal, and endeavoured to jGg on (as he 
expressed it), he had no wish after snch a lapse of time 
to avail himself of the present opening to remove him. 
He was too generous an opponent to take advantage,' 
and notv to resent what he had already forgiven. 

How far such good feeling was appreciated we cannot 
say, but we hear no more of the Principal. 



A project had been offered for his consideration, as 
to the possibility of organizing the Spanish army upon 
the same principle as the Portuguese. He replies : — 

"I am quite convinced, that the majority of the Spanish 
officers would prefer submitting to the French to allowing us* 
to have anything to say to their troops. In truth, they are by 
no means convinced, or, at all events, will not allow, that our 
officers know any more of their profession than they do them-- 
selves ; and we may depend upon it that we should always have 
them acting against us, and that all their class would follow 
their example. 

" I think it probable (but I am not certain) that we should 
get some of the lower orders to serve in regiments officered by 
British officers; but I am convinced that if the authorities set 
their faces against the measure, we should get but few." 
(viii. 237.) 

At a later period, upon some renewed proposals of 
raising regiments to be officered by British, he gives 
his reasons for believing that it would not answer, de- 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 129 

pending greatly on the natural prejudices of the men ; 
but he adds : — 

" I must observe that British officers require to be kept in 
order as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly 
in foreign service. The experience which I have had of their 
conduct in the Portuguese service, has shown me that there 
must be an authority, and that a strong one, to keep them 
within due bounds; otherwise, they would only disgust the 
soldiers over whom they were placed, the officers whom they 
were destined to assist, and the country in whose service they 
were employed." (viii. 309.) 

Referring again to the proposition respecting the 
amendment of the Spanish army, he says to Mr. 
Wellesley : — 

" In regard to the employment of British officers, I entertain 
the same opinion that I always have. They will be worse than 
useless if they have not the support of the Commander-in-chief, 
who must have the cordial support of the Government, or he 
will have no authority. 

" I retain likewise the same opinion regarding my having 
the command of the Spanish armies. I consider troops that are 
neither paid, fed, nor disciplined, to be dangerous only to their 
friends, when assembled in large bodies. 

" I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot and 
will not obey ; and therefore I am not desirous of having any- 
thing to say to the command of the Spanish troops. 

" Upon this subject of the employment of British officers, and 
of the command being given to me, I may be wrong; but I 
entertain an opinion which I have not heard from others. It 
is my opinion that the officers of the Spanish armies are the 
principal exciters of the general sentiment which prevails against 
the French. They all consider themselves deprived of their pro- 
fession by the government of Buonaparte ; and therefore, if we 
mean to encourage the resistance of the people, we ought not to 
disgust the Spanish officers, and so far deprive them of their pro- 
fession as to give to British officers the effectual control over the 
army. 

K 



130 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

u Although there are many difficulties in introducing our 
officers into the Spanish service, and in giving the Commander- 
in-chief the command of the whole, many of the advantages 
might be obtained. I think that I have already acquired such an 
influence over the Spanish officers that they would do anything 
I should desire, excepting, perhaps, to discipline their troops 
and establish subordination amongst them. 

" It has always been my opinion, that much might be done 
by the British Government to increase the authority and influ- 
ence of the Commander-in-chief in this country. But all pro- 
positions for increase and extension of authority are received in 
England with jealousy ; and I have, therefore, never made any 
direct proposition. I might have hoped, that the desire which I 
have always expressed to be allowed to confine my attention to 
my own army might have satisfied the King's Government that 
I want no extension of authority, and that I deprecate it, as 
throwing upon me additional responsibility and trouble. 

" But I have no hesitation in saying, that the only remedy 
for the existing evils is to increase to the utmost the power and 
authority of the Commander-in-chief, and to leave to his discretion 
the distribution of all the aids to the Peninsula." (ix. 112.) 

A little later, with reference to an appointment which 
the Spanish Government had made, he expresses himself 
rather warmly : — 

" I am certain that the existing Spanish Government have 
no intention of doing anything offensive to me, but I should be 
inclined to entertain doubts iu consequence of this appointment. 

" Senhor is the person who was employed by the 

Central Junta to attend this army (p. 114). He is not only 
the most useless and inefficient of God's creatures, but is an 
impediment to all business, and he cannot speak a word of 
truth. 

" After knowing the truth of all my complaints of those days, 
and, as he assured me, reporting them to his employers, he 
suddenly turned round, when the Junta sent a sum of money, 
and swore r that we wanted nothing, and were amply supplied.' 
He had the impudence to tell me so at Truxillo ; and after I had 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 131 

forced him to acknowledge that he told a falsehood, I turned him 
out of the room, and desired that I might never see his face 
again. I shall hold no communication with him ; and it will 
remain for the Government to consider whether such a man 
should be appointed in connection with this army." (ix. 360.) 

" I do not expect much from the Spaniards, notwithstanding 
all that we have done for them. They cry ' Viva' and are very 
fond of us, and hate the French ; but they are, in general, the 
most incapable of useful exertion of any nation that I have 
known : the most vain, the most ignorant, particularly of mili- 
tary affairs. The utmost we can hope for is, to teach them how 
to avoid being beat." (ix. 366.) 

" It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not 
have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation 
of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, 
and thinking and talking of any other subject than Spain/' 
(ix. 524.) 

He accepted the command of the Spanish army 
in October 1812, and had given his utmost attention 
with a view to put it into a state of efficiency ; but in all 
his letters he expressed his doubts as to what it might be 
in his power to effect, in consequence of the national 
character and the general incapacity of the Government. 

Towards the end of December he writes to the Mi- 
nister at War : — 

" The Cortes have done me the honour to confer upon me 
the command of their armies, and have thus manifested to the 
world the confidence they repose in me. 

" It is impossible to perform the duties as they ought, unless 
I possess sufficient powers ; and I request that you will inform 
the Government, that if they do not feel themselves authorised, 
or have not confidence in me, to trust me with those powers, I 
beg leave to decline the command. 

. " I stated distinctly what the powers are which I require. 
[He then recapitulates them, and adds :] I beg to have a decided 
answer on all these points. Whatever may be the decision of 



132 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

the Government, my desire to serve the cause of Spain will 
remain the same/'' (x. 1.) 

In March following he writes, — 

" I have been doing everything in my power to get on the 
Spanish army, and I must do the officers the justice to say that 
they do everything in their power. I have much reason, how- 
ever, to complain of the Government." (x. 164.) 

" I wish you would see whoever is really at the head of 
affairs, and represent to him how desirous I am to carry on the 
service in the most honourable, advantageous, and agreeable 
manner ; but that the engagements with me must be strictly 
carried into execution, if it is wished that I should retain the 
command. It is only necessary to express a hint, or desire, that 
I should resign, or fail to perform their engagements entered 
into with me, and / shall resign with much more pleasure than I 
ever accepted." (x. 216.) 

The campaign commenced in May. The Spanish 
Government was entirely under the domination of the 
newspapers at Cadiz, and the greatest difficulty was 
found in respect to pay for their troops. Lord Welling- 
ton wrote to some of their generals as to their difficulty 
of moving. To one he says • — 

" Whether you march now, or at a future period, I consider 
it to be more important to have a small body well paid and ap- 
pointed, than a larger one which there did not exist means of 
paying and feeding. The former may render some service, the 
latter cannot/' (x. 339.) 

He says afterwards to the Spanish Minister of War: — 
" It is impossible to maintain a Spanish army in the field, 
excepting by the resources of Spain itself. The campaign is 
about to open, and I foretell what will happen. For a short 
time the troops will be maintained, whilst the harvest is on the 
ground. This will last but a short time, and the Spanish troops 
must be dispersed, or sent to the rear. Resources for the army I 
know the country can afford, which require only due care to be 
realised." (x. 380.) 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 133 

He complains, after the army had advanced, of the 
neglect and misconduct of the Intendants and civil au- 
thorities of the province of Andalusia ; whereby the 
Spaniards, who were joined to the allied British and 
Portuguese, were unfurnished with mules and means of 
transport, and 

" though clothed, armed, and disciplined, were obliged to be 
kept in the rear, so that the campaign would be fought without 
a single Spanish corps, although it was supposed that 160,000 
men were in arms." (x. 415.) 

He received a most unfavourable reply to his remon- 
strance, and very soon after they removed generals from 
their commands, and appointed others, in breach of the 
agreements with him. 

He writes to Mr. Wellesley, begging him to call to- 
gether any of 

" the persons who had been concerned in nominating him 
to the command, and to tell them that if he did not receive some 
satisfaction for the insults offered by those arrangements, it would 
be impossible for him to hold the command/'' (x. 491.) 

In another letter to Mr. Wellesley he says: — 

" Although I think the conduct towards General Castanos 
and Giron is harsh and unjust, I do not complain of it as a 
breach of engagement with me. Neither do I complain of their 
refusal to promote the officers whom I recommend. It was 
ungracious. But what I complain of is, that having made en- 
gagements with me, without which I neither can nor will hold 
the command, they have broken them, not in one, but in an 
hundred instances ; and that they do it wantonly, because they 
know my disinclination to relinquish the command, on account 
of the bad effect it would have in Spain and throughout Europe. 
Their conduct, therefore, is injurious and an indignity, and I 
must have satisfaction !" (x. 564.) 



134 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

At last he says to the Minister at War : — 

" I shall be much concerned, for many reasons, if I should 
be obliged to relinquish the command ; but if I should, I can 
assure your Excellency that / will do it at the period and in the 
mode which may be most convenient and agreeable to the Re- 
gency." (x. 611.) 

He tells the Government at home : — 

" The Spanish Government have behaved very ill in this, as 
they have in every other transaction ; but in the existing state of 
affairs, I do not think it wise to push them to extremities. The 
Cortes and the people of Cadiz are making an intrigue of it ; and 
I have, therefore, thought it best to act on my own grounds, ac- 
cording to my own judgment of what is most for the public 
interest, and keeping myself clear of the intrigues and cabals of 
others." 

Here is a further illustration of his power of over- 
coming all personal feelings upon public grounds. 

We have seen in the last extracts how disgusted he 
was with their conduct towards him : that " he would 
resign the command with much more pleasure than he 
had accepted ;" but he had reason to know that the 
question of getting rid of him had become a matter of 
party and intrigue. The ostensible Government was 
weak ; the people were factious : and if he had now 
pressed the former, however they might have deserved 
it from their wretched and pusillanimous conduct towards 
him, it would have afforded a triumph to the latter: 
which he considered more dangerous to the State. 



He had now quitted Portugal, not to return ! A 
good deal of correspondence had been maintained during 
the whole of his stay at Frenada, from the month of 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 135 

January, and after his advance into Spain, relating, as 
usual, to finance, or to neglect on the part of the autho- 
rities. The last letter, dated July 20, 1813, to Sir 
Charles Stuart, is upon the misconduct of a Juiz da 
Fora, and concludes with the following sentence : — 

" I must say that the British army have met with nothing 
but ingratitude from the Government and authorities of Portu- 
gal for their services ; and that everything that could be done, 
has been done by the civil authorities lately, to oppress the 
officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has, by any 
accident, been in their power. / hope, however, that we have 
seen the last of Portugal!" (x. 557.) 

We find one more letter respecting Portugal, which 
it is interesting to insert, as expressing his feelings, 
though, fortunately, no necessity arose for acting upon 
it: — 

" In regard to the appointment of General to command 

the army when Marshal Beresford goes to England, I shall be 
obliged to you to remind the Government, that they are ordered 
by the Prince Regent to consult my opinion on matters of finance 
and military affairs; and I recommend to them not to adopt 
such a measure as to appoint a commanding officer to the army 
without consulting with me. 

" I was prejudiced in favour of General , and I believe 

I was the cause of his being employed with the army in this 
campaign. My opinion is very much altered. He possesses 
no one military quality, and he has been repeatedly guilty of 
that worst of all tricks, which invariably defeats its own ends, 
viz. courting popularity with the common soldiers, by flattering 
their vices, and by impunity for their misconduct. Such a man 
will not do in this army." (ix. 263.) 

Here we take leave of his Portuguese annoyances. 
Those from the Spaniards continued in full force. Some 
of the instances were, perhaps, prior in date to the letter 
which we have just quoted, and which we have done for 



136 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

the purpose of keeping the affairs distinct and clear of 
each other. 

The Spanish Government had been altered. Lord 
Wellington had been appointed by the former Govern- 
ment with certain powers, and under certain stipulations 
on their parts, which, with the bad faith that distin- 
guished them throughout, the new Government broke 
through in many instances ; and the Minister at War, 
in his correspondence with the British Ambassador, 
endeavoured to show that the " existing Regents could 
only agree to what was directed by the Cortes, and 
could not confirm any agreement made by their pre- 
decessors.' 5 

Lord Wellington proved, by original letters, that the 
existing Government had, after full consideration, con- 
firmed all the agreements of their predecessors ; and in 
regard to any alteration of what was agreed with him, 
he did not see how it could be done, "so as to enable 
him to hold the command with advantage to the public 
or honour to himself." He adds : — 

" Matters cannot go on much longer as they are : either I 
must possess the confidence and support of the Government and 
the Minister at War, whatever may be the nature of the agree- 
ment with me, or I must resign the command, notwithstanding 
the consequences, of which I am as well aware as any man." 
(xi. 22.) 

But even then he subdues his feelings and adds : — 

"Tell the gentlemen, that if I am obliged to take this step 
I will do it in the manner most agreeable to them ( ! ! ), and 
least injurious to the public service." 

Notwithstanding his private conviction of the worth- 
lcssness of the man, he still continues his official corre- 
spondence with the minister : — 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 137 

" I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the union 
of the command of the armies of the allied nations in one hand, 
is the only mode by which great successes can be acquired : but 
I do not despair of being still able to acquire such as will be 
satisfactory. 

" I propose to continue to exercise the command as usual, 
and I shall omit to announce to the army my resignation, till I 
receive those further orders which your Excellency announces to 
me." (xi. 164.) 

In his letter to the Secretary of State at the end of 
November he says : — ■ 

" Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards, 
that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously. 

" You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which 
I know were written and published by an officer of the War 
Department, and, I believe, under the direction of the Minister 
at War, Don Juan O'Donoju. I believe these libels all to pro- 
ceed from the same source — the Government, their immediate 
servants, and officers ; and although I have no reason to believe 
that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at 
large, they certainly have upon the principal officers of the 
army. They must see that, if they are not written by the 
Government, they are, at least, not discouraged : they know 
that we are odious to the Government, and they treat us ac- 
cordingly. 

" The Spanish troops plunder everything. Till lately there 
was some semblance of inquiry, and a desire to punish : lately 
these acts have been left entirely unnoticed, till I have inter- 
fered with my authority as Commander-in-chief of the Spanish 
army. 

" I will now request you to consider what will be the con- 
sequence if any reverse were to happen, or that you were to 
think fit to withdraw your array." (xi. 325.) 

He then proceeds to suggest the course to pursue, 
and adds : — 

" I recommend you to withdraw the troops if these demands 



138 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 

are not complied with. You may rely upon this, that if you 
take a firm, decided line, and show your determination to go 
through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, you 
will bring the Government to their senses, and you will put an 
end at once to all the petty cabals existing at this moment, 
and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to 
extremities. If you take any other than a decided line (which 
in its consequences will involve them in ruin), you may depend 
upon it you will gain nothing, and will only make matters 
worse. 

" I recommend this, whatever may be the decision respecting 
my command of the [Spanish] army. They are, probably, the 
more necessary if I should keep the command. The truth is, 
that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain ; and 
if you do not bring the nation to their senses before they go too 
far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might 
expect from the services rendered to them. 

"Although I am quite certain that nothing can ever be 
done with the Spaniards, excepting by coming to extremities 
with them, I am very averse that there should be the appear- 
ance of difference of opinion just at this moment here, if it can 
be avoided." (xi. 338.) 



Here was the exemplification of a great man with a 
great mind. This counsel was not the result of the 
working of a petulant temper, justly irritated by studied 
insult. We have seen, a few pages back, how nobly he 
disregarded all that was merely personal, and how con- 
scious he was of the public injury which would arise 
from yielding to any personal exasperation. But here 
he shows how injurious too much subserviency would 
be ; and with the warmth of a bold, but not a passionate 
mind, he recommends bringing matters to a crisis as the 
only remedy. 

He afterwards had reason to believe that there was 
an inclination in the 'Cortes to get rid of the existing 



FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 139 

Government, principally on account of their treatment of 
the British ; and says : — 

" I believe the effect in the Cortes has been produced very 
much by the language I held about the San Sebastian libels." 
(xi. 338.) 

Fortunately, the events of the campaign speedily 
removed him from the country, and thus terminated 
the series of his Foreign Annoyances. 



SECRECY AND CAUTION. 



Secrecy, or the power of keeping to himself his opinions 
and intentions, was undoubtedly a prominent feature of 
the Duke's character. It seems to have been adopted 
upon principle, from the very earliest period of his public 
career. 

A letter of his own in these Dispatches, written in 
1804, exemplifies, in the shortest and most explicit 
manner, the nature of his feelings on the subject. 

In virtue of the authority vested in him during the 
campaigns in the Deccan in 1804, previous to the break- 
ing up that army, he had appointed Lieutenant-colonel 
Wallace to the command of the subsidiary force, which 
was to be stationed with the Peshwah at Poonah. 
Colonel Wallace was an officer who had justly obtained 
a military reputation by the zealous manner in which he 
had executed the duties confided to him ; but he had 
not hitherto had any independent charge entrusted to 
him, involving other considerations as well as the strict 
duty of the soldier. 

General Wellesley, after he had left Lieutenant-colonel 
Wallace at his destined post, writes to him ; and we 
believe it will be difficult to find more sensible principles 
explained in more simple terms : — 

" I believe that in my public dispatch I have alluded to 
every point to which I wish to draw your attention, excepting 






SECRECY AND CAUTION. 141 

one, which I will mention to you, that is, the secrecy of your 
proceedings. Ninety -nine cases out of a hundred might be 
posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public 
interests; but when the public business is the subject of general 
conversation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon 
every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that 
occasion where it is necessary. There is an awkwardness about 
a secret, which enables observant men invariably to find it 
out. 

" Secrecy is always best. Those who have been long trusted 
with the conduct of public affairs, are in the habit of never 
making public any business of any description which it is not 
necessary for the public to know. Secrecy becomes natural to 
them, and as much a habit to them as it is to others to talk ; 
and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as 
they may think proper. I mention this, because, in fact, I 
have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your 
hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you 
ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it 
is essentially necessary. 

" Remember, what I recommend is far removed from mys- 
tery : in fact, I recommend silence upon all occasions, to avoid 
the necessity of mystery upon any." (xi. 562.) 

It lias been professed in our introductory observa- 
tions, that all the statements, and the deductions from 
them, would be founded solely upon the contents of the 
Dispatches, subjected as they had been before publi- 
cation to strict examination from the Duke himself. 

The following anecdote, it is true, is not contained in 
any one of the Duke's letters ; but it is published in 
vol. i., and must have been seen by him, and, there- 
fore, is as much to be relied upon as if it had been 
stated by himself. The event recorded took place at an 
earlier date than that of the letter which we have quoted 
above; but precedence has been given to the latter, 
because it states in the Duke's own words his own 



142 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 

feelings and principles, upon which he invariably acted, 
and which are illustrated in the anecdote itself. 

It is not intended to insinuate that any British 
officer would have been open to the bribery which an 
Oriental might feel himself warranted in offering, and 
which the latter would, probably, regard as too much a 
matter of custom to consider in any way disgraceful. 
We do not, therefore, put it forward as a proof of 
General Wellesley's disinterestedness respecting money ; 
but it is told in an amusing way, strongly exemplifying 
his curt and abrupt style, and at least illustrates his 
general adherence to the practice of secrecy : — 

" At a conference in camp on December 24, 1803, Mohiput 
Ram, the Vakeel, or Resident, from the Nizam, was very anxious 
to ascertain from General Wellesley what districts were likely to 
be assigned to his master. The General declined giving any 
information, when Mohiput offered him seven lacs of rupees for 
it (about 70,000/.). General Wellesley said, f Can you keep a 
secret V Mohiput, hoping that he had touched the right 
chord, eagerly answered, 'Yes/ 'And so can 1/ said the 
General. 

" Mohiput was supposed to have obtained the information 
afterwards, as the messenger who carried the dispatches was 
waylaid and murdered." (i. 522.) 

Sir Arthur Wellesley (as he had then been made) 
left India in March 1805, and reached England in Sep- 
tember. 

He was in no public situation from that time, in 
which the particular characteristic we are now consi- 
dering was called for, until he was sent for the second 
time to Portugal m 1809. 



The French, under Soult, were in possession of 
Oporto, and the whole of the kingdom north of the 



SECRECY AND CAUTION. 143 

Douro ; and Sir Arthur made immediate preparations to 
attack him. 

It appeared that much discontent prevailed in Soult's 
army, and arrangements were made for one of the dis- 
affected French officers to have an interview with Sir 
Arthur. He might naturally feel a little suspicious of 
such persons, and his natural caution (allied as it was to 
his general principle of secrecy) shows itself upon the occa- 
sion, as we see by the following letter to Colonel Tramt, 
who commanded the Portuguese troops in that district, 
and by whom the interview was to be managed : — 

" We shall have troops on the march to-morrow towards 
Vizeu ; and as it is desirable that your friends [alluding to the 
French officers] should not see more of our troops than is abso- 
lutely necessary, and should know nothing of our operations, I 
request you to bring or send them word to Murtede, three 
leagues from hence, and let me know at what hour they will be 
there." (iv. 275.) 

It is not our object to follow the military details, and 
we find nothing to illustrate the characteristic we are 
considering, till July, when he writes the following 
letter, in answer to one in which Mr. Frere, then the 
British Minister in Spain, had probably recommended 
the gentleman alluded to to his favourable notice. 

Sir Arthur, apparently, had received a contradictory 
account. He says : — 

" I conclude that Colonel Bourke [one of the British officers 
attached to the Spanish armies] has given me the character 

which he has heard of Senor ; but I beg you will believe 

that if I should find it correct, I shall be convinced you had 
no knowledge of this character when he was sent ; and, at all 
events, I shall have no prejudice against Senor ." (iv. 437.) 

The following letter, three weeks after, probably 
refers to the same person : — 



144 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 

" I have no reason to complain of Senor . He 

only appears to me to be too anxious to obtain a knowledge of 
our plans ; but I do not know whether I ought to attribute this 
appearance of anxiety in him to my prejudices against him, or 
to his desire to make his own employment of more importance, 
or to his curiosity, or to his wish to make himself useful. A 
man in his situation, if he is not honest, has it in his power to 
do us much mischief. He has certainly the mind and manner 
of an intrigant, and comes from a part of Spain of which the 
people are most likely not to be inimical to the French. 

" Besides his anxiety to obtain a knowledge of our plans 
from me, I have heard him making inquiries respecting the 
strength of corps from others, with which he had certainly no 
concern." (iv. 478.) 

We do not suppose that he learned much from Sir 
Arthur, who evidently could not divest himself of grave 
doubts respecting him. 

When he was compelled, by the want of all supplies 
for his army, to fall back into Portugal, after Talavera, 
the question of the defence of that country became 
pressing. 

Sir Arthur considers the subject in all its bearings, 
in a very full exposition of his views to Lord Castlereagh 
(August 25, 1809), and here we find the first intimation 
respecting the celebrated Lines of Torres Vedras, though 
in vague and indefinite terms : — 

" The difficulty lies in the embarkation of the British army. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring the contest for the 
capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark. You will see 
by the map, that Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army 
that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure 
the navigation of the river, by the occupation of both banks, and 
the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, 
be given up. However, I have not entirely made up my mind. 
I have a great deal of information, but I should wish to have 
more before I decide." (v. 89.) 



SECRECY AND CAUTION. 145 

He went to Lisbon early in October, for the purpose 
of a personal reconnaissance; but his only announce- 
ment of that move in his private letter to Lord Castle- 
reagh is, — 

" I am going to Lisbon on Sunday, all being quiet ; and I 
hope in a short time to be able to make a report on the defence 
of Portugal, which I hope will be satisfactory to Government." 
(v. 210.) 

The first instructions for the engineers were drawn 
up during this visit, though they were subsequently 
modified and improved. 

He did not anticipate an early attack, but he looked 
to every possible contingency, and his instructions en- 
tered into the most minute details. But they were con- 
fined solely to those who were to carry them into execu- 
tion. It is impossible to say how far he may have 
divulged his scheme to those about him, in the course of 
conversation: but the principle of secrecy, which he 
had so ably inculcated early in his career to his 
friend Colonel Wallace, in India (p. 141), probably in- 
fluenced him still ; and we find no indication of it, in 
any letter or dispatch even to the Government, till much 
later. 

Upon an occasion, in January 1810, when he had 
reason to feel that his own personal inspection of the 
works was necessary, he merely says in his letters to 
Generals Sir L. Cole and R. Crawfurd (who were com- 
manding on the frontier), that he was going " for a few 
days upon a reconnaissance towards Torres Vedras ;" 
and, in fact, though no doubt the execution of such 
works must have been, and was, known to thousands, 
they were completed with so little eclat or display, that 
the public in England, the greater number of our own 
army, and certainly the whole of the Trench army, were 

L 



146 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 

taken by surprise when we occupied them, after the 
battle of Busaco. 



His caution and forethought, and the avoiding of 
every public or outward demonstration which might ex- 
cite suspicion or alarm, or convey any intimation of what 
his views might be, seemed to extend to every point, If 
matters should be brought to extremities, the final em- 
barkation of the army, notwithstanding every previous 
precaution, must have been a hurried and hazardous 
operation, and if not well considered beforehand, must 
have been attended with immense loss of baggage, &c, 
even if the troops themselves were saved ; and the fol- 
lowing letter to Sir George Berkeley, who commanded 
the fleet in the Tagus, is in reference to that object : — 

" With a view to the possible necessity of evacuating Por- 
tugal, I have considered it desirable that the baggage of the 
army (left in store at Lisbon) should be embarked in the trans- 
ports; and it has occurred to me, that the moment at which 
this measure can be adopted without being misunderstood by the 
public, and without creating alarm, is that at which reinforce- 
ments arrive from England." (v. 429.) 

A formal public embarkation of stores and baggage, 
when the enemy were still beyond the frontier, would 
naturally have conveyed an impression that lie antici- 
pated danger, though remote ; but the passage of boats, 
whether to or from the ships, at such a time as he points 
out, would be no novelty — it would hardly be noticed \ 
and the idea that the embarkation going on was a long- 
sighted measure of precaution, would not strike the 
mind of the Lisbon people, and be by them disseminated 
far and wide. 

" I have accordingly ordered that the baggage of the several 



SECRECY AND CAUTION. 147 

regiments may be embarked as soon as the reinforcements 
shall arrive, in the ships in which the regiments would be 
placed; and that the baggage of the regiments expected from 
England should be left in one of the ships which have brought 
each of them." 

But with all this careful forethought as to the effect 
which premature demonstration might produce upon the 
public mind, we find on other occasions the exercise of 
sound, good sense, which made him feel the inexpediency 
of attempting concealment. Intentions might be con- 
cealed; events could not. 

After his advance to the frontier, in June 1810, he 
writes from Celerico to Mr. Stuart : — 

" I do not think that any measure can be adopted to prevent 
false reports, or to remedy the evils which result from them. 
False reports respecting the operations of armies are always 
circulated, particularly where British officers are concerned. 
These reports are circulated even in this town, where there is no 
reserve, and where every person who chooses sees the reports of 
intelligence received. Then we are the most indefatigable writers 
of letters and news that exist in the world, and the fashion of 
the times gives encouragement to lies. I know no mode of 
getting the better of the inconvenience, which is the consequence 
of the circulation of these false reports, excepting to have no 
reserve on the real and well-founded intelligence. I would not 
recommend publication, as it might lead to inconveniences of 
another description ; nor would I, as Col. Peacocke very inno- 
cently but indiscreetly did last year, check, by any public order, 
the circulation of every description of report." (vi. 193.) 

In corroboration of the danger and inconvenience 
resulting from the gossiping propensity which he felt 
was inherent in British correspondents upon foreign 
service, he writes to Lord Liverpool : — 

" I enclose a paper which purports to be a translation of a 
letter from one French marshal to another, which had been 



148 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 

intercepted, conveying information of the strength of the Allies, 
extracted from the English newspapers. It may be satisfactory 
to have the reasons which this paper affords for believing that 
the enemy have no better means of acquiring intelligence. Very 
recently all the newspapers contained accounts, not only of the 
numbers, but of the positions occupied by this army." (vi. 232.) 

An affair of outposts had taken place in Gen. R. 
Crawford's division, quite in the advanced position 
beyond the Coa, in which it was sopposed that the 16th 
Light Dragoons had got into some scrape. It was sug- 
gested to Lord Wellington to have an inquiry into their 
conduct ; which he refused, saying that he was perfectly 
satisfied, and that the very fact of instituting the inquiry 
would imply some, misconduct ; and he ends his letter 
to Gen. Crawfurd with his customary attack upon 



"All this would not much signify if our staff, and other 
officers, would mind their business, instead of writing news and 
keeping coffee-houses." [He no doubt had somebody in view.] 
" But as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write, 
and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his 
account of what he does not know, and his comments on what 
he does not understand ; and those are circulated by the idle 
and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies ; and it 
would be cruel to allow the reputation of this regiment to be 
whispered away by ignorance, idleness, and slander." (vi. 276.) 

In a letter to Sir Thomas Graham, then commanding 
at Cadiz, he again adverts to the mischief and danger 
arising from the private correspondence of officers : — 

"I was astonished to see in the English newspapers an 
accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz, 
with the number of guns and what calibre each was to contain, 
and their distance from each other, and from the enemy. This 
must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If 
officers wish to give their friends this description of information, 



SECRECY AND CAUTION. 149 

they should request them not to publish their letters in the 
newspapers." (vi. 325.) 

In a letter to Marshal Beresford, of September 8th, 
1810, dated Gouveia, he says : — 

" Upon considering the subject which you mentioned last 
night, I do not think it so important as it appeared upon first 
hearing. 

" I beg you, however, not to mention the subject to anybody. 
The croaking which already prevails in the army, and parti- 
cularly about head- quarters, is disgraceful to us as a nation, and 
does infinite mischief ; and it would become worse if this story 
were known." (vi. 392.) 

We have no means of knowing what is alluded to. 
It may have been trifling, whether it related to public 
affairs, or to any private person or transaction ; but it is 
a continued illustration of his horror of gossip. 

In a letter to Lord Liverpool, again adverting to the 
intelligence contained in the English newspapers, he 



" I did not mean to say that the information in the news- 
papers was received from your Lordship's office, or from that of 
the Commander-in-chief, for I know that neither have the in- 
formation from me ; but I wished to point out the disadvantages 
under which we carried on our operations. Gen. Foy brought 
from Parish not only the paper containing the information, but 
copies of all my dispatches, and Massena knew all that I intended 
to do, and knew accurately every inch of my position, by how 
many guns defended, for what purpose, &c. It may be right to 
give the British public this information, but they ought to know 
the price they pay for it, and the advantage which it gives the 
enemy. 

" Neither I, nor any other officer in command of a British 
army, can prevent the correspondence of the officers. I have 
done everything in my power by way of remonstrance, and have 
been very handsomely abused for it. This intelligence must 
certainly have gone from some officer of this army, by whom it 



150 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 

was confidentially communicated to his friends in England ; and 
I have heard that it was circulated from one of the offices with 
apian!" (vii. 357.) 

With a reference to the unlimited publication of his 
dispatches in England, to which some of these remarks 
may have pointed, and to which he has already said 
there might be consequent disadvantages, we find a 
letter : — 

" I generally confine myself to a relation of facts, and seldom 
give any opinion upon them, and always send the same to the 
Portuguese Government ; marking in the Portuguese dispatch 
those facts which, in my opinion, ought not to he published, and 
which it would be inconvenient for the enemy to know. 

" I will, with your Lordship's permission, adopt the same 
practice with my dispatches to you, and mark with a pencil in 
the margin those parts which, in my opinion, ought not to be 
published." 

So suspicious was he of the schemes of the enemy to 
procure information, that he regarded many things in 
that light which might not have struck other persons. 
He writes to General Campbell : — 

"I received the enclosed from the French Governor of 
Almeida. I beg you will tell him that we generally send off 
immediately any prisoners ; but I beg him to let me know his 
wish for any particular men, or belonging to any particular 
corps, recently made prisoners. 

" The truth is, that this gentleman wants to get a little news. 
He has found out that our men know little, or are but little 
communicative, and he wants to get some Frenchmen in exchange 
for them, from whom he thinks he will find out what is going 
on. It is as well to let him believe that we are good-natured 
gulls, who will easily swallow." (vii. 297.) 

The numbers of French prisoners at Lisbon became 



SECRECY AND CAUTION. 151 

very embarrassing, and a proposition was made by Ad- 
miral Berkeley that disabled men should be sent back. 
Lord Wellington gives the following reasons for not 
concurring : — 

" I am sorry to say that no confidence can be placed in the 
parole of any French officer. I know many, who have been 
allowed to quit England on parole not to serve till exchanged, 
who are now serving in Spain. 

"I have invariably experienced the greatest inconvenience 
from allowing any person to return to the enemy's army. It is 
not believed in England that the generals commanding the 
French armies have no communication, and are entirely iff nor ant 
of all that is passing around them, excepting what they derive 
from deserters, and from prisoners occasionally sent back in 
exchange for some of our officers or soldiers. 

"I attribute the success which we have had, in a great 
degree, to the want of information by the French generals. 

u At this moment, though this whole army is within a few 
miles of them, they do not know where they are ; but if disabled 
prisoners are to be sent to them, they will get all the informa- 
tion they require. The disabled, as well as other prisoners, 
ought to be sent to England." (viii. 62.) 

Animadverting upon the gross mismanagement of 
their cause by the Spaniards in one of his letters to Mr. 
Wellesley, he says : — 

" Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the 

folly of the principal people will be manifest. I apprized 

of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Uodrigo, 



and him alone, the success of which depends principally upon 
the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from 
the enemy. Some Spanish women were apprized of the plan by 
him, and it must reach the enemy ! Yet he is one of the best 
of them." (viii. 159.) 

In a letter to some person, who was probably 
employed in collecting intelligence by means of com- 
munication with the French army, he says : — 



152 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 

"I beg you to take care how you communicate with the 
Portuguese in the French army. Do not let any one of them 
know where you are on any account, and be particularly cautious 
that a second individual of them does not discover that you are 
in correspondence with one of them ; be assured that those who 
have betrayed their country are not to be trusted." (viii. 403.) 

The following letter is a striking proof of his caution 
and forethought as to the effect which even trifling cir- 
cumstances might produce upon the enemy. We have 
seen that he had a conviction of the very little real 
knowledge which the French generally possessed respect- 
ing him ; but he was conscious that, with all his care, 
some intelligence might reach them : — 

" As I am about to undertake an important operation in 
Estremadura, which will require some time to complete it, I am 
anxious to take advantage, as much as possible, of the difficulties 
which the enemy experience in obtaining intelligence to gain 
time. With this view I have remained so long in this part of 
the country after the body of the army had marched ; and I 
have detained the 5th Division here, and am desirous that you 
should remain in this part of the country for some time longer. 
I beg you to circulate in the country that I am going to hunt on 
the banks of the Huelva and Yeltes ; and you might even have 
a house arranged for the hounds at Aldea de Yeltes!" (ix. 3.) 

The concealment of his actual or intended move- 
ments, by remaining to the last at the quarters where he 
was known to have been, might have struck even a 
common mind ; but we believe it is not every general 
who would have suggested the latter part of the letter, 
and have made his hounds of use in the public service of 
his country. 



DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT MONEY 
AND RANK. 



We know little of the Duke's private circumstances in 
early life. It is not possible that he could have had 
much fortune ; and though we have no reason to believe 
that the habits of his youth were expensive, yet we may 
fairly presume that one brought up at Eton, introduced 
at an early age into the army, and made one of the 
aides-de-camp to the Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, would 
not have been without those temptations which beset 
other young men of his standing and position ; and, 
consequently, that if circumstances connected with the 
honourable exercise of his profession should afterwards 
throw favourable chances in his way, he would naturally, 
and, indeed, properly, take advantage of them. 

A high and advanced position in India was always 
considered a lucrative one. Colonel Wellesley, though 
not holding at that time high military rank, was placed 
in a prominent position, from which he could hardly 
derive very great advantage, in consequence of his junior 
standing. We have, indeed, his own statement, in a 
letter to the Governor-general, of the expenses attendant 
upon the extra staff which he had been obliged to main- 
tain, and the extended scale of an establishment con- 
sistent with his position, and the cost to which he had 



154 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 

been subjected when he was Commander-in-chief in the 
Deccan : — 

" I take the liberty of drawing your Excellency's attention 
to the inadequacy of the allowances which I received as a Major- 
general of the Staff of the Army ; or to the increased expenses 
which I was obliged to incur by the necessity of augmenting all 
my establishments, and of forming them upon a scale more 
consistent with the character with which I was invested by your 
Excellency, than with the situation of a Major-general com- 
manding a division of the army." (iii. 310.) 

And yet, though he must have felt this pressure upon 
his finances during the whole of that service, we find 
that, only the preceding year (Sept. 28, 1803), when 
referred to respecting a claim of prize-money for the 
capture of Baroach, of which he, as the commander of 
the army engaged, would have had a share, he had the 
delicacy to decline giving an opinion. In reply to the 
Secretary of Government at Bombay, he says : — 

" As the commanding officer of the troops employed at the 
siege of Baroach acted upon that occasion under my immediate 
orders, I consider that / have a claim to a 'proportion of any 
benefit that may accrue to those troops from the capture of that 
place. As a party in the case, therefore, my opinion can have 
little weight, and / beg to decline giving it." 

The allowances which the Governor-general thought 
fit to make him, of course form no part of General 
Wellesley's own dispatches. We may reasonably suppose 
that his representations were duly attended to ; but we 
have no reason to believe that he was at any time placed 
in a position which could have given him pecuniary 
advantages. 

His advance in rank was, of course, attended with 
advance of pay ; but we apprehend that European service 
is not of a nature to fill the pocket. When he entered 



MONEY AND RANK. 155 

upon the exalted situation of Commander-in-chief of the 
largest British army upon record, we may very readily 
and truly believe that his personal expenses would have 
been fully, if not more than, equal to his appointments. 
A man who has his own private resources to fall back 
upon may find his professional income sufficient; and 
probably General Wellesley contrived to make it so. 
But it would have been no proof of a mercenary spirit if 
he had taken such advantages as his professional position 
might honourably lay open to him. 



A considerable time elapsed before we again have an 
opportunity of observing his feelings upon such subjects ; 
but the very first occasion offers to us again the same 
proof of his personal disinterestedness. 

Upon his second appointment to command in Por- 
tugal his rapid movement upon Oporto, which was at 
that time in possession of the French, enabled him to 
take possession of it. 

A question soon arose as to the rights of the captors, 
and how far the property thus taken from the enemy 
(for it must be acknowledged that they were, and had 
been for some time, in full and undisputed possession) 
was to be considered as prize. The navy, who, as being 
employed at the mouth of the river, considered them- 
selves as parties contributing to the success of the opera- 
tion, put in their claim ; and of course, if it were 
granted, and the property condemned, Sir Arthur, as 
commander-in-chief, would be largely entitled to share. 

The question was submitted to him, and the fol- 
lowing is his answer to the British minister at Lisbon. 

The most valuable part of the property was wine, 



156 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 

belonging to the English merchants (and some cotton, 
which the French had bought and collected here in 
charge of the French consul). The Admiral, on the 
notion that all the property at Oporto was to be dealt 
with by the rules of prize, thought us entitled to salvage 
upon the British portion. Sir Arthur says : — 

" My opinion is, that if we are entitled to it at all, we are 
entitled to the whole of the property ; but the doubt I have is, 
whether we have a right to any part. 

" Oporto being a Portuguese port, and the British army 
acting in this country as allies, everything taken in Portugal 
belongs to the Government of Portugal. 

" However glad I shall be that the success of the army 
should turn out to their benefit, and however convenient it might 
be to me to share in this benefit myself I am very unwilling to 
forward such a claim, if it is to put our friends out of temper. " 
(iv. 331.) 

Some months afterwards he again writes :■ — 

" I considered well the whole question of the claim of the 
army to the property at Oporto, and the result was a conviction 
on my mind that we have no claim whatever. This is my 
opinion, but I may be wrong; and I should be sorry if the 
army were to lose any advantage to which they are entitled by 
any error of judgment of mine." (v. 136.) 

Whether his judgment were right or wrong, we 
cannot conceal from ourselves that he had a very consi- 
derable pecuniary interest involved in the ultimate 
decision ; and though from his multitudinous duties, and 
no special legal learning upon such points, he might not 
have been induced to moot the point, yet if the navy or 
others were inclined to establish the claim, it cannot be 
denied that he showed much personal disinterestedness 
in the view which he took. 



MONEY AND RANK. 157 

In the summer of 1809, the Spanish Government 
appointed him to the rank of Captain-general of the 
Spanish army. He replies : — 

" I have to express my acknowledgments to the Government 
for the honour they have done me; and I have to return them 
thanks for the horses which they have been pleased to present to 
me in the name of His Majesty Ferdinand VII. 

" In respect to the pay attached to the rank of Captain- 
general, I hope the Government will excuse me if I decline to 
become a burthen upon the finances of Spain during this contest 
for her independence." (v. 3.) 

We find his conduct regulated by the same disin- 
terested principles in his connexion with Portugal. 
Writing to Lord Liverpool in Sept. 1811, he says: — 

" The Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer 
upon me the title of Conde de Vimeiro, and a pension of 20,000 
cruzados per annum. 

' ' I have thought it proper not to accept of any allowance 
from the Portuguese Government for the office of Marshal- 
general of the army, which I fill. 

" In case H. R. H. the Prince Regent [of England] should 
allow me to accept the favour conferred upon me by the Prince 
Regent of Portugal, I propose in like manner to decline the 
acceptance of the pension offered to me during the continuance 
of the existing war for the independence of the country." 
(viii. 252.) 

In the commencement of the following year a propo- 
sition was made to him of giving him a regiment of two 
battalions, which, of course, in a pecuniary point of view, 
would have been more advantageous. This is the way 
in which he took the offer, in his letter to Colonel 
Torrens : — 

" I should esteem it a favour if you will tell Sir David 
Dundas that I am very much obliged to him, but that I have no 



158 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 

wish to be removed from the 33d Regiment, of which I was 
major, lieut. -colonel, and then colonel. 

" I must say that my friend the late Secretary- at- War made 
it the least profitable of all the regiments of the army, and I 
believe a losing concern, having reduced the establishment at 
once from 1200 to 800, when it consisted of about 750 men; 
and I had to pay the freight of the clothing to the East Indies, 
and its carriage to Hyderabad, about 500 miles from Madras. 

" With all this, I have the reputation of having a good thing 
in a regiment in the East Indies." (v. 455.) 

Some proposition appears to have been made by the 
Duke of York to the Prince Regent respecting a military 
government for him. It was without his knowledge, 
and was unsuccessful in consequence of a misunder- 
standing on the part of the Prince Regent. 

Colonel Torrens apparently announced this to him, 
and received the following reply : — 

" I am obliged to the Duke of York, as much as if his recom- 
mendation of me had been successful. 

" His Royal Highness the Prince Regent must have misun- 
derstood Lord Wellesley when he supposed that he intended to 
convey to him that a military government was no object to me, 
and that I had other views. Lord Wellesley must have said, 
that I had never spoken or written to him, or to anybody else, 
respecting such an object ; but he could not have said that I had 
other views. Indeed I do not know what views I could have, 
excepting to serve the country to the best of my ability. 

" I have never stated to anybody a wish to have a military 
government, because I make it a rule never to apply to anybody, 
in any manner, for anything for myself; and I have always been 
convinced that, if it was expedient and proper that I should 
receive such a favour, the Duke of York would recommend me, 
without any application from myself or my friends. 

" I should have been very happy to receive, at the recom- 
mendation of H. R. H. the Commander-in-chief, the mark of 
favour of the Prince Regent which was proposed for me. 

" I have not much time to attend to my own affairs, and I 



MONEY AND RANK. 159 

do not exactly know how I stand with the world at present. The 
pay of Commander of the Forces, which is all that I receive in 
this country, does not defray my expenses here, while my family 
must be maintained in England ; and I think it probable that I 
shall not be richer for having served in the Peninsula. A military 
government, therefore, would be desirable, as an addition to my 
income." (ix. 2.) 

Some months afterwards, from Madrid, he writes : — 

" I have been going on for more than three years upon the 
usual allowance of a Commander-in-chief, that is, ten pounds a- 
day, liable to various deductions, reducing it to about eight 
guineas ; but it will be necessary that Government should now 
either give me an additional pay under the head of table-money, 
or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge 
some of the expenses, such as charities, &c, which I am obliged 
to incur in the existing state of this country, or I shall be 
ruined. 

" It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services, but 
I believe there is no service in which the Commander-in-chief, 
with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British 
service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of 
an officer holding a permanent command in the British service 
whose receipts have been confined to 10/. a-day with deductions. 
They all receive either the allowance of a government with that 
of a commander-in-chief, or an allowance of some other descrip- 
tion; but I doubt that the trouble, or responsibility, or the 
expenses of any, at all equal mine. However, I should not have 
mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect to be 
served at the lowest possible rate, if I did not find that I was in 
a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray 
without injury to myself." (ix. 373.) 

The Government at home appear to have made 
arrangements upon the subject before they could have 
received the above letter, which was dated August 24 ; 
for on the 7th of September he writes : — 

" I am very much obliged to your Lordship for having 



160 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 

adverted to my expenses in this country, and for having provided 
for them so handsomely. You will have received a letter from 
me on the subject since you dispatched yours : I should never 
have written it if I had not incurred an enormous expense at 
Madrid which I could not bear. 

" You communicate to me that it is the intention to propose 
to Parliament to grant me the sum of 100,000/. to enable me to 
support suitably the honours which H. R. Highness has recently 
been pleased to confer upon me. 

" I request your Lordship to take an early opportunity of 
expressing my gratitude for all his favours : they are far beyond 
my hopes, and I can show my gratitude only by continuing to 
serve H. R. H. with the same zeal and devotion which have 
already acquired them for me." (ix. 398.) 

The Prince Regent at the same time granted certain 
heraldic distinctions, " as a lasting memorial of the 
glorious and transcendent achievements of the said 
Arthur Marquis of Wellington on various occasions." 

" I shall receive with gratitude any honour which H. R. H. 
may think proper to confer upon me ; but the addition proposed 
to my arms is the last which would have occurred to me. It 
carries with it an appearance of ostentation, of which I hope I am 
not guilty ; and it will scarcely be credited that I did not apply 
for itr (ix. 406.) 

We see the modesty and simplicity of mind with 
which he received favours. He, no doubt, had an 
internal consciousness that he deserved them ; and how- 
ever insignificant such things are to the real advantage 
of man, they have acted as a stimulus to the human 
mind in all ages. But his mode of receiving them made 
every one of his countrymen additionally proud of the 
gift and of the recipient. 

We do not know who is referred to in the conclusion 
of the same letter : but his conduct does not show to 



MONEY AND RANK. 161 

advantage when contrasted with that of his illustrious 
leader : — 

" I am quite surprised at the conduct of the . I 

always thought the Order of the Bath that mark of the King's 
favour which it was most desirable for an officer to receive; and 
I mentioned it to you, as I thought it likely it would be agree- 
able to him. It might be very proper to create him a peer, but 
I 'would not propose such an arrangement. Even if it had been 
proper that I should do so for any officer, I should have consi- 
dered it my duty to make you acquainted with what I know are 
* * *V feelings on this subject. He was mueh disappointed 
and hurt that this mark of the King's favour was not conferred 
upon him when the restrictions (imposed by the Eegency Bill) 
ceased ; and I really believe that his regard for me alone pre- 
vented him from resigning his situation. If — — had 

been made a peer, I really believe that he would, notwithstanding 
that he is junior to — • — ■. — . 

" But your Lordship is aware that we none of us act discreetly 
in cases where our own passions are concerned." 

We think he might have made one exception ! 



; He was made a Knight of the Garter in March 1813, 
and in the usual course w^oulcl have to relinquish the 
Order of the Bath, of which he was a member. He 
writes to Lord Liverpool : — 

" Some of my brother officers have expressed an anxious 
desire that I should continue a Knight of the Bath, into which 
I have admitted most of them ; and all of them owe this honour 
to actions performed under my command. Under these circum- 
stances, and adverting to the reasons which induced you to wish 
that I should resign the Order, I would wish you to consider 
whether it would not be better that I should keep it. I feel 
great reluctance in suggesting this, and should not have done 
so if it had not been suggested to me by some of the knights. 

M 



162 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 

God knows I have plenty of Orders, and I consider myself to 
have been most handsomely treated by the Prince Regent and 
his Government, and shall not consider myself the less so if you 
should not think proper that I should retain the Order of the 
Bath." (x. 376.) 

After the battle of Vittoria he was made a Field- 
marshal in the British service, accompanied by an auto- 
graph letter from the Prince Regent, containing these 
words : — "You have sent me, among the trophies of your 
unrivalled fame, the staff of a French marshal ; and I 
send you in return that of England." 

Lord Wellington returned a respectful answer, con- 
cluding : — 

" I can evince my gratitude for Y. It. Highnesses repeated 
favours only by devoting my life to your service." (x. 532.) 

Some officer applied to him to procure some mark 
of royal favour or distinction, adverting, as we may 
judge from the answer, to the favours which had been 
conferred upon himself. His answer is very charac- 
teristic : — 

" What I would recommend you is, to express neither wishes 
nor disappointment upon the subject, even to an intimate friend, 
much less to the Government. Continue, as you have done, 
to deserve the honourable distinction to which you aspire, and 
you may be certain, that if the Government is wise you will 
obtain it. 

" The comparison between myself, who have been the most 
favoured of His Majesty's subjects, and you, will not be deemed 
quite correct ; and I advert to my own situation, only to* tell you 
that I recommend to you the conduct which I have always 
followed. 

" Notwithstanding the numerous favours that I have received 
from the Crown, I have never solicited one ; and I have never 
hinted, nor would any one of my friends or relatives venture to 



MONEY AND RANK. 163 

hint for me, a desire to receive even one. And much as I have 
been favoured, the consciousness that it has been spontaneously 
by the King and Regent gives me more pleasure than anything 
else. 

" I recommend to you the same conduct and patience, 
and above all, resignation, if after all you should not succeed." 
(xi. 98.) 

At the battle of Vittoria all the baggage of King 
Joseph fell into his hands. It was all legitimate prize, 
and he was under no necessity of giving up any part of 
it. That, however, was not his mode of acting ; and 
some months after he wrote to his brother : — 

" I sent them all to England, and have found that there are 
among them much finer pictures than I conceived there were. 
And as, if the King's palaces have been robbed of pictures, it is 
not improbable that some of his may be among them, and I am 
desirous of restoring them to His Majesty, I shall be much obliged 
if you will mention the subject to Don J. Luyando, and tell him 
that I request that a person may be fixed upon to go to London 
to see them, and to fix upon those belonging to His Majesty." 
(xi. 586.) 

After the battle of Toulouse, and the termination of 
hostilities, he was appointed to the post of British Am- 
bassador at Paris. No man could be more qualified for 
the office, though he had never hitherto held a diplomatic 
situation. His acceptance was, however, expressed pre- 
cisely in the same terms, and guided by the same prin- 
ciple, as upon any other public appointment in his own 
profession : — 

" I am much flattered by your thinking of me for a situation 
for which I should never have thought myself qualified. I hope, 
however, that the Prince Regent and his Government are con- 
vinced that I am ready to serve him in any situation in which it 
may be thought that I can be of any service. Although I have 
been so long absent from England, I should have remained as 



164 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 

much longer if it had been necessary; and I feel no objection 
to another absence on the public service, if it be necessary or 
desirable." (xi. 668.) 



To these instances of his total want of all affectation, 
all wish or attempt to push himself forward, or to apply 
for favour or benefit, we must add his candour. 

During the long and arduous career through which 
we have been following him, it is true that there were 
not many failures. There were many instances, no 
doubt, in which the results that he might have anticipated 
were not realised ; there were others, perhaps, in which 
his own sounder judgment would have induced him to 
decline taking a part, if it had not been for consider- 
ations of public policy ; and therefore, if failure did take 
place, he had not himself to blame. 

But there is one very striking instance of his honest 
candour, in a letter to Lord Liverpool in November 
1812 :— 

" It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength 
of the enemy's armies. I have seldom found myself mistaken in 
my estimate of their numbers, when I relied upon the returns. 
The only occasion on which I have been seriously mistaken was 
at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country. 

" From what I see in the newspapers, I am afraid that the 
public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, 
notwithstanding that it is, in fact, the most successful in all its 
circumstances, and has produced more important results than 
any in which a British army has been engaged for the last 
century. We should have retained still greater advantages if I 
could have taken Burgos, as I ought, early in October. 

" The fault of which I was guilty was, not that I undertook 
the expedition with inadequate means, but that I took there the 
most inexperienced, instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid 
the 3d, 4th, and Light Divisions, who had been with myself 



MONEY AND RANK. 165 

always before; and I brought with me/ that were good,' the 1st 
Division, and they were inexperienced. In fact, the troops ought 
to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial. 

" I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Govern- 
ment for the failure of the siege. The Government had nothing 
to say to the siege : it was entirely my own act !" (ix. 563.) 

A court-martial was to be held upon Sh; John 
Murray, for his conduct when he relinquished the siege 
of Tarragona in July 1813; and the only reason for 
adverting to it here (as it was subsequently given up) is. 
to adduce a further proof of the Duke's candour. 

He was compelled to prefer the charges, in his official 
capacity as Commander- in -chief (although Sir John 
Murray was acting in command of an entirely detached 
corps), and partly because an angry feeling existed on 
the part of the Admiral who was acting in co-operation 
with Sir John. 

The change of circumstances arising from the removal 
of the British allied army into France, and the subsequent 
peace, had rendered it impossible to hold the court till 
after a very considerable lapse of time, and different 
places had been fixed for the purpose. 

Mr. Larpent, the Juclge-ildvocate- General, was of 
course to have been employed ; and at the close of his 
" Private Journal" a letter is inserted from the Duke of 
Wellington, who was then Ambassador at Paris, in 
January 1815, from which we quote an extract in proof 
of our opinion : — 

"Sir John Murray contends, that one paragraph of my in- 
structions directed him not to risk an action. I think he has 
mistaken my meaning. - " And he gives his reasons for thinking 
so. 

"The Court has, of course, a right to judge of my meaning 
by the words in which it is conveyed (in whatever manner I may 



166 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT MONEY, ETC. 

now explain it), as the obvious meaning of those words was to be 
the guide of Sir John's conduct. I must add, also, that what- 
ever care I may have taken, it is not improbable that, in drawing 
an instruction for the operations of so many corps, all with sepa- 
rate commanders-in-chief, I may not, in every instance, have 
made use of the language which should convey the meaning I 
had in my mind." 

Here, again, is the kindly feeling towards the officer 
who would suffer, combined with the candid acknowledg- 
ment that he might himself 'have given ground for the 
conduct impugned by some deficiency in his own 
instructions. 



SUBORDINATION. 



Placed very early in life in a position of great power, 
and compelled to exercise authority, it is not extraor- 
dinary that he should have attached much importance to 
the necessity of subordination amongst those who were 
serving under him. We do not here allude so much to 
the mere military technical discipline of the soldier, as to 
the moral, honourable, gentlemanly feeling of the officer. 

Those who have had to struggle on till later in life, 
without attaining to stations of responsibility, are gene- 
rally found to. be more inclined to evade than to support 
principles of implicit obedience. But a man who is 
placed in command soon feels the necessity of enforcing 
due submission. It is true that there are different 
ways in which this is effected. Strict discipline, rigid 
severity, and the arm of power, no doubt will do it ; bat 
we believe, and the instances before us in these Dis- 
patches prove, that mild, dispassionate, and manly 
reasoning, appealing to the sense, the honour, and good 
principles of the person addressed, will frequently do it 
better. 

We have only one instance to adduce during Colonel 
Wellesley's command in India, but it is strictly in point. 

Colonel Murray, who had a command in the Presi- 
dency of Bombay, had had a difference of opinion with 



168 SUBORDINATION. 

the higher authorities; and General Wellesley had re- 
ceived some reference upon a part of the question. He 
writes to Colonel Murray : — 

" I have read with the utmost concern the letter to General 
Nicholls. It was hastily drawn and dispatched, to say no more : 
and I strongly recommend you to desire to withdraw it. It 
contains some strong censures upon Mr. Duncan (the Governor 
of Bombay) personally, and upon his government. An officer in 
the service of a Government, let his rank be what it may, has no 
right to, and cannot with propriety, address such sentiments to 
that Government, even supposing that they were merited by a 
long course of injurious treatment by such Government. 

" Remember I tell you, that no person can approve of your 
having written that letter, and I again most anxiously recom- 
mend you to withdraw it." (i. 541.) 

Soon after he writes again, and after some reference 
to the grounds of the misunderstanding he adds : — 

• fc For my part I shall shortly resign my charge in this part 
of India, and, excepting as far as good wishes go, I shall be indif- 
ferent to what passes. Bat I shall be sorry to hear that you 
misapply your talent by entering into these disputes, and that 
you have thereby tired the Government, and put it under a neces- 
sity not to employ you." (ii. 66.) 

This appeal seems to have produced its effect, for 
very shortly after he writes to the Secretary of the 
Governor -general : — 

" I have received a letter from Colonel Murray, in which he 
acknowledges his error in writing to the Governor of Bombay ; 
according to my advice he has made an apology, and has desired 
leave to withdraw his letter." (ii. 89.) 



His return to Europe reduced him for a time to a 
subordinate station ; and we believe that no page of his- 
tory will produce a more modest, touching, and honour^ 



SUBORDINATION. 169 

able example of what an officer and a gentleman should 
feel than Sir Arthur's on that occasion. 

An expedition was fitted out to proceed to Plan over 
in 1805, and he was appointed to command a brigade in 
it. It was afterwards abandoned, and the brigade was 
stationed at Hastings. 

The compiler of his Dispatches tells us, that an inti- 
mate friend having inquired in familiar terms of Sir 
Arthur how he, having commanded armies of 40,000 
men in the field, having received the thanks of Parlia- 
ment, and having been made a Knight of the Bath, could 
submit to be reduced to the command of a brigade of 
infantry? he answered: "For this plain reason, — I con- 
ceive it to be my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and 
cheerfulness when and wherever the King or his Govern- 
ment may tl link proper to employ me" (ii. 616.), 

His conduct afterwards, when the arrival of his seniors 
deprived him of his first command in Portugal, is exactly 
founded upon the same principles. He became by it 
a junior and subordinate officer. He might not, arid he 
did not, agree with, or approve the course adopted 
by his superiors, but he obeyed! He felt that from 
that time his services would be comparatively useless, 
and he requested to be allowed to retire ; but as long 
as he remained, no young junior ensign was ever more- 
obedient to his commander. 

His own conduct thus furnished a test of the sin- 
cerity of his principles ; and a man who had so done was 
fully justified afterwards in exacting similar obedience 
from those who were placed under him. 

When he was on the passage, on the first expedition 
to the coast of Portugal, he wrote home to the Secretary 
of State : — 



170 SUBORDINATION. 

" Burghersh and Pole have apprised me of the arrangements 
for the future command of their army. 

" All that I can say is, that whether I am to command the 
army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to ensure its 
success ; and you may depend upon it, that I shall not hurry 
the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they 
ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit 
of success. 

" The Government will determine for me in what way they 
will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere." (iv. 43.) 

A month after he writes : — 

" I assure you matters are not prospering here ; and I feel 
an earnest wish to quit the army. I have been too successful 
with it ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation with satis- 
faction to the person who shall command it, and of course not 
to myself. However } I shall do whatever the Government may 
wish. 3 ' (iv. 118.) 

A week later he writes again: — 

" It is impossible for me to continue any longer with this 
army ; and I wish that you would allow me to return home and 
resume my office [Chief Secretary for Ireland], if I shall still be 
in office, and it is convenient to the Government that I should 
retain it ; or if not, that I should remain on the staff in Eng- 
land ; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain 
without employment. You will hear from others of the causes 
which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the mili- 
tary and other public measures of the Commander-in-chief, but 
with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for 
him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away, and the 
sooner I go the better." 

He accordingly returned to England, and the inquiry 
into the Convention of Cintra took place. 

He was asked why, if he dissented from the pro- 
priety of the armistice, he had affixed his signature to 



SUBORDINATION. 171 

it ? His answer was quite characteristic, and in accord- 
ance with the principles he had always professed : — 

"I never said, or gave authority to anybody else to say, 
that I was compelled, or even ordered to sign the paper. 

" It is true I was present when the armistice was negotiated 
by the Commander-in-chief, and I did assist in his negotiations, 
and I signed it by desire of the Commander-in-chief: but I 
never said and never will say, that the expression of the desire 
of the Commander-in-chief was in the shape of an order which 
it was not in my power to disobey, much less of compulsion . 

" I thought it my duty to comply with this desire of the 
Commander-in-chief, from the wish which I have always felt, 
and according to which I have always acted, to carry into effect 
the orders and objects of those placed in command over me, 
however I might differ in opinion with them. I certainly did 
differ in opinion upon more than one point in the detail of what 
I was called upon to sign : but as I concurred in, and advised 
the adoption of the principle, I did not think proper to refuse to 
sign on account of any disagreement on the details." (iv. 153.) 



For some months after he was re-appointed to the 
command in Portugal, in April, we find no letters or 
observations upon the point now under our considera- 
tion. The first which occurs so strongly exemplifies 
his principles, that it is well w T orth inserting. 

Some Portuguese officer (probably of rank) had 
written a letter to the Portuguese Government direct, 
without going through the hands of Marshal Beresford, 
his superior officer ; and apparently containing a com- 
plaint of the Marshal, which the Government had 
published. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley writes to the Marshal : — 

" 's conduct appears to be very bad. These people 

arc so much accustomed to trick that they cannot refrain from 



17£ SUBORDINATION. 

it, and they have recourse to it now to acquire popularity." 
There is only one line to be adopted in opposition to all trick ; 
that is, the steady, straight line of duty, tempered by forbearance, 
lenity, and good nature. 

" You ought to publish an order to forbid any officer to 
make a report to any superior authority, excepting through his. 
immediate commanding officer ; and to point out the falsehoods 

in the report of as the cause of the order at that moment. 

I would insert in this order or in the correspondence no severity 
or asperity, only a plain and short abstract of facts." (iv. 441.) . 

His earliest, and, for a long time, his most serious 
inconvenience, arose from trie Commissariat. Writing to 
Mr. Huskisson, the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
urgently calling the attention of the home Government 
to the lamentable want of money with the army, he 
says : — 

" The gentlemen of the Commissariat are very new in their 
business, and I am not without grounds of complaint of their 
want of intelligence ; but I believe they do their best, and I 
shall not complain of them. I dismissed one, two days ago ; 
but I have cancelled the order for his dismission, upon his pro- 
mise of greater exertion." (iv. 445.) 

All his general officers suffered from the same cause/ 
and some of them apparently took strong measures • for 
we find the following letter to General Sherbrooke in 
July.— 

" I am not astonished that you and the general officers 
should feel indignant at the neglect and incapacity of some of 
the officers of the Commissariat, by which we have suffered so 
much : but what I wish to impress upon you is, that they are 
appointed by the King's authority, though not holding his com- 
mission ; and that it would be more proper if all their faults were 
reported to me, by whom they can be dismissed, than that they 
should be abused by the general officers, however well deserved 
we may deem it to be. I do not enter into the grounds you had 
for being displeased with Mr. , which I dare say were saffi- 



SUBORDINATION. 173 

cient ; but I only desire that in all these cases punishment may 
be. left to me, who alone can have the power of inflicting it." 
(iv. 483.) 

It was not only in cases of this nature, where, in fact, 
there was a sort of mixed authority between the civil and 
the military departments (for the Commissaries were not 
commissioned officers, But were appointed by the Trea- 
sury), that he felt the necessity of sole responsibility; 
but, a fortiori, he exacted it in purely military cases. 

A letter to Mr. Villiers gives us reason to infer that, 
for reasons which no doubt appeared sufficient to that 
gentleman, he had suggested to General Blunt, who was 
in- command at Lisbon, some changes in the distribution 
of the troops there, of which Sir Arthur did not ap- 
prove :— 

" I intend to assemble the army on the Tagus, and to act on 
the north or south bank as I may think proper. I hope, how- 
ever, that the troops will be left in their stations till I send them 
orders to move. 

" The foundation of all military plans is compounded of the 
situations of one's own troops, those of the allies, and those of 
the enemy : but if I cannot be certain even of my own, it is im- 
possible for me to form, much less to execute, any military plan. 
I do not in general leave the troops idle, and you may depend 
upon it they will have enough to do before the campaign is over. 
The troops must not be moved without my direction." (iv. 337.) 

After the retreat following the battle of Talavera, 
some occurrence took place without his orders, which, 
upon the principle as explained above, deranged his plans. 
No names of the person or the place are given, but the 
following memorandum shows how strongly he felt it : — > 

" From the orders sent yesterday to he will see 

how important it is that an officer should strictly obey the orders 
which he receives; and, having obeyed them, should patiently 
wait for further orders. 



174 SUBORDINATION. 

" He could not suppose that he was forgotten, or that any 
of those points respecting which he has taken upon himself to 
give orders, such as the march of the 11th Regiment and the 
artillery from Lisbon, &c. had not been attended to. 

" The orders given yesterday contain a detailed plan for the 
defence of Portugal, founded upon a supposition that different 
corps were in certain situations. 

" In consequence of 's orders and arrangements 

all this now becomes a matter of doubt; and he will understand 
that his movements and orders have involved him in very serious 
responsibility." (v. 36.) 

Writing shortly afterwards to Marshal Beresford, he 
adverts to the same circumstance, as connected with 
some proposed movement of the latter, and says : — 

" General 's disobedience of orders, although well inten- 

tioned, was positive, and committed with his eyes open; and as 
his corps was useless at Zarza Mayor, and in your retreat might 
have embarrassed you, I was not sorry, by ordering him back to 
the position he had quitted, to show him and the army that / 
must command and they must obey." (v. 55.) 

It is possible that some of these events may not be 
inserted here in strict chronological order ; but the object 
has not been to record the events of the campaign, so 
much as to illustrate the feelings and objects of the com- 
mander. 



We have already seen that he had had reason to 
complain of the selection of officers sent from home into 
the Portuguese service, and the following letter shows that 
his objections were not confined to the junior ranks : — 

" I enclose a letter to your Lordship relative to Brigadier- 
general and Colonel who have absented themselves 

from the Portuguese service without leave ; and who, it appears, 
cannot be punished, as they are not in His Majesty's service. 



SUBORDINATION. 175 

" I beg to recommend, that in future persons of this descrip- 
tion may not be sent to serve in Portugal, because no means 
exist of punishing the military disorders and irregularities of 
which they may be guilty, of the kind committed by Brigadier- 
general and Colonel . 

" In respect to these gentlemen, I should also beg leave to 
suggest that they may not in future be employed in England, 
as inspecting field-officers, &c" (v. 236.) 

By the following letter we see that it was not merely 
the military efficiency in the field, or the obedience to 
his orders upon professional subjects, with which his 
time and talents were occupied, but that he had actually 
to pay attention to, and endeavour to control, the private 
conduct of men hundreds of miles from him. 

With the weight pressing upon his mind, and 
occupying (as one should have thought) every faculty, 
it might have been hoped, that those who were left in 
charge at distant points might have relieved him from 
these minor cares, But the following letter shows that 
this was not the case. 

To Colonel Peacocke, commanding at Lisbon, he 
says : — 

"I am concerned to be obliged to inform you, that it has 
been mentioned to me that some British officers in Lisbon have 
conducted themselves in a very improper manner at the theatres. 
I cannot conceive for what reason officers should conduct them- 
selves at Lisbon in a manner which would not be permitted in 
their own country. 

" Officers commanding regiments, and superior officers, must 
take measures to prevent a repetition of such conduct ; or 1 must 
take measures to prevent the character of the army, and of the 
British nation, from suffering by the misconduct of a few. 

" I beg you to take such measures as may be necessary to 
prevent a repetition of this conduct/'' 

The Commissariat still continued to be the source of 



176 SUBORDINATION.. 

his principal embarrassment. They had great difficulties 
to contend with, no doubt, and Sir Arthur was well aware 
of it. But there was a great want of experience in the 
department ; and, probably, from the tone of the follow- 
ing letter to the Commissary-general, Mr. Murray, some 
want of energy and exertion : — 

"I have the mortification to learn that the horses of the 
cavalry have been worse supplied in their present quarters than 
they have yet been. 

" You were informed on the , by the Quarter-master- 
general, of the proposed distribution of the cavalry, with a view 
to the supply of forage. 

" I beg to know what orders you gave, and what arrange- 
ments you made, and on what dates, and to whom, to ensure 

these objects ? I also desire to know who gave Mr. leave 

to go to Lisbon ? He ought to have made arrangements before 
he left his station, even if he had leave. 

" I am determined that the Government shall know how the 
public are served, and all the most important objects are 
disappointed, by the inefficiency or neglect of the officers of the 
Commissariat." (v. 421.) 

In another letter shortly after to General Payne he 
says :■ — 

a This failure of all our measures for the re-establishment of 

the heavy cavalry is entirely attributable to Mr. , of whom I 

shall make a formal complaint to the Treasury, and shall suspend 
him from his office till their pleasure is known. 

" If the cavalry had been in order, and had recovered, as I 
had reason to expect they would, I might now strike a blow of 
essential importance. However, it cannot now be helped. Mr. 

shall be punished, and I hope the next commissary will do 

his duty better." (v. 445.) 

British officers were employed with different divisions 
of the Spanish armies to communicate confidentially with 
the British ; and so little reliance was to be placed upon 



SUBORDINATION. 177 

all the Spanish reports of their own proceedings, that 
the accuracy of these officers was of vital importance. 
Lieutenant-colonel Carroll was one of them, and had 
written to Lord Wellington after some affair, of which a 
very different account reached him from other quarters. 
The Spaniards were reported to have dispersed in a 
dastardly way, which Colonel Carroll had not reported. 

" If this fact be true, it is desirable that you should have 
reported it ; and, indeed, as the reports of officers employed as 
you are, are the foundation of the measures of the Government, 
and upon which I must found the operations of the army under 
my command, it is most desirable that they should be correct 
and full in every particular." (v. 362.) 

A correspondence had taken place with General R. 
Crawfurd, in which that officer had apparently felt hurt 
at some of Lord Wellington's observations, who now 
writes : — 

" I am concerned that you should believe I had any feeling 
of disapprobation in consequence of our discussions upon commis- 
sariat concerns. You and I must necessarily take a different 
view of these questions : / must view them in their relations with 
the different parts of the army, and with the departments at 
home ; your view is naturally confined to their relation with 
your own immediate command. 

" In discussing them, I considered that it was to be carried on 
as if neither had any concern in things as they stood, and made 
my remarks with perfect freedom, without taking much trouble 
to choose the terms : but there was no feeling of disapprobation 
during the time or since. 

" I conceive that a part of my business, and not the most 
easy, is to prevent discussion and disputes between the officers 
under my command ; and I therefore did not send you the 
letter, from General Cox to General Beresford, to which you 
refer. The observations which I made on the letter would show 
you what I felt. 

" But it is really better to drop the whole of the subject. I 

N 



178 SUBORDINATION. 

am convinced that in all you have done you have been actuated 
solely by a desire to forward the service, and to force those, who 
are more interested than we are, to do their duty by their 
country and by us." 

The different officers who were in command of 
brigades, &c, were on many occasions extremely solici- 
tous to increase their strength, more especially in 
British. The following is one of his replies to such 
application : — 

" I have no doubt of the zeal of the troops under your com- 
mand, or of their desire to be actively employed. 

" In answer to your desire to have more English, I must 
inform you that I class and dispose of the troops of different 
descriptions according to my views of the service which will be 
required of them, and not as a matter of favour to any officer" 
(vi. 380.) 

The Portuguese Government were still very trouble- 
some in urging their views of military operations : — 

" They will end in forcing me to quit them : and then they 
will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone 
keep things in their present state. Indeed the temper of some 
of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than 
the folly of the Portuguese. I have always been accustomed to 
have the confidence and support of the officers which I have 
commanded : but for the first time, whether owing to the 
opposition in England, or that the magnitude of the concern is 
too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am 
mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a 
system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the 
public service, and which I must devise some means of putting 
an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to 
form their own opinions ; but officers of high rank ought to 
keep their opinions to themselves. If they do not approve of 
the system of their commander, they ought to withdraw from 
the army. And this is the point to which / must bring some, if 
their own good sense does not prevent them from going on as 
they have done lately." (vi. 403.) 






SUBORDINATION. 179 

Some correspondence appears to have taken place 
between Lord Wellington and Dr. Prank, the head of 
the Medical Department. Lord Wellington writes to the 
latter, with the temper and moderation which distin- 
guished him, in order to prevent erroneous impressions 
from taking effect amongst the valuable members of that 
branch of the service. But the necessity for his writing 
illustrates strongly the truth of his observations in the 
letter which we have quoted a few pages back, as to the 
difficulty which he had in executing " the part of his 
duty, and not the most easy, of preventing discussions 
and disputes amongst his officers." 

" I have ordered a Board to inquire into the complaint of 

Lieutenant , which I have no doubt will end in a manner 

satisfactory to you. But I feel concerned at the tone of the 
letters which I have received from you lately, written under the 
notion that these complaints were reflections upon you, encou- 
raged by me. 

" Lieutenant 's complaint, in particular, is a reflection 

upon me much more than upon you ! 

" We all do our best to carry on the service in a manner the 
most satisfactory ; and I have been much misunderstood by you 
and the gentlemen of the Medical Department, if it is supposed 
that I have expressed dissatisfaction. 

" But the best arrangements may fail, and it may be necessary 
to inquire into the causes of these accidents. 

f ■ These inquiries, it is true, always suppose that there has 
been some failure : but it does not follow of course, that there 
has been fault, much less on the part of the head of the Depart- 
ment." 

Applications from persons in high stations, some- 
times, perhaps, private friends, on behalf of officers who 
had incurred Lord Wellington's displeasure, were no 
doubt, at times, a source of much embarrassment and 
annoyance to him. Every man who got into a scrape 



180 SUBORDINATION. 

was apt to think that a word from a person of rank or 
importance would influence Lord Wellington, and effect 
his reinstatement. The application was, no doubt, fre- 
quently made to him from mere easiness of temper, or to 
get rid of importunity, without a full knowledge of the 
case on the part of the writer ; but the following is an 
instance how little effect they had with one who did not 
form an opinion in a hurry at the beginning of a case, 
and did not change it from fear or favour at the end : — 
" To the Right Honourable 



" Oct. 19, 1810. 

" My dear Sir, — I received your letter regarding Mr. , 

late Lieut, of the Regiment, and I am much concerned that 

the conduct of that officer was such as to prevent me from at- 
tending to your request. When in arrest for one crime, he 
insulted, in the grossest and most wanton manner, another 
officer ; for which he refused to make any apology, though de- 
sired to do so by me ; and he broke his arrest. 

" If I were to interfere in favour of those who commit 
offences of this description, I should give such a blow to the 
discipline and subordination of the army, that there would very 
soon be no army remaining. 

" I am convinced that you will perceive the impossibility 
of my interfering in any manner. 

" I enclose the orders of the army, and the decision of the 
court-martial." (vi. 496.) 

Applications for leave to go home, as we have already 
seen (p. 97), were amongst the most irksome trials that 
he had. He had himself been upon service from the 
very commencement, without an hour's relaxation. It 
is true that, if he had been compelled by health or any 
other consideration, to vacate his post for even the short- 
est time, everything must have been paralyzed ; but 
though this did not apply with equal force, in the case 
of every officer serving under him, it did weigh heavily 



SUBORDINATION. 181 

when they held responsible situations. The following 
letter to General R. Crawfurd explains his feelings • — 

" Officers (general officers in particular) are the best judges 
of their own private concerns ; and though my own opinion is, that 
there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction 
and power of attorney (and that, after all, is not so settled), I 
cannot refuse leave to those who say that their business requires 
personal superintendence. 

" It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service 
that officers should absent themselves as they do, each requiring 
that, when it is convenient to return, he shall find himself in the 
same situation as when he left. In the mean time, who is to do 
the duty ? How am I to be responsible for the army ? Is 

Colonel ■ a proper substitute for General Crawfurd, in the 

command of our advanced posts ? or General — — for Sir Sta- 
pleton Cotton, in command of the cavalry ? 

" I may be obliged to consent to the absence of an officer, 
but I cannot approve of it. I repeat that you know the situ- 
ation of affairs as well as I do, and you have my leave to go, if 
you think proper." (vii. 191.) 

The following is an admirable specimen of a courteous 
yet stern refusal to an unreasonable application : — 

" It always gives me great concern to be under the necessity 
of refusing compliance with a request, and I might have hoped 
to be spared this by one who must know that I would gratify 
him if it were in my power ; and who must be aware that it is 
absolutely without precedent that any officer should ask, much 
less obtain, leave of absence, on any account, excepting that of 
sickness or of business, the neglect of which may be prejudicial. 

" I repeat that I cannot give leave to any officer whose health 
does not require his return to England, or who has not busi- 
ness which cannot be done by another, or delayed. You cannot 
bring forward either of these pleas. Your health is good ; and as 
for your business, I know of none that can require your imme- 
diate return, which would not have required that you should 
have remained, when you left England six months ago. 

"■ I trust that I shall be spared the pain of again refusing 
you." (v. 302.) 



182 SUBORDINATION. 

An officer, who had been suspended from rank and 
pay by sentence of court-martial, applied for leave of 
absence : — 

" When I observe in Lieut. 's letters a disposition to 

repeat the offence, which it had been the object of the sentence 
to punish, I cannot think him an officer entitled to any indul- 
gence. 

" A very trifling degree of education and practice will enable 
an officer to string together a few words in a letter, in a manner 
and conveying a meaning which a superior cannot bear. But 
this is a dangerous qualification, unless the possessor has sense 
to guide his pen, and discretion to restrain him from intem- 
perate language. 

" As the sentence of the court has not had the effect upon 

Lieut. , I hope that the refusal to grant an indulgence 

(which, probably, would not have been refused, if applied for in 
those terms of civility in which indulgences are usually asked), 
will correct a disposition which can never tend to his advan- 
tage. 

" He must remain at the head -quarters of his regiment 
till the term of his suspension is concluded/'' (vii. 222.) 

He writes to Lord Liverpool respecting officers on 
leave : — 

" I assure you that the departure of the general officers 
was as much against my inclination as their arrival in England 
was injurious to the public interests. I did everything to prevail 
upon them not to go, but in vain ; and I acknowledge that it 
has given me satisfaction to find that they have been roughly 
handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of 
some of them was that, in the late operations, I have been obliged 
to be general of cavalry and of the advanced guard, and the 
leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day. 

" I have requested Col. Torrens not to allow any general 
officer to come out in future, who is not willing to declare that 
he has no private business to recall him to England, and that 
he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the 
Peninsula." 



SUBORDINATION. 183 

The following observations may be said to refer 
rather more to discipline than to subordination ; but as 
the conduct and character of officers are involved, it is 
not improperly connected with this branch of our sub- 
ject. They are contained in letters to Marshal Beres- 
ford, with respect to the cavalry : — 

" I recommend you to keep your troops very much en masse, 
I have always considered the cavalry to be the most delicate arm 
that we possess. We have few officers who have practical know- 
ledge of the mode of using it, or who have ever seen more than 
two regiments together ; and all our troops, cavalry as well as 
infantry, are a little inclined to go out of order in battle. To 
these circumstances add, that the defeat of, or any great loss 
sustained by our cavalry, would be a misfortune amounting 
almost to a defeat of the whole, and you will see the necessity of 
keeping the cavalry as much as possible en masse and in reserve, 
to be thrown in when an opportunity may offer." 

This was written on the 20th of March. A gallant 
affair of cavalry, but not attended by any result, took 
place within a very few days, (on the 25 th,) in which the 
very circumstances foreseen by Lord Wellington occurred 
from want of attention to the principles above laid down. 

" I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, 
and point out to them the mischiefs which must result from the 
disorder of troops in action. The undisciplined ardour of the 
13th Dragoons and the 1st Portuguese cavalry is not of the de- 
scription of determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers, confi- 
dent in their discipline and their officers. Their conduct was 
that of a rabble, — galloping, as fast as their horses would carry 
them, over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no 
mischief when they were broken, and sacrificing all the objects 
of your operation by their want of discipline. 

" If the enemy could have thrown out of Badajoz only 100 
men, regularly formed, they would have driven back these two 
regiments ; and would, probably, have taken many whose horses 
were knocked up. If the 13th are again guilty of this conduct, 



184 SUBORDINATION. 

I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and 
men to do duty at Lisbon." (vii. 400.) 

Another affair took place afterwards (June 1812), 
which thoroughly proved the soundness of the principles 
he had laid down for the management and use of cavalry 
at the time of the affair at Campo Mayor, and the dis- 
regard of which had led to the present disaster : — 

"I have never been more annoyed than by 's 

affair, and I entirely concur with you in the necessity of in- 
quiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our 
officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything, and 
then galloping back as fast as they gallop on. They never con- 
sider their situation, never think of manoeuvring before an 
enemy, so little that one would think they cannot manoeuvre 
except on Wimbledon Common ; and when they use the arm as 
it ought to be used, they never keep nor provide a reserve. 

"The two regiments were the best in the cavalry in this 
country, and it annoys me particularly that the misfortune has 
happened to them. I do not wonder at the French boasting of 
it ; it is the greatest blow they have struck." (ix. 240.) 

Another letter, a few weeks later, touches on the 
same subject, not referring to cavalry only : — 

tf The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe 
loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by officers lead- 
ing the troops beyond the point to which they are ordered, and 
beyond all bounds [mentioning the instances], have induced me 
to determine to bring before a court-martial any officer who 
shall in future be guilty of this conduct. 

" I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and 
soldiers to advance upon the enemy ; but it is my duty to regulate 
this spirit, and not to allow them to follow up trifling advan- 
tages, in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the 
enemy whom they had before beaten. The desire to be forward 
in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army ; 
but the quality I wish to see the officers possess is, a cool judg- 
ment in action, which will enable them to decide with prompti- 
tude how far they can and ought to go ; and to act with such 



SUBORDINATION. 185 

decision that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence, 
and obey them with alacrity. 

" I trust that this letter will have the effect of inducing the 
officers to reflect seriously upon the duties they have to perform 
before the enemy, and avoid the error which is the subject of it." 
(vii. 545.) 

The provocations to himself and his army to take the 
law into their own hands were abundant, and nothing 
but the most decided conduct of the commander could 
have prevented fearful reprisals. The people of the 
country were ready enough to cry out, but very little 
disposed to assist in detecting or punishing the offenders ; 
and the difficulty of maintaining due discipline was in- 
creased to the greatest degree, in spite of all his efforts. 

" I have received reports as to the misconduct of certain 
officers at Espinhal, on the 11th of May. I have ordered Capt. 

into arrest, in hopes that the Government [Portuguese, as 

he would be tried by civil law,] will adopt measures to enforce 
the attendance of evidence. 

" I observe that, as usual, there is great readiness to com- 
plain, but no desire to prosecute ; and though Capt. will 

be brought to trial for having taken upon himself to do himself 
justice, I am not astonished when a British officer is guilty of 
this conduct. 

" They scarcely ever enter a village in which they or their 
people are not robbed, and they can get no redress on the spot ; 
and I repeat, that since I have been in Portugal I have not 
known any man punished except for being a French partisan. 

"But whatever may be the conduct of the Portuguese, I 
shall not allow the British army to commit irregularities with 

impunity ; and Captain shall certainly be tried, if within a 

month evidence is produced against him." (viii. 98.) 

We do not know who the following delinquent 
was: — 

" In regard to , surely no man can complain that 

the want of 'daily state reports ' for so many days was not a 



186 SUBORDINATION. 

ground of complaint. I ordered the person responsible to the 
Adjutant-general to be put in arrest ; and upon being informed 

that 's superiors were in fault (for fault there was), 

I said, Let them be put in arrest. I do not think there is any- 
thing unreasonable or harsh in this : and with every good dis- 
position towards , he must not expect that I shall 

recall anything I have ever authorised to be written respecting 
anybody on any omission of duty. 3 ' (viii. 127.) 

Some months before this time (Sept. 1811) he had 
written home respecting certain officers, who had then 
been proposed to be sent out (vide p. 92). He now 
says : — 

" When I wrote in February in regard to Clinton, things 
were in a very different state, and opinions very different. 

"I object to the mode which our officers have of adopting 
an opinion before they entirely understand the subject; and 
then acting as if it were necessary that he should produce an 
alteration of measures in an army as he would in the House of 
Commons. Every man has a right to form his own opinion, and 
to retain it : but I expect, what I do not always find, that when 
he comes to the army he shall act according to my opinion, I 
being alone responsible. However, matters are so altered, that 
not only I have no objection, but I shall be glad to have the 
assistance of General Henry Clinton. 

" Former subjects of difference are gone by, and are not worth 
considering ; neither would ever think of them under existing 
circumstances." (viii. 264.) 

A complaint had been made against General Camp- 
bell by of the Regiment, who felt that 

he had spoken in violent and abusive terms to him, and 
who demanded a court-martial. In that division of our 
subject which treats of courts-martial we shall find Lord 
Wellington's reasons for not granting one at that time. 
But though the language in that officer's letters had 
been highly improper, Lord Wellington's sense of justice 



SUBORDINATION. 187 

made him feel that the General was not free from blame, 
and he wrote to the General himself. It is impossible to 
conceive a more manly, dignified suggestion to a superior 
officer, of the mode in which duty (occasionally most 
harassing and painful) should be carried on, than the 
following : — 

" Harsh and ungentlemanlike language by a superior, does 
afford ground of complaint to an inferior officer. But the com- 
plaint ought to be made at the moment. 

" It would, undoubtedly, be better if language of this de- 
scription were never used ; and if officers placed as you were 
could correct errors and neglects, in language which should not 
hurt the feelings of the person addressed, and without vehe- 
mence. 

" But, unfortunately, there are some of us who cannot avoid 
to feel warmly for the success of the operation of which we have 
the charge, and to express ourselves with vehemence, and in 
language not perfectly correct ; and though I consider every 
officer responsible for language of this description, the complaint 
ought to be made immediately, in order that the circumstances 
may come fairly before those whose duty it may be to inquire 
into the subject. 

" Conceiving, therefore, that Lieutenant-colonel *s feel- 
ings could not have been hurt by the language now complained 
of, or that he could not have allowed four months to elapse, 
and that it is now only made to aggravate complaints upon 
other subjects, which afford him no ground for complaint, I do 
not think it proper to make his complaint upon this head the 
subject of further inquiry." (viii. 292.) 

An officer of the rank of Major-general had been 
furnished with detailed instructions, which he had disre- 
garded. Lord Wellington gives his proofs of the dis- 
obedience of his orders, and of the inconvenience result- 
ing from it ; and concludes with what may be regarded 
as a most quiet, yet impressive reprimand : — 

" Till I received your letter I did not conceive it possible 



188 SUBORDINATION. 

that you would so far have disregarded your instructions, other- 
wise I should certainly have prevented it. 

" I am willing to believe that the omission to obey my in- 
structions was not intentional, and that it is to be attributed to 
that description of inattention which is too much the practice of 
the service. If the instructions of the 5th March had been 
read with attention, and pains had been taken to understand 
them, and a plan had been taken for the mode of executing 
them, in case of the occurrence of the case for which they were 
provided, it is impossible that the mistakes of which I complain 
could have occurred." (ix. 72.) 

We have nothing to guide us as to the regiment 
alluded to in the following observations : — 

" There exists a committee in the th Regiment, which, I 

suppose, is the committee for mess, &c. ; but you will see that 
it extends its attention to other matters, with which it ought 
to have no concern, and which is improper and injurious to 
discipline. 

"Nothing upholds discipline and good order to a greater 
degree than the sentiments and spirit of the officers. No man 
dares to neglect his duty, or to conduct himself in a manner un- 
becoming an officer and a gentleman, if he knows that his con- 
duct will be noticed with disapprobation by his brother officers. 
But such a spirit among the officers is very different from what 
appears as the proceedings of the committee in the th. 

" In the former case every officer judges and acts for him- 
self, and discourages misconduct or neglect of duty by his de- 
meanour towards those guilty of either. He does not bend his 
opinion even to a whole mess, which, I am sorry to say, some- 
times acts in the spirit of combination ; much less does he 
shape his conduct according to the opinion of a committee of 
that mess. 

"The existence of such a committee, taking upon them- 
selves to advert to circumstances such as the th have con- 
sidered, must be prejudicial to subordination ; and that even 
the officers themselves cannot with propriety act as this com- 
mittee has. 



SUBORDINATION. 189 

" I beg you to call before you the officers, and point out to 
them the danger and impropriety of such conduct ; and inform 
the commanding officer that / shall consider him responsible" 
(x. 179.) 

Much discontent had been excited in the cavalry 
regiments by the orders to draft their horses, and some 
of the officers seem to have remonstrated in a tone which 
displeased Lord Wellington. 

We have seen in a former chapter how much op- 
posed he was to the measure, and how strenuously he 
endeavoured to avoid carrying it into execution. But 
his efforts were unavailing. It was ordered! he must 
obey ! and those under him must obey ! 

He writes as follows to General Alt en : — 

" I have received the orders of the Commander-in-chief to 

draft the horses from the ; and whatever may be the 

feelings or opinion of the regiment, I shall certainly obey the 
orders if it should be necessary. 

" I did not require the opinion of to be aware of 

the merits of the 2d Hussars, which I, probably, should have 
taken a proper opportunity of expressing, if it had not appeared 
by your letter that the probability of drafting the horses had 
occasioned dissatisfaction, inconsistent with military subordina- 
tion ; and which had induced you to ' advise ' the regiment to 
bear their fate f quietly, and as good, disciplined, brave soldiers 
ought, and to behave on their march everywhere as such :' and 
to tell me that c you trust they will do so/ 

" I had believed that the would certainly behave 

so on all occasions : and if there were any doubt, that something 
more than advice would have been given to ensure it. 

" I have now to inform you that, if I find it necessary to 

draft the horses I shall order to march with the 

regiment as their colonel, and to remain with them till they 
are embarked, in order that I may be certain that they ( behave 
as good, disciplined soldiers ought ;' and that, contrary to my 
usual practice, I shall refrain from paying in general orders the 



190 SUBORDINATION. 

compliment their services may deserve till they shall have quitted 
the country/' (x. 257.) 

The officer who had remonstrated did not gain much 
by high-sounding words. 

The recommendation of individuals to serve in dif- 
ferent capacities, through the medium of private friends, 
was a source of embarrassment, and his power of writing 
civil letters must sometimes have been severely tried. 
His brother, Sir Henry Wellesley, had recommended a 
gentleman, who, we may suppose, had been hitherto 
employed, or who had employed himself, in collecting 
intelligence : — 

" Although I do not very much approve of General , I 

shall have no objection to employ him, provided he will join, 
take the command of, and stay with the troops to which he is 
appointed, and confine his attention solely to them, 

" His letter from , of the 22d April, is a counterpart of 

all those I have ever seen from him. I possess many, which 
would convey equally good information; and the letters are not 
confined to you, who may have sent him to acquire information, 
but they fly about the army and England, addressed to persons 
of all descriptions. I possess accurate information on every 
point on which he has written, and can supply you with it if 
you like. 

" If he will discontinue his attention to universals, and con- 
fine them to his particular duty, I will employ him as a general, 
otherwise not : but I will not allow him to remain as an idler 
and amateur with any army, in order to give him an opportu- 
nity of circulating the description of intelligence which he picks 
up." (x. 366.) 

Whether he ever was employed we know not ; but 
it is evident that Lord Wellington's horror of gossip was 
as strong as ever. 

The occasional absence upon leave, and subsequent 
return of officers, occasioned many temporary appoint- 



SUBORDINATION. 191 

ments, the holders of which were afterwards reduced to 
their former positions. The nature of these temporary 
promotions, on most of the occasions, must have been 
obvious; and under the presumption (which from his 
general character we must entertain) that Lord Wel- 
lington was not guilty of injustice to the officer so 
circumstanced, we should believe that none but a very 
sensitive (not to say huffy) man could have taken offence. 
Unfortunately we find many such, and the following 
letter shows that he was not free from them : — 

" I cannot understand the nature of the feelings of an officer 
which are to be mortified by his performance of his duty in the 
situation in which His Majesty and the rules of the service 
have placed him. I can only say, that in the course of my 
military life I have gone from the command of a brigade to that 
of my regiment, and from the command of an army to that 
of a brigade or division, as I was ordered, without feeling mor- 
tification. 

" As, however, you feel mortified upon reassuming the com- 
mand of your regiment from the command of a brigade (of which 
your regiment forms a part), you will see the propriety of my 
determination not to remove officers from their regiments to the 
temporary command of brigades of which their regiments do not 
form a part ; as it is probable that your feelings would have 
been mortified in a greater degree if you had now been obliged 
to return to your regiment from a brigade of the line." (x. 369.) 

After the battle of Vittoria he writes home : — 

" Any reinforcements may come to Santander, though I am 
very apprehensive of marching our vagabond soldiers through 
the province of Biscay, in the state of discipline they and their 
officers generally come out to us. The people will shoot them 
as they would the French, if they should misbehave. 

" We started with the army in the highest order, and up 
to the day of the battle nothing could be better ; but that event 
annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers have got 
about a million sterling in money. The night of the battle 



192 SUBORDINATION. 

was passed in looking for plunder : the consequence was, they 
w r ere totally knocked up, and incapable of pursuing the enemy. 
The rain came on and increased their fatigue, and we have 
now, out of the ranks, double the amount of loss in the battle : 
we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy. 

" This is the consequence of the discipline of the British 
army. We may gain great victories, but we shall do no good 
till we alter our system, so far as to force all ranks to do their 

duty. The — th are a disgrace to the name of 

soldier, in action as well as elsewhere; and I propose to draft 
their horses from them, and send the men to England, if I 
cannot get the better of them in any other manner/'' (x. 473.) 

" It is an unrivalled army for fighting, if the soldiers can 
only be kept in their ranks during the battle: but it wants 
some of the qualities indispensable to enable a general to bring 
them into the field in the order fit to meet an enemy, or to take 
advantage from a victory : the cause of their defects is want of 
habits of obedience and attention to orders by the inferior office?^, 
and indeed by all. They never attend to an order, with an inten- 
tion to obey it, and therefore never understand it or obey it 
when obedience becomes troublesome or difficult. 

" I cannot recommend for promotion, because I 

have had him in arrest since the battle for disobeying an order 
given to him by me verbally. I put him in arrest, and had 
determined to make an example of him ; but I have since 
released him. But I cannot recommend him for promo- 
tion. 

" Our soldiers are terrible fellows for everything but fighting 
with their regiments. What do you think of seventy or eighty 
of them having wandered during the late operations, and having 
surrendered themselves to some of the French peasantry, whom 
they would at other times have eaten up V (x. 624.) 

He always acknowledges their readiness to fight : 
and we have seen in some of the preceding pages that 
the object he had most at heart was to make his officers 
exercise proper judgment in restraining their men, when 
common sense and ordinary prudence ought to* show 



SUBORDINATION. 193 

them that there was no necessity to incur loss of life. 
Here is another case in point : — 

" I shall be obliged to you to tell that I am con- 
cerned again to be obliged to disapprove of his conduct. He 
has just lost 150 men for nothing, and in disobedience of your 
orders. If the enemy were ten times worse, and more dis- 
heartened than they are, the conduct of in getting 

his brigade into unnecessary scrapes would make them soldiers 
again. 

" It is unworthy of one of his reputation to get his brigade 
into scrapes for the sake of the gloriole of driving in a few 
piquets, knowing as he must do that it is not intended he should 
engage in a serious affair. 

" I hope he will reflect upon what has passed, and observe 
that the best he can do is to obey orders, and execute strictly 
the designs of his commander." (xi. 181.) 



Promotion of officers, within their own regiments, is 
of course the regular process, and naturally looked to by 
the members of it. 

One of the cavalry regiments had grossly miscon- 
ducted itself, in Lord Wellington's opinion, during and 
immediately after the battle of Vittoria, and he had 
stopped promotion in it. Three troops had been since 
given to officers from other regiments, and a fourth 
was now vacant, for which, apparently, interest was 
being made at home ; as Lord Wellington writes to 
Colonel Torrens, to tell him that the regiment was 
still in very bad condition, adding, — 

" I will not recommend any officer belonging to it for any 
promotion whatever. From what I have seen of them, my 
opinion is that they cannot be called a regiment at all : there 
is no established system of discipline or subordination among 

o 



194 SUBORDINATION. 

them, and the gentleman at their head is quite incapable of 
commanding them. 

" The question is, whether to refrain from promoting the 
officers of a bad regiment is the way to improve it ? If it is, 
they ought not to be promoted, and I will not recommend them 
till the regiment is improved, whatever may be the extent to 
which private interests may be effected. If it is not, the sooner the 
officers of the are promoted the better ! " (xi. 189.) 

The following remarks probably refer to the same 
regiment : and though in a work of this nature the pro- 
motion of any given officers is of very minor importance, 
it is adduced here as a proof of his readiness to take a 
lenient and favourable view if he could :— 

" Captain of the was killed in an awkward affair 

which a squadron of that regiment got into : and there are now 
two troops vacant. Although they are still in my opinion the 
worst, the worst commanded, and the worst officered regiment 
that I have ever met with, and we are obliged to get the 
general officer of the brigade to look after them as the com- 
manding officer of the regiment, yet, as Sir Stapleton thinks 
they are in some degree improved, I have recommended the 
oldest lieutenant for one of the vacant troops, and Lieutenant 
for the other." (xi. 415.) 

He had at length got the Spanish troops into some 
sort of discipline. When they got to the borders of 
France he says : — 

" The Spaniards plundered a good deal, and did a good 
deal of mischief in the first two days : but even this misfortune 
has been of service to us. Some were executed and many 
punished ; and I sent all the Spanish troops back into Spain 
to be cantoned, which has convinced the French of our desire 
not to injure individuals. The inhabitants have in general 
returned — many at the risk of their lives, having been fired at 
by the French sentries, and are living very quietly and comfort- 
ably with our soldiers cantoned in their houses." (xi. 304.) 



SUBORDINATION. 195 

They still gave him much trouble wherever they did 
remain. It was, perhaps, not unnatural; probably they 
were not very carefully treated as to food, &c. by their 
own authorities ; and it must be borne in mind that the 
spirit of retaliation had an effect upon a Spaniard which 
did not influence an Englishman. Lord Wellington 
writes to General Morillo, and was apparently a good 
deal excited ; it is in warmer terms than usual : — 

" Before I gave the orders of which you and your officers 
have made such complaiuts, I warned you repeatedly of the mis- 
conduct of your troops, which I told you I would not 'permit. I 
give you notice, that whatever may be the consequences, I will 
repeat those orders if your troops are not made to conduct them- 
selves as well-disciplined soldiers ought. 

" I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army into 
France, in order that the soldiers might plunder and ill-treat 
the French peasantry ; and I beg that you and your officers will 
understand, that I prefer to have a small army that will obey 
to a large one that is disobedient and undisciplined : and if the 
measures which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and 
good order, occasion the loss of men and the reduction of my 
force, it is totally indifferent to me; and the fault rests with 
those who suffer their soldiers to commit disorders. 

" I cannot be satisfied with professions of obedience. My 
orders must be really obeyed, and strictly carried into execution ; 
and if I cannot obtain obedience in one way, I will in another, or 
I will not command the troops which disobey." (xi. 390.) 

Don Manuel Freyre, under whom General Morillo 
was, wrote to Lord Wellington upon this subject, and 
probably in a tone of remonstrance. Lord Wellington 
replies : — 

" Finding that all my remonstrances to General Morillo and 
his officers were vain, that the disorders still continued, and 
that I received warnings from various quarters of the danger to 
the General and others from the vengeance of the peasantry, I 



196 SUBORDINATION. 

directed that his troops should be kept under arms during the 
day, till further orders. 

" Notwithstanding General MorihVs doubts that I have the 
right to give such orders, I believe he will find that every officer 
in command not only has the right, but that it is his duty. 

" His letter appears to be a complaint of me, which he cer- 
tainly has a right to make, and it is my duty to transmit it to 
the Government." (xi. 400.) 

Every reader of this proceeding, we believe, will con- 
sider Lord Wellington to be perfectly justified ; and that 
General Morillo's remonstrance was merely a specimen 
of Spanish pride and temper, which Lord Wellington 
would have been fully authorised to treat as such. But 
no : as usual, he views it in the most tranquil and 
placable manner, and proves again, as in so many former 
cases, how leniently he could view matters ; and with a 
consideration, of which the General hardly seems worthy, 
he merely says : — 

" As the letter shows that it was written in a moment of 
irritation, and contains some matters not very relevant to the 
subject, I detain it, till I shall hear from you, that it shall be 
forwarded as it is, or altered and confined to the simple com- 
plaint of my order." 

The General, however, was not satisfied, and General 
Freyre wrote again ; to whom Lord Wellington replied : — 

" It would be very satisfactory to me to allow this subject 
to drop ; but General Morillo's letter contains some assertions 
which I cannot allow to pass unobserved. 

" In regard to the particular expression in the order to which 
he refers, I have no hesitation in stating why I used it. I had 
repeatedly sent to General Morillo, to request he would keep 
his troops in order ; in answer to which he told General Hill, 
that it was impossible ; as his officers and soldiers received letters 
by every post from their friends, urging them to take advantage, 
and make their fortunes. There was no remedy for this, then, 



SUBORDINATION. 197 

but a strong one. I considered what General Morillo told 
General Hill, as an acknowledgment that neither he nor his 
officers could stop the evil, and i" acted accordingly. 

" I hope this letter will show the General that there is no 
foundation for his complaints, and that he will withdraw them, 
as made in a moment of irritation, to which every man is liable. 

"If he does not do so, I hope he is prepared to prove them. 
My regard for him and his troops must prevent me from allow- 
ing these charges to remain unrefuted ; and they must be proved, 
or formally withdrawn" (xi. 422.) 

We hear no more of the General's complaints ; and 
we close this head of our subject by showing that, to 
the last, Lord Wellington's opinions as to subordination 
did not depend upon the rank of the offender. 



CONDUCT AND FEELINGS RESPECTING 
COURTS-MARTIAL. 



There is no part of an officer's duty which is more dis- 
tressing than that of passing judgment upon the sentences 
of courts- martial. Even at home, with all the assistance 
of skilful and experienced professional men, and with 
abundant leisure to consider and re-consider a case, it is 
embarrassing enough ; and we can easily conceive how 
that must be increased by all the circumstances attending 
foreign service. 

The Duke has been reckoned hard and stern. We 
cannot read these Dispatches without feeling that he un- 
fortunately had cause enough to become so ; but the 
perusal of the many cases in which he may show it, 
prove that there never was a mind more thoroughly 
imbued with a sense of justice ! 

But though there may be many proofs of inflexible 
decision, there are many touching instances of his wish 
for lenity. We have no means of forming a judgment in 
many of the cases why he was influenced one way or 
the other ; the only wonder is, that amidst the numerous 
and overwhelming duties which pressed upon him, he 
should have had the time and the power of cool reflec- 
tion upon each case, to enable him to write and to record 
so much as he did. We trace clearly a wish to look at 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 199 

the favourable side ; and we find, certainly, in many of 
the cases, that he trusted to what a more petulant or 
intemperate man would have disregarded, viz. the sense, 
and honour, and good feeling of the delinquent. 

It has been urged against him, that having once 
formed and pronounced an opinion he was immovable, 
and that no circumstances which might subsequently 
transpire could effect a change. This, if true to the 
letter, would savour of injustice • but we must bear in 
mind the circumstances in which he was placed. He 
was not a rash or passionate man : his maxim was 
11 Audi alteram partem" or, at least, his practice in all the 
other events of life was " look at both sides of the ques- 
tion." In order, therefore, to be enabled to form his 
opinion, he was, we believe, very strict in requiring that 
every part of the case should be brought forward at once. 
He could have no personal knowledge of it, and his only 
means of forming a judgment was by duly balancing 
what was laid before him. When that decision was 
formed and pronounced, it is not to be wondered at that 
his other avocations should compel him to dismiss it 
from his mind, and that subsequent attempts to alter his 
judgment were steadfastly resisted. It might be harshly 
done in some cases, and the friends of the suffering par- 
ties would say unjustly. But however we may feel for 
them, we must have some consideration for the arduous, 
overpowering nature of his own position. 

We have evidence from the best authority, as to his 
feelings and conduct on these subjects, in the "Private 
Journal" of Mr. Larpent, who was appointed Judge-Advo- 
cate-General in 1812, and who joined the head-quarters 
in November, at the commencement of the retreat after 
the failure at Burgos. 

There does not appear to have been any permanent 



200 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

officer previously filling that post ; and he tells us that 
Lord Wellington said to him : — 

" If your friends knew what was going on here, they would 
think you had no sinecure. And how do you suppose I was 
plagued when I had to do it nearly all myself?" 

In spite of Lord Wellington's assiduity there were 
many cases still undecided, which were passed over to 
Mr. Larpent ; "some," as he says, "of near two years' 
standing/' 

His description of Lord Wellington may be received 
without reserve. He was personally a stranger to him, 
and acknowledges with much naivete that at first he 
approached him "like a boy going to school." This did 
not last : Lord Wellington's quickness and habits of 
business soon got over any such feelings. On the second 
opportunity of meeting, when Mr. Larpent had taken 
his papers upon the mere chance of seeing him, Lord 
Wellington said, — " ' Come up ;' and in ten minutes he 
looked over four sets of charges against officers, and they 
were all settled, with a few judicious alterations in which 
I entirely agreed." 

" I like him much in business affairs. He is very 
ready, decisive, and civil. He thinks and acts quite for 
himself : tvith me, if he thinks I am right ; but not other- 
wise. I have not, however, found what I was told I 
should, that he immediately determines against anything 
that is suggested to him. On the contrary, I think he 
is reasonable enough; only, often a little too hasty in 
ordering trials where an acquittal must be the conse- 
quence, when they could not be made out in evidence, 
which is the great difficulty." 

The coolness and the experience of the practised lawyer 
was here of value ; and we cannot but agree with him in 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 201 

thinking " it does harm, as I would have the law punish 
almost always when it is put in force." 

The first proofs which we find of his sentiments 
respecting courts -martial, and the conduct of officers 
who were implicated, are very early in his Indian career. 

Writing to Colonel Murray respecting some trans- 
actions which had led to them in his division, he says : — 

" These courts-martial are distressing at present. We must 
endeavour to stop these trifling disputes. 

" It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in 
your quarter. This must be put an end to : and there is only 
one mode. The commanding-officer must be of no side except- 
ing that of the public, to employ indiscriminately those who can 
best serve the public, be they who they may. 

" The subjects are generally referable to private quarrels 
in which the public have no concern. The character of officers 
is undoubtedly a public concern ; but in many instances it would 
be much more proper and creditable to both parties to settle it 
by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the army by 
courts-martial, for the gratification of any private pique." (i. 378.) 

The active service which followed, probably did not 
furnish officers with leisure to quarrel, and we find no 
more such observations. But towards the conclusion of 
his service in that country a case seems to have arisen 
which exemplified more than one of General Wellesley's 
characteristics : his sense of duty to the public in order- 
ing the court ; his sense of the inadequacy of the sen- 
tence pronounced, which his duty to the public compelled 
him to order to be revised ; a sense of justice to the 
offender himself, by allowing a mere form to invalidate 
that sentence ; but, finally, the determination that such a 
man should not be again at large to the injury of the 
service, by ordering him to be suspended till the pleasure 
of the Court of Directors could be obtained. 



202 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

" Capt. was put in arrest by my orders, and a court- 
martial was assembled. In the course of the proceedings it 
appears that the members and the Judge-Advocate were not 
sworn, which is fatal to the legality of the sentence. The Court 
acquitted him of some charges ; and for those charges of which 
they found him guilty they sentenced a very inadequate punish- 
ment, by no means likely to operate as an example. 

" The late Commander-in-chief referred the trial to me, and 
I ordered that it might be revised. 

" From various causes it has not been possible to assemble 
the Court till to-day, and the number of members at present 
alive is not sufficient. The sentence passed is obviously illegal, 
supposing it to be adequate to the crimes proved. There never 
was a more flagrant instance of breach of trust ; and if he should 
by any accident be suffered to escape with impunity, the worst 
impression will be made on the minds of the natives in general. 

" Under these circumstances, I beg leave to recommend that 
he may be suspended from the service till the pleasure of the 
Court of Directors is known." (ii. 582.) 



When lie commenced his glorious but trying career in 
European warfare, lie had a different class to deal with. 
The common soldiers of the British army were composed, 
for the most part, of the lowest classes, — indeed it might 
be said, the dregs of society ; men who, under the most 
favourable circumstances, would be difficult to control, 
but who, when half starved, were often driven nearly to 
desperation, in spite of all discipline. The Duke's letters 
upon the subject of our military law, showing its total 
inadequacy to meet the evils of such a state of crime and 
abomination as he is often forced to describe, are pain- 
ful pictures of what he had to undergo. 

" The state of discipline of the army is a subject of serious 
concern to me. It is impossible to describe the irregularities 
and outrages of the troops. They are never out of the sight of 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 203 

their officers that outrages are not committed. I am convinced 
that the law is not strong enough to maintain discipline upon 
service. It is most difficult to convict any prisoner, for the sol- 
diers have little regard to the oath; and the officers, who are 
sworn to try ( according to the evidence/ have too much regard 
to the strict letter of it. A court-martial is no longer a court of 
honour, where a soldier was certain of receiving punishment if he 
deserved it ; but is a court of law, whose decision is to be formed 
upon the evidence of those upon whose actions it is constituted 
as a restraint. 

" The law in this respect ought to be amended, and when 
the army is on service in a foreign country, any one, two, or 
three officers ought to have the power of trying criminals, and 
punishing them instanter" (iv. 404.) 

A complaint having been forwarded from the Com- 
mander-in-chief's office at home, of delay in respect to 
a court-martial, he says : — 

" In an army so large and so dispersed as it is in general, 
it is not at all times possible to collect the members of a court, 
and the witnesses who it is necessary should attend ; and when 
a court is assembled its proceedings must be suspended when 
the army, or that part of it, are in operation against the enemy. 
I am much concerned if any officer suffers from delay in bring- 
ing him to trial, or in bringing it to a conclusion. It can 
be no object to me to delay a trial; on the contrary: but I 
must take care that when it does take place it is one in earnest, 
and that the law is attended to. 

" If the mode of trial by court-martial is inconvenient in 
active service, the fault is the law, and, I hope, not in the mode 
in which it is carried into execution." (viii. 163.) 

No doubt he was very often obliged to sanction 
the execution of a sentence which he felt was well 
deserved ; but we find many instances in which (with an 
acumen that no professional lawyer could have exceeded) 
he detects a fallacy, and points out the true bearing of 
the case, which required further consideration or revision. 



204 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

We do not aver that his observations always went to a 
mitigation of the sentence; bnt there was a nicety, a 
delicacy, and a selection of the right point, in many of 
his comments, which are very striking from their 
justness. 

A soldier was tried for quitting his post, and after- 
wards selling a silver cup, which had been stolen from 
the church where he had been upon duty. 

He was found guilty of quitting his post; and of 
infamous conduct in having, and afterwards selling, the 
cup : but he was acquitted of quitting his post for the 
purpose of going in search of this plunder and stealing 
this cup. 

Lord Wellington returns the sentence to the Presi- 
dent for revision, saying, — 

" Unless the prisoner had evidence to the contrary, it seems 
the most natural, and almost necessary inference to be drawn 
by the Court, that he quitted his post [of which he was found 
guilty] for the purpose of stealing [of which he was acquitted]. 

" If the Court retains its opinion, I think he should be ac- 
quitted of all, but quitting the post : as the having the cup, and 
selling it without accounting for how he obtained it, is (though 
the strongest evidence of felony), in itself no offence at all, 
except as a receiver of stolen goods, with which he is not 
charged." (xi. 186.) 

No professional counsel whom the prisoner could 
have employed, could have dissected the case, and 
defeated the fallacies, with more skill and acuteness 
than is displayed here. We have no detail of the 
result. 

A Paymaster had absented himself from his regi- 
ment after the battle of Talavera. His defence was, that 
he had public money in his charge ; but that he remained 
with the sick and wounded on their retreat. He was 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 205 

found guilty of absenting himself, and sentenced to be 
"privately" reprimanded. 

Lord Wellington was dissatisfied with the sentence, 
and sent it back to the Court. He says to the 
President : — 

" The point is, did Mr. really remain with the hospital? 

did he ever make inquiries respecting the position of his regi- 
ment ? It will appear to the Court that the hospital was within 
two miles of his regiment. 

"This may induce the Court to alter their sentence; but, 
if it should not, I beg to suggest to them to omit the word 
'privately.' I have to observe that privacy is inconsistent with 
every just notion of punishment \" (v. 164.) 

Another case is recorded, in which he feels that the 
wording of the sentence required revision ; and points 
out to the Court the injurious effect to the service, 
arising from want of attention to that point; and he 
writes to the President : — 

" Lieutenant — of the — th Regiment was tried for 

'most unofficer-like and un gentleman -like conduct/ of which 
he was honourably acquitted. I request you to revise this sen- 
tence. The affray in which he was concerned arose in a dis- 
graceful place ; and though, by the activity he showed to quell 
it, he might merit the acquittal, I should not do my duty if I did 
not draw attention to the term ' honourably. 3 

" Honourable acquittal by court-martial should be considered 
by officers and soldiers as a subject of exultation ; but no man 
can exult in the termination of a transaction, a part of which has 
been disgraceful to him. 

" The honourable acquittal of Lieutenant in this sen- 
tence, which records that he was concerned in an affray origi- 
nating in a disgraceful place, will connect with such an act the 
honourable distinction which a court-martial has it in its power 
to bestow. 

"I therefore anxiously recommend the Court to omit the 
word 'honourably 3 in their sentence." (v. 217.) 



206 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

A similar case is afterwards recorded. 

A Regimental Surgeon had been tried by a court- 
martial for having confined a man in the guard-house 
upon a charge of having stolen a mare, and afterwards 
having agreed to liberate the man if he would pay 
sixty dollars ; of which he was honourably acquitted. 
Lord Wellington sends the sentence back for revision, 
and adds : — 

" Whatever may be the opinion as to the prisoner's guilt 
or innocence, I would suggest that it is not an honourable 
transaction to take money from a supposed thief, in order to 
compromise a prosecution for robbery; and there is nothing 

which entitles Surgeon to the distinction of an honourable 

acquittal. 

" Surgeon confined the man for justice, or for money. 

If for justice, he abandoned it, and made a compromise for 
60 dollars, which is not an honourable transaction. If for 
money, the charge is proved, and the Court should sentence 
accordingly. 

" It gives me concern to differ with the Court ; and I shall 

assure them that I have no knowledge of Surgeon ; that I 

brought him to trial as an act of duty ; and that, as far as he is 
concerned, I am indifferent as to the result. 

" I have a feeling, however, for the honour of the army, and 
for the character of the country for justice ; and I hope the 
Court will see the necessity of supporting the discipline and 
character of the army by marking their own disapprobation of 
the transaction." (vii. 70.) 

A Deputy-purveyor had been tried for neglect of 
duty, in not attending to certain sick and wounded men. 
The Court found him guilty, but passed a lenient sen- 
tence, stating that " no material injury had occurred to 
the service!' Lord Wellington desired them to revise 
their sentence, and comments upon the case : — 

" I recommend the Court to omit that remark; as it con- 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 207 

veys a notion that their sentence has been lenient, because the 
gentleman's conduct was excusable, as he had ordered an infe- 
rior officer to attend the wounded. This is a principle very erro- 
neous, and very detrimental to the service. Every officer is 
personally responsible for the execution of the orders which he 
receives from his superiors, and I am responsible for the whole. 
It is no excuse for me, or any other officer, to state that he 
ordered an inferior to carry it into execution. Instances may 
occur when an officer receiving an order may be under the 
necessity, or it may be his duty, to entrust it to another ; but in 
this case there was no such necessity. 

" If the Court agree with me, they will consider whether the 
punishment they have inflicted is adequate to the offence. A 

person in Mr. 's situation has but few duties to perform : 

but those, however trifling, are important to the service, and the 
well-being of the soldier. 

" It is the duty of a court-martial to prevent such neglect, 
and the chance of suffering to the soldiers, by the punishment 
they inflict ; and this Court will judge whether they have per- 
formed that duty by their sentence." (xi. 404.) 



We may reasonably (as, in fact, almost connected 
with the subject) here advert to his conduct towards 
officers whom he did not think fit to visit more severely, 
or to try by court-martial, but whose proceedings merited 
some animadversion; and because it proves what we have 
already noticed, his natural bearing towards leniency. 

It is true that these cases are not all confined or (in 
some cases) even connected with military offences, but 
we adduce them as they arise in the course of the Dis- 
patches, merely to prove that he could take a lenient view 
of a subject, and that he was not in every case the Iron 
Duke. 

In the very first movement that he made upon Oporto, 
in 1809, the Portuguese army was in a very raw and in- 



208 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

efficient state. British officers were attached to parts of 
it ; and the following letter is addressed to Brigadier 
Campbell : — 

" The Adjutant-general has communicated your letter, re- 
porting the conduct of Captain the Marquis of in absenting 

himself from his battalion without leave, when the troops 
were in pursuit of the enemy ; and that you had put him in 
arrest. 

" I am not disposed to carry matters to extremities with the 
Marquis ; and I beg that you will call him and the officers of the 
regiment before you, and point out the extreme impropriety of 
his conduct, and that it is incumbent upon the nobility and 
persons of fortune and station to set the example. 

" You will tell the Marquis, that I hope the lenity with which 
his fault has been treated upon this occasion will induce him to 
be more attentive to his duty ; and you will then release him 
from his arrest." (iv. 334.) 

Here is exactly a case in which temper, moderation, 
and a view to ulterior effect, were shown. We may be 
quite sure that the same lenity would not have been shown 
to any British officer who had so misconducted himself. 
Sir Arthur would have felt that the latter ought to know 
his duty, and would have no excuse ; but the present 
offender was probably a young man— certainly a young 
soldier ; and what would have been misplaced lenity in 
the one case, would act as encouraging forbearance in 
the other. 

In another case, a Mr. Downie (afterwards Sir John 
Downie, and who became a lieutenant-general in the 
service of Spain), who was at that time a commissary in 
the British service, was induced by a spirit of gallantry 
to exceed his duty. Sir Arthur writes thus to General 
Mackenzie, to whom Mr. Downie was attached : — 

"I beg that you will let Mr. Downie know that he is a 
commissary, and his business is to collect supplies ; and that I 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 209 

am much surprised and highly displeased with him for quitting 
his station to move forward to Alcantara, where a few shots were 
fired, to see what service he could render there ; as if he could 
render any so important as that upon which he was employed by 
me. I thought he had seen too much service to be so incon- 
siderate." (iv. 385.) 

Mr. Downie was apparently hurt at this reprimand, 
and Sir Arthur writes again to General Mackenzie : — 

" My objection to his conduct was founded upon his own 
report, written in pencil on the letter from Colonel Grant, 
upon the military principle that the only proper place for any 
military officer was that to which he was ordered. However, 
I am not irreconcileable upon this or any other subject : 
I am quite convinced that Mr. Downie did what he thought 
best for the service ; and that a gentleman who feels a censure 
so sorely, will take care not to incur the risk of receiving 
another." (iv. 435.) 

An allegation had been made against a particular 
regiment for misconduct during the battle of Vittoria. If 
it were well-founded, Lord Wellington felt that the officer 
who commanded it must be brought to trial. If the 
regiment, as a body, had been disgracefully repulsed, it 
would, of course, reflect upon the commanding officer, 
who must take his fate. If it was only a part of the 
regiment which had given way, as such things must be 
expected, it would not require further inquiry. Lord 
Wellington had himself seen the regiment shortly before 
the event spoken of, and with his characteristic leniency 
is the person to suggest the latter view of the case, and 
concludes his letter thus : — 

" Under these circumstances, and adverting to the desire in 
which we must all participate, that there should be no discussion 
on the conduct of any part of the army which gained such a 
victory, I would request you to consider whether your censure 
would not apply exclusively to the light infantry or other skir- 

P 



210 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

mishers in front of the regiment. If it would not, we must bring 
the major to a court-martial." (x. 530.) 

He was not only subjected to the labour of looking 
through, and passing final judgment upon, courts- 
martial which had already been held, but, as we see 
by the following letter, had to take cognizance of many 
such cases before they were brought to trial. He 
writes to Major Davy, commanding the 5th battalion, 
60th Regiment : — 

" I have received your letter relative to the charge exhibited 
by Lieutenant S against Captain A . 

" Captain A has entirely cleared himself; and I shall 

certainly not gratify the malicious spirit of Lieutenant S by 

submitting the conduct of Captain A to further inquiry. 

" I desire also that you will inform Lieutenant S that 

I will not order a court-martial for the trial of Lieutenant de 
E , the subject of that charge having been already inci- 
dentally before the general court-martial. 

" I desire you will put Lieutenant S in arrest, for un- 

military conduct in disturbing the harmony which ought to 
subsist amongst the officers of the regiment. 

"You will keep him in arrest with the regiment, as I 
know enough of the character and past conduct of that officer to 
be suspicious that his late conduct is to be attributed to a desire 
to leave his regiment during the time it may be actively 
employed." (v. 355.) 

In a letter to Lord Liverpool, 11th April, 1810, he 



" The army is becoming healthy : it would, indeed, be an 
excellent army if the soldiers did not plunder. 

" Several have lately been convicted and executed ; which I 
hope will have effect, as well upon officers as men. It will induce 
the former to take more pains to keep their men in order, and 
support the authority of the non-commissioned officers ; and I 
hope will convince the latter that I possess the power, and am 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 211 

determined to exert it, to punish those who are guilty. I am 
still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice 
operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything 
when plunder or wine is in their reach." (vi. 30.) 

The difficulty in compelling the magistrates and peo- 
ple of Portugal to obey the orders (or professed orders) 
of their Government, for the supply of articles required 
by the troops, had occasioned a wish, at Lisbon, to esta- 
blish military law. 

Lord Wellington, as we have already seen, was pain- 
fully aware of the bad effects resulting from the neglect 
of the law as it stood, on the part of the inhabitants ; 
more especially as weakening or destroying the efficiency 
of military law in his own army; and many readers 
might imagine that his turn of mind was one which 
would have made him hail such a proposition with avid- 
ity. Gn the contrary, we find the coolest, the most just, 
and most convincing arguments against it : — 

" What is military law ? As applied to any persons except- 
ing the army (for whose government there are particular provi- 
sions of law), it is neither more nor less than the will of the 
General. He punishes, with or without trial, by his own orders. 

" For what object is it to be established in Portugal, except 
with a view to restrain the people ? We have no such object. 
What we want is : 1 st, to make the magistrates do their duty. 
We may try them by court-martial for neglect, but what punish- 
ment could it inflict except dismissal from office ? and that the 
present Government can do. 2ndly, we want to make the people 
perform their duties, and supply the articles required by the law. 
The law which imposes those duties and requires those articles 
furnishes the means of its own execution, and imposes penalties for 
non-performance, and it is the duty of the inferior magistrate to 
impose that penalty. 

" If military law is to supersede every other authority, the 
troops must be the executive officers of the law ; and, probably, 
when the enemy may be in the country governed by this law, 



212 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

the troops must be employed in the civil government, instead of 
opposing the enemy. 

" Depend upon it, military law will only increase our diffi- 
culties." (vi. 43.) 



In pursuing the perusal of the Dispatches, which ex- 
tend over so long a time and embrace so many subjects, 
it is difficult to separate all the subjects referred to under 
precise and definite heads. The present section relates 
more especially to his conduct and feelings upon the 
subject of courts-martial; but that has an almost in- 
separable connexion with his conduct towards officers, of 
or to whom he might have been obliged to address himself 
upon subjects not deserving more severe treatment. We 
have already adduced one or two cases, and others may 
present themselves hereafter, though mixed with more 
important ones ; but in them all there is a quiet, gentle- 
manly, yet feeling severity, that makes them striking 
and remarkable. 

Colonel Peacocke was left as Commandant at Lisbon ; 
he had had some disagreement with Lieut. -colonel Walsh, 
who was also left there in command of detachments and 
convalescents. 

Lord Wellington feels that Colonel Peacocke has put 
himself in the wrong, and this is the tone of his repri- 
mand, if it may be so called : — 

" I consider that Lieut. -col. Walsh in his line has ren-. 
dered very essential service to the army ; and I am so little 
disposed to allow him to be removed from either of the offi- 
ces of which he has, till you took the command, done the duty 
in a satisfactory manner, that if these complaints should con- 
tinue I shall be under the necessity of making an entirely 
new arrangement at Lisbon, however disagreeable it may be to 
me." (v. 163.) 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 213 

The following is a private letter to Mr. Villiers, 
which, though not immediately referring to any military 
event or person, is worth notice from its friendly and 
playful mode of giving a reproof: — 

" I am concerned to be obliged to make any complaint of 
any protege of yours, but I must say that I think I have some 
cause to complain of Mr. . 

" He was appointed by me to the Commissariat in June, and 
on the 16th of July he writes a letter to the Lords of the Trea- 
sury, in which he gives them to understand neither more nor 
less than that the Commissary -general and all his officers, as 
well as myself, are either knaves or fools ; and that he can save 
thousands to the public by some new mode he has discovered of 
supplying the troops with bread ! 

" Now I must say, if Mr. has made any discovery it 

was his duty to apprize me of it ; and, at least, to try whether 
our failure to save the public these thousands upon thousands 
was to be attributed to knavery or folly, before he wrote to the 
Treasury upon the subject." (v. 376.) 

In a subsequent letter he says : — 

" As for Mr. , I only beg that he will not write letters 

to the Treasury on subjects which he does not understand." (v. 
380.) 

He appears in all his correspondence to have had a very 
high opinion of General R. Crawfurd, who commanded 
the Light Division, and had been the most in advance 
towards the enemy during the whole winter of 1809-10. 
In some letters a probable necessity for withdrawing 
some of those regiments was communicated, and by the 
tone of Lord Wellington's letter we may infer that it 
was unsatisfactory to the General : for Lord Wellington 
concludes one letter by saying : — 

" You may depend upon it, however, that whatever may be the 
arrangement which I shall make, I wish your brigade to be in 
the advanced guard." (vi. 34.) 



214 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

We do not, of course, hear what reply the General 
made ; but in all probability it was with some warmth, 
and apparently accompanied with a proposition of re- 
signing, as we may infer from the following : — 

" In answer to your letter of the 17th, I will only tell 
you that it has excited any feeling in my mind excepting anger. 
I have already told you that I shall regret exceedingly the ex- 
istence of a necessity to place in other hands the command of 
our advanced guard ; and I shall regret it particularly if it should 
deprive me of your assistance altogether. 

" I shall be able, in a day or two, to make arrangements 
that may enable me to leave you in the command of your divi- 
sion, which I am very anxious to do." (vi. 48.) 

We must acknowledge that a man in his position of 
a more hasty and intemperate nature, or one of a more 
sullen, and what in common parlance might be called a 
huffy temper, would not have been so placably disposed ; 
and we find many communications afterwards which 
never testify the slightest symptoms of any angry feeling. 

A most friendly letter follows very soon : — 

" Nothing can be more advantageous to me, or can give me 
more satisfaction, than to receive the assistance of your opinion 
upon any subject ; but you may depend upon it, there are few of 
the general arrangements which have not been maturely con- 
sidered by me. I request, therefore, that whenever you see 
reason to wish to make any alteration you will let me know 
it; but do not make the alteration without reference to me. 33 
(vi. 87.) 

Cases of this nature, occurring between himself and 
the senior or more responsible officers of his army, were, 
of course, the cause of much anxiety to him ; and we 
have abundant proofs of bis desire to avoid public ani- 
madversion, or to make the matter worse by public 
exposure. He had a natural repugnance to all courts of 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 215 

inquiry, or courts-martial, excepting in cases of absolute 
necessity ; and, when possible, he always endeavoured to 
avoid them. But it was not the rank of the officer that 
deterred him ; a junior ensign was as sure of a just view 
of his case as a general officer. In a letter to General 
Sherbrooke we find : — 

" Upon considering the charge against Ensign of the 

y and the second charge, founded solely upon his 

writing certain letters, I think them so frivolous that I shall be 
obliged to you to call before you General , and the com- 
manding officer of the regiment, and Ensign , and inform 

them that I consider the first charge as frivolous, and the second 

as groundless ; and, therefore, that I have ordered Ensign 

to be released from his arrest. At the same time I beg you to 

point out to Ensign that I will not allow him to disobey 

any order of his commanding officer, however trifling ; and that 
the next time he errs he shall certainly be brought to trial." 
(v. 154.) 

A frivolous charge, arising out of private quarrels 
and abusive letters between three British officers in the 
Portuguese army, had been laid before him : — 

" I do not think it proper to employ the time of the officers 
of the army in investigating the truth or falsehood of all the 
nonsense these contain. Nor do I think it expedient to expose 
to the Portuguese army, by such an investigation, the weakness 
and the futility of the disputes of those who, to be of any use 
to them, or to do credit to the British army, must command 
respect. 

" I am of opinion that you should recommmend to the Prince 
Regent to dismiss the gentleman who does not attend to the 
admonition to reconcile the differences; and you may depend 
upon it, that I will take care not to admit such a firebrand into 
the medical department of this army. 

" Although I do not deem it expedient to assemble a general 
court-martial for the investigation of these charges, I cannot 
pass them by without animadverting upon the spirit with which 



218 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

they have been formed, and how necessary it is that it should 
be crashed, if we do not wish to expose to the curiosity of the 
public in this country a scene of vindictive but childish slander, 
such as, perhaps, has never before come out before a general 
court-martial." (vii. 167.) 

These cases are, perhaps, trifling in themselves ; but 
they show how the time was occupied, and the mind was 
worn, of a man who had much more important duties 
to attend to. And when we see the sound practical 
common-sense and the honourable feeling with which he 
animadverts upon them, we cannot but testify our feeling 
of admiration and approbation. 

We have already adduced several instances of his 
reluctance to push matters to extremity, and to avert the 
necessity of trial, by urging the offender to adopt some 
course which would enable him to avoid it. Here is 
another case : — 

" I am very desirous to prevent these charges coming before 
a court-martial. 

" You imagine that you have reason to complain of an order 
issued by your commanding officer, and you have remonstrated. 
I put out of the question the justice or injustice of that order 
for the present, as bearing in no manner on the case. If 
you address your superior officer, you must avoid the use of 
offensive terms. You sent a letter containing the terms ( totally 
destitute of foundation ;' ' the reverse of what has been stated; 3 
'gross injustice to yourself. 3 I believe it will be admitted that 
such expressions would not be tolerated in private life, much less 
can the use of them be allowed from an officer to his superior, 
upon an order issued by that superior. These expressions are 
entirely unnecessary : your object was to show General Camp- 
bell that he was mistaken respecting the — th Regiment ; your 
comments were not necessary, and when conveyed in offensive 
terms, would appear as if added only for the purpose of 
offending. 

" The discussion cannot lead to any good, and if the Court 



RESPECTING C0URTS-M ARTIAL. 217 

view it in the light that I do, you will be in a situation in which 
I should be concerned to see an officer of your rank. I request 
you, therefore, to reconsider the subject; and nothing will give 
me more pleasure than to have succeeded in prevailing upon 
you to recall expressions which nothing should have provoked 
you to use." (viii. 199.) 

The majority of these cases were not likely to be 
attended with more severe punishment to the delin- 
quent than being obliged to quit the service, or degrada- 
tion of some sort. But we now meet with one in which 
the offence must have been more heavily visited ; and 
it is impossible not to be alive to the feeling manner 
in which Lord Wellington looks at it, with reference to 
the officer implicated, combined with the manly, honest 
way in which he looks upon its ill effects upon the army 
at large. 

An officer of the Brunswick troops had been accused 
of cowardice in the presence of the enemy. He had after- 
wards applied for leave of absence or to resign, which 
was refused: — 

" I have delayed to reply to your Highnesses letter till I 
had received information regarding Lieutenant . 

" I recollect to have refused him leave of absence after the 
siege of Badajoz, or to accept his resignation, because I was not 
aware of the circumstances : if I had been made acquainted with 
what had occurred, I should have thought it desirable that he 
should quit the service. 

" The instances of want of spirit amongst the officers are 
very rare, and the example of punishment for this crime is not 
required ; and this being the case, I should wish to avoid giving 
the soldiers a notion that an officer can behave otherwise than well 
in the presence of the enemy : and if there should be an unfor- 
tunate person who fails in this respect, I would prefer to 
allow him to retire to a private station rather than expose his 
weakness. 

" I beg your Highness to accept his resignation, and to 



218 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

allow him to return to Germany, as being in every respect unfit 
to serve His Majesty in your Highnesses regiment ; at the same 
time, that it is not expedient to expose his weakness by bringing 
him to trial before a general court-martial." (viii. 233.) 

These are proofs that his leading object in all such 
cases had reference to the effect upon the army at large; 
upon all the classes and ranks of it. The soldiers could 
not be kept in a state of discipline if their officers set 
them the example of insubordination. It was essential 
to the due subordination of an army, that the lower 
ranks of it should look up to those under whom they 
were placed. Respect for their character was of im- 
portance, as well as deference to their professional skill. 
If a case was made public by being brought before a 
court, every soldier in the army would be apprised that 
officers had been charged with offences of the same sort 
as themselves. Though it was not possible to avoid it 
on all occasions, his object was to maintain discipline, 
but without exposure. 

The court-martial held upon a soldier for desertion 
and for serving with the enemy had found him guilty, but 
recommended him to mercy. Lord Wellington writes to 
the President : — 

" There is not a shadow of a doubt that this soldier deserted ; 
and having deserted, served in the enemy's ranks. Indeed, if he 
had not so served, he could not have been taken in the battle at 
Salamanca. After being taken, he did everything in his power 
to conceal himself, and denied all knowledge of his comrade of 
the 66th, who happened to be in the hospital and recognised 
him. These facts, all proving his guilt, are perfectly known, 
at least, to the regiment to which he belongs ; and yet the 
Court having found him guilty, and passed sentence of death, 
have recommended that / should pardon him. 

" I wish the Court to reconsider their recommendation, and 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 219 

particularly to consider the task they throw upon me, whose 
duty it is to uphold the discipline and efficiency of the army. 
If they persist, I shall certainly attend to it j but I must say, 
that this case is the most clearly proved of any that has come 
before me, of premeditated desertion to the enemy, and of sub^ 
sequent service in his ranks ; and that it does become general 
courts-martial to take serious notice of a crime of this nature 
so proved, in an army in which, amongst other crimes, desertion 
is so prevalent." (x. 98.) 

In another case of an officer who had been found 
guilty, but recommended to mercy, he writes : — 

" I would beg the Court to observe, that it is never thought 
necessary to trouble a court with any but cases carrying an 
appearance of an extra ordinary degree of guilt ; and it is a 
waste of public time, and in itself very extraordinary, that a 
court having the guilt proved, and having convicted the prisoner 
by their sentence, and decreed a punishment, should then do 
worse than defeat all the objects of the trial by holding up an 
example of impunity, procured through the means of the very 
tribunal appointed to maintain the good order of the army. 

" I am quite convinced, that if I were to exercise my own 
judgment on their recommendations, or if courts-martial were to 
consider them (as they are) mistaken lenity, and were to be more 
sparing of them, the army would be in a better state. 

" The Court have found Lieut. guilty ' of behaving in 

a scandalous, infamous manner, unbecoming an officer and a 
gentleman/ In the whole catalogue of military crimes, it is 
hardly possible to find one more enormous or injurious to the 
service. 

" Supposing H.R.H. the Prince Regent should attend to 
their recommendation, do the Court believe that the officers of 
his regiment would associate with a man to whom such infamy 
attached ? Is there any regiment in the service of which the 
officers would not think it a disgrace to associate with him ? Is 
there an officer of the Court who would not consider himself 
disgraced, if he were seen in company with him ? 

" His R.H. will be called upon to pardon an officer for a 



220 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 

crime so infamous that neither the officers of the corps to which 
he belongs, nor of any other in the army, will associate with 
him. 

" I entreat the Court to feel that confidence in the justice 
and propriety of their sentence which it deserves, and to allow 
it to go without recommendation. If they still desire it, I shall 
send it to England, but without remark on my part; as I never 
will be instrumental in retaining in His Majesty's service as an 
officer, a person found guilty of scandalous and infamous con- 
duct, and of forcing him into the society of officers, by whom to 
associate with him will be deemed disgrace." (x. 315.) 

A corps had been formed to assist the Provost-mar- 
shal of the army in the repression of disorders, selected 
from all the cavalry regiments, and called the Staff Corps. 
The duties were, perhaps, severe (though there was some 
pecuniary advantage), and, as acting against men of the 
same class of life as themselves, perhaps somewhat 
odious ; but, as Lord Wellington observed, — 

" If the odium is accompanied with danger ; if a serjeant can 
be resisted with impunity when endeavouring to prevent a pri- 
vate from plundering; if such sergeant (as appears by this 
court-martial) is put in fear of his life, and is actually obliged to 
remonstrate with the private soldier to induce him not to shoot 
him ; what can be expected ? 

" There is no crime so fatal to the very existence of an army, 
and no crime which officers, sworn as members of a court, should 
feel so anxious to punish, as that of which this soldier has been 
guilty. 

" It is very unpleasant to me to resist the inclination of the 
Court to save the life of this man ; but if the impunity with 
which this offence will have been committed should occasion 
resistance to authority in other instances, the supposed mercy 
will turn out extreme cruelty, and occasion the loss of some 
valuable men. I recommend the Court to withdraw their 
recommendation, and to allow the law to take its course." 
(xi. 328.) 



RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 221 

The following case, with the particulars of which we 
are not acquainted, was, probably, of a heinous nature. 
The culprits were all foreigners, and not with his own 
army. It is the first instance which we have met with, 
during the long and severe trials to which his temper 
and patience had been exposed, where we find him 
offering no extenuating considerations, and taking so 
sweeping and severe a view of it : — 

" I have received the eight proceedings against certain sol- 
diers of Dillon's regiment, and confirmed them all. 

" I desire that and may be pardoned; that 

and and lance-corporal may be shot ; and that the 

remainder should draw lots for one more to be shot : according 
to the sentence of the Court. The other eleven are to have the 
choice of corporal punishment or to be executed, according to 
sentence : those who are punished to receive not more than 300 
lashes. 

" The punishment to take place in the most solemn manner, 
in presence of the troops, to be paraded for the purpose ; and 
care to be taken to impress upon them that their entrance into 
the service is voluntary, and that any attempt to desert will be 
followed by certain punishment." (xi. 340.) 

In making our selection out of the very numerous 
letters upon Courts-martial in the Dispatches, we have 
been influenced mainly by taking those which tended 
to show Lord Wellington's object or feeling in the par- 
ticular case, or his peculiar talent of detecting a fallacy, 
or showing the probable effect of a sentence, rather than 
with reference to their real importance, and without 
adhering to the exact period at which they occurred. 

We may, perhaps, be open to the charge of giving 
too many repetitions of cases illustrative of the same 
subject. It may be so : but we have been induced to 
do it, in order to prove that he acted upon principle, 



222 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS, ETC. 

and that his decision was not confined to a solitary 
instance. 

Many of them are comparatively trifling; hut they 
furnish, perhaps, for that very reason, a stronger proof 
of the labours and anxieties of his position. 

Serious, urgent, and highly criminal cases, might 
naturally call for his best attention : but when we see 
his valuable time taken up and his mind distracted from 
more important avocations by the consideration of many 
such as we have adduced, it is only wonderful that he 
could have got through them, and have recorded in such 
detail his feelings and opinions upon them. 



HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 



This put an end to his vexations and annoyance from 
the weak and paltry Portuguese, and from the wretched 
and contemptible Spanish Government. 

He entered the E-rench territory in December, and it 
is curious and interesting to observe the difference of his 
bearing and conduct. 

Erom a very early period after his second arrival at 
the head of the army at Lisbon, he had been subjected 
to all the paltry intrigues which we have already re- 
corded ; and, upon principle, had submitted to them with 
a forbearance that probably would have been shown by 
no other general so circumstanced. He felt that he was in 
the kingdom of Portugal as an ally, and as such, that he 
was subject to the laws and government of that country. 
He had writhed under the vexatious indignities to which 
the acting Government had subjected him ; and though 
he must have felt on many occasions that he could have 
enforced his own views, it would have been in violation 
of the high principles which always influenced him. 

He said, as we have already seen (p. 109), that his 
situation would have been preferable in an enemy s coun- 
try, as there we could take what we required ; but, even 
under the highest provocation, he would not permit his 
officers to proceed to extremities in the country of an 
allv. 



224 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 

Some measures of that nature had occurred near 
the frontier of Portugal, in May 1810, and we find his 
firm and strong determination to permit nothing of the 
sort. Writing to Colonel Cox, governor of Almeida, 
and afterwards, upon the same subject, to General Craw- 
furd, he says : — 

" Neither I, nor any other officer in the British service, has 
the power of confining and punishing a magistrate, whatever 
may be the nature of his crime ; and / certainly shall not permit 
such a practice. I beg to know the officer, or the civil magis- 
trate of Castello Bom, who received corporal punishment." 
(vi. 119.) 

" I wish to mention to you, that neither I nor any other 
officer of the British army have the power of confining or punish- 
ing magistrates or others in Portugal. All that can be done is 
to report them to me : and I shall order them to head-quarters, 
and thence to Lisbon to be punished by the Government " (vi. 
120.) 

There can be little doubt that he would have been 
heartily supported by his own army, who were half 
starved on many occasions by the infamous neglect of 
those whose country they were defending ; and there can 
be as little doubt that he would have been equally sup- 
ported by the Portuguese army, who were well aware 
that their only chance of ultimate success depended upon 
him. But, strong as these considerations were, and 
almost irresistible as the temptation must frequently 
have been to take the law into his own hands, he did 
resist, and went through to the last. 

The impediments from the Portuguese were rather 
passive, and indolent neglect of what was required ; but 
the vexations which he experienced from the Spanish Go- 
vernment were even worse : for, in addition to the same 
neglect as to provisions and means of transport, the in- 



HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 225 

tolerable vanity of the national character (at least of that 
class who had the power in their hands) made it almost 
impossible to deal with them. Their army was said to 
be numerically strong, but it was useless, because it 
was immovable, either from want of equipment or of dis- 
cipline ; and when at times it was in some measure more 
complete in arms and clothing by the assistance of Eng- 
land, the empty vapouring of the higher authorities, and 
the boasting bravado of those who called themselves sol- 
diers, invariably led to attempts against the enemy which 
inevitably failed. They were always clamorous with 
Lord Wellington to induce him to advance and to co- 
operate, though it was obvious to any military man that 
they were unequal to the task ; and when, on one or two 
occasions, he was induced to yield to their importunity, 
they invariably neglected every precaution which he had 
suggested, and deserted him at the important moment. 
In fact, from the moment he set foot in their country he 
never received cordial support, either from the civil or the 
military authorities. 

His entry upon the soil of France placed him, how- 
ever, upon a new footing. He was then in an enemy s 
country, and was justified in using the powers of a con- 
queror. But his efforts, even in that capacity, were most 
earnestly directed to prevent his army from committing 
depredations, and to obtain the supplies for them through 
the regular established authorities, instead of by force 
and violence. Every letter to officers commanding divi- 
sions or brigades of his army, whether British or foreign, 
were directed to this point ; and he published numerous 
proclamations, calling upon all public functionaries to 
continue at their posts, and upon the inhabitants gene- 
rally not to quit their habitations. He had acted upon 
the same principles in Spain and Portugal, and in each 

Q 



226 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 

country had found how useless his efforts were, and how 
feebly (if at all) he was seconded by the authorities. 
But there his high sense of duty would not permit him 
to fly in the face of the Constitutional Government ; and 
although he saw his soldiers in many cases almost dying 
of famine, he would not attempt to take power into his 
own hand, or permit his officers to do so. 

Here, however, in France, the case was different. 
He had the power, and with the firmness which was 
inherent in him he exercised it. 

He wished and endeavoured to confide everything 
(not inconsistent with military security) to the mayors 
and municipal officers of every district ; and all his letters 
and addresses to them are couched in a tone calculated 
to uphold their authority. 

But when they attempted to set him at defiance, and 
to give themselves airs, his conduct was very different 
from what it had been in Spain. He must have been 
equally conscious in each case of the injury resulting to 
the service from the presumption, the arrogance, or the 
insolence of the individual ; and it is impossible to 
believe that he could, have been insensible to the per- 
sonal disrespect to himself. But in the one case he was 
acting as the ally of the nation to which the offender 
belonged, and therefore appealed for redress to the Go- 
vernment of that nation ; in the other case he was, for the 
time, virtually the chief of the country which he had con- 
quered, and might make his own rules. 

Disturbances caused by the plunder and irregular 
conduct of some of the Spanish troops under Mm a, in 
Sir W. Beresford's division, had created a strong feeling 
of hostility amongst the peasantry, more particularly in 
the villages of Bidarry and Baygorry. The feeling and 
conduct of these peasants might have been quite natural, 



HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 227 

and in fact justifiable ; but it was essential to the safety 
of the army to put a stop to it. 

The Duke's language upon the occasion is the first 
instance which we meet with of a threat. On the 28th 
January he writes to Sir William Beresford, who had 
secured some of the offenders : — 

" I enclose a letter which shall go to you in print ; and I 
will be obliged to you to read, and have it explained, to the 
gentry you have with you, and send off one of them with an 
officer of the Staff Corps to give it to the people of Bidarry and 
Baygorry. You may also give the person you send to under- 
stand, that if I have further reason to complain of these or any 
other villages, I will act towards them as the French did towards 
the towns and villages in Spain and Portugal ; that is, I will 
totally destroy them, and hang up all the people belonging to 
them that I shall find. 

" Let the rest of the people of Bidarry be detained till we 
see what effect my letter produces." (xi. 483.) 

He here felt the necessity of showing the authority 
which he possessed to subdue turbulence ; but it is 
clear that the natural goodness of his disposition was 
predominant. Is it possible to suppose that an austere, 
violent, ill-tempered man, embittered perhaps by well- 
grounded causes of offence, writing to his officers, and 
threatening to burn houses and hang their inhabit- 
ants, would have commenced his letter by alluding to 
" those gentry whom you have with you ?" The kindly 
feeling of the man appears in every line, notwithstanding 
his authoritative denunciations, though we cannot under- 
take to say what he might have been compelled to do, 
if forced. 

He issued a proclamation respecting mayors and 
other civil officers throughout all the country which he 
md conquered. It was not unnatural that these injunc- 
tions should have been received with angry feelings, and 



228 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 

rather negligently complied with ; and we find that he 
was obliged to write to Sir W. Beresford, in whose can- 
tonments there had been some difficulty or disturbance. 

" I send you all the proclamations respecting mayors, civic 
guards, &c, and will send you more when I get them. 

" If your adjoints (assistants to the mayors) will not con- 
tinue in office, call together the respectable inhabitants, and tell 
them that a civil government is much more interesting to them 
than to me: that I will make them comply with my orders, 
whether they have a magistrate or not ; and that they had much 
better have the protection of a magistrate than be without one, 
and that I require them to name one." (xi. 541.) 

Here is certainly the exercise of authority and the 
dictation of power, but it is not arbitrary. It is tem- 
perate, it is cool : it is issued more for the benefit of the 
conquered than the conqueror ; and even in cases where 
he might have been justified in taking the law entirely 
into his own hands, by the military at his command, and 
exercising summary justice upon those who had given 
him cause of offence, he prefers doing it through the 
proper course. 

Some disturbances (the Dispatches do not say what, 
or whether connected with our troops) had occurred at a 
place called Hagetnau. Lord Wellington writes to the 
mayor : — 

" Vous aurez la bonte de faire arreter Dupay, ancien maire ; 
Saubigne, ex-adjoint ; et le nomme Mathieu, ex-employe des 
droits reunis ; et tout autre qui ont eu part dans F affaire des 
partisans a Hagetnau. Pour moi, je suis en cela l'exemple des 
generaux Francais, et je fais pendre tous ceux qui font le 
metier de partisans, et je ferai bruler leurs maisons. Je serais 
fache d'etre oblige de faire avaucer les troupes pour maintenir 
la police." (xi. 601.) 

It may seem rather ironical to request one mayor to 
have the goodness to arrest his predecessor ; but it shows 



HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 229 

the tone and temper which characterised all his pro- 
ceedings. 

It was not to be expected, however, that the national 
vanity, combined with the natural exasperation at the 
fact of their being now under the rod and domination of 
a foreign (and perhaps, of all others, a British) army, 
should be entirely subdued. And it was to be expected 
that many a vain jack-in-office would hardly conform 
without some swagger, though we have no reason to 
believe that this conduct was extensive or prolonged. 
The following proves, that when it did show itself it did 
not pass unnoticed. 

The Earl of Dalhousie had been left in charge of the 
troops near Bordeaux, which town had declared in favour 
of the Bourbons ; and our fleet were making arrange- 
ments for coming into the Garonne. Sir William 
Beresford had occasion to communicate with the fleet ; 
but the person who was sent with his letter was stopped 
by the mayor of a place called La Teste. Lord Welling- 
ton writes to Lord Dalhousie : — 

" When your lordship shall send in that direction you will 
take that mayor prisoner, and send him to my head-quarters. If 
mayors of villages are each to have a military force sent to them 
to receive their formal surrender, they must be considered as 
military men, and must be made prisoners of war. I shall con- 
sider them accordingly, and will send Monsieur le Maire de La 
Teste a prisoner of war to England when he falls into my 
hands." 

Here is the same firmness and determination, but 
accompanied by the same calmness and temper. The 
petulant vanity of this Frenchman had obstructed public 
business. It was necessary to check such presumption, 
but it was not of the urgent character to require moving 
a regiment. Lord Dalhousie is merely instructed, or 



230 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 

rather requested, " when he shall send in that direction' 
(as if he was going out hunting or coursing), to catch 
this mayor ! We have no further record of the fate of 
the mayor ; but the whole proceeding is strongly illus- 
trative of the calm, easy, playful (though not-to-be- 
trifled- with) temper of Lord Wellington. 

We have no further instance of it during the short 
remainder of that campaign ; but a knowledge of what 
was likely to be the consequence would probably check 
any exuberant display of importance. 

A very similar case arose the following year in 
another part of France, when the British army moved up 
to Paris after the battle of Waterloo. 

The Sous-prefet of Pontoise had thought proper to 
refuse compliance with a requisition made upon him, — a 
course which the Duke adopted in all cases of provisions 
or forage ; not with a view of paying for what was 
received, but to avoid abuse and plunder on the part of 
the troops. 

The Duke's letter appears to have been almost an 
excess of ironical politeness ; — 

" Monsieur, j'ai ordonne qu'on vous fasse prisonnier parce- 
que ayant envoye une requisition a Pontoise pour des vivres, 
vous avez repondue que vous ne les donneriez pas sans qu'on 
envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre. 
Vous vous etes done mis dans le cas des militaires, etje vous fais 
prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre. 

" Si je vous traitais comme Fusurpateur et ses adherens ont 
traite les habitans des pays ou ils on fait la guerre, je vous 
ferais fusilier : mais, comme vous vous etes constitue guerrier, 
je vous fais prisonnier de guerre." (xii. 556.) 

The choice of the word guerrier to this self-sufficient 
gentleman is inimitable, and we can really picture to 
ourselves the Duke's chuckle at sending this letter, and 



CONCLUSION. 231 

afterwards sending off Monsieur le Sous-prefet to Eng- 
land, — if he ever went ! 



We are not writing the Duke's memoirs or a history 
of his military deeds, and we have not thought it neces- 
sary to say anything respecting his transactions between 
the termination of hostilities at Toulouse and the final 
march to Paris after Waterloo. 

His last brilliant and triumphant campaign did not 
expose him to the same difficulties : his renown was 
acknowledged throughout the world, the allies with 
whom he was acting were cordial and zealous, his own 
countrymen were prepared to hail every act with ap- 
probation, and the characteristics which were so strongly 
displayed as he was rising to eminence, were not called 
for in the same degree when he had attained the summit. 

We have followed him, as far as our professed object 
is concerned, through the whole of his glorious and 
eventful life. We believe that we have adduced abun- 
dant evidence, from the most unquestionable sources, to 
prove what we set out with saying, — that there never 
existed a more noble, great, and glorious spirit ; and with 
that impression we leave his example for the admiration 
and imitation of his fellow-countrymen. 



London:— Printed by G. Barclay, Castle St. Leicester Sq. 






"^rm 



